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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Disappearing Acts: Performing the Petrarchan Mistress in Early Modern England 
 
Author: Katherine R. Kellett 
 
Advisors: Mary Thomas Crane and Caroline Bicks 
 
 
Disappearing Acts interrogates the concept of Petrarchism and the role of the 
Petrarchan mistress in early modern England. Critics from the early modern period 
onward have viewed Petrarchism as limiting to women, arguing that it obstructs female 
agency. This view stems from a long history of trying to establish the parameters of 
Petrarchism itself, a body of literature whose inchoate nature makes it difficult to define. 
Disappearing Acts takes as its starting point the instability of Petrarchism, embracing the 
ways in which it functions as a discourse without boundaries, whose outlines are further 
blurred by its engagement with other genres, forms, and contexts. Examining the 
intersections between Petrarchism and other early modern discourses—religious, 
political, theatrical, humanist, romantic—illuminates the varied ways in which the role of 
the mistress is deployed in early modern literature and suggests that, as a term, the 
“Petrarchan mistress” loses the coherence that critics often impose on it. Rarely ever 
entirely there or entirely missing, the figure of the mistress instead signifies an unstable, 
liminal role that results in far more complex representations of women. This project 
emphasizes the complexities of the Petrarchan mistress and examines this figure as a 
performative role that is negotiated rather than simply inhabited as a prison.
Each chapter traces the intersections between Petrarchism and another early 
modern discourse in England. Chapter One examines the overlap between Reformist 
language and Petrarchan language, particularly in the “absent presence” of the Eucharist 
and the female beloved. I argue that the elusive persona of the Protestant martyr Anne 
Askew is produced by the conjunction of Petrarchan and Reformist discourses. Chapter 
Two interrogates the relationship between the theory of the king’s two bodies and the 
concept of the Petrarchan female double, pairing Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene with 
the writings of Elizabeth I and Mary Queen of Scots. I suggest that female queens of the 
sixteenth century both secured and imperiled their authenticity by comparing themselves 
to a false version. Chapter Three examines the relationship between Petrarchism and the 
figure of the ghost in early modern England. I consider Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale 
in relation to the female complaint, a popular genre appended to sonnet sequences in 
which a ghost complains about her fate, and I argue that Shakespeare’s evocation of 
ghostliness enables Hermione to return from her immobilized position to perform a 
Pertrarchan role in which she can speak her own desires. Chapter Four reexamines Mary 
Wroth’s character, Pamphilia, as two different characters produced by two different 
genres: one by the prose romance The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania and one by the 
sonnet sequence Pamphilia to Amphilanthus. While the Pamphilia of the sonnets 
proclaims her constancy, the Pamphilia of the romance exposes the tensions produced by 
the varied historical uses of the term in discourses from martyrology to stoicism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
To literary scholars, Petrarchism is a term that gives the impression of coherence. 
Usually defined as a body of writing that imitates Petrarch’s works, Petrarchan literature 
has been seen as a shaping force in early modern culture. Despite its pervasive use in 
criticism, however, the stability of the term “Petrarchism” is illusory, and there is no 
agreement in the field about what Petrarchism actually is. Some define it as a set of 
tropes—oxymorons, antitheses, common metaphors—while others define it by its subject 
matter—desire, gender relations, praise—while still others define it primarily as a form—
the sonnet—that spurred imitations in the many sonnet sequences that followed Petrarch. 
The history of the criticism on Petrarchism traces a long struggle over how to define the 
term, and critics from the early modern period through today have tended to cope with 
the diffuseness of the term by evaluating Petrarchan works, demarcating the “good” 
imitators from the “bad” and “real” Petrarchism from “false.” Critics thus substitute a 
value judgment for a clear definition, betraying their need to establish parameters around 
a field of literature difficult to define. 
This project takes as its starting point the instability of Petrarchism. Although 
Petrarchism has recognizable features, it has never been confined to one form (the lyric) 
or one thematic issue, nor can it be defined as one set of tropes. Instead, Petrarchism 
functions as a discourse without boundaries, and its outlines are further blurred by its 
engagement with other genres, forms, and contexts. Petrarchan conventions help 
constitute a range of discourses in the early modern period—religious, political, 
  
2 
 
 
theatrical, humanist, romantic. Far from a monolithic concept, Petrarchism is a flexible 
set of characteristics that take on different connotations in the different settings in which 
they are deployed. Rather than engaging in an attempt to set definitive boundaries around 
Petrarchism, this study takes pleasure in seeking the ways in which Petrarchism changes 
and is changed by other discourses.  
Embracing the amorphous qualities of Petrarchism has particularly significant 
implications for our understanding of how Petrarchism represents women. The concept of 
the Petrarchan mistress stems largely from critical attempts to fix the boundaries of 
Petrarchism and to codify its principal features and characters. Critics of Petrarchism 
from the early modern period onward have defined the term by disparaging the role of the 
Petrarchan mistress as constrictive and oppressive, arguing that it obstructs female 
agency. Just as Shakespeare protests that praise of the mistress creates a woman “belied 
with false compare,” so do modern feminist critics deem the mistress objectified in the 
obsessive catalogues of her body parts.
1
  The Petrarchan mistress is often seen as entirely 
there—simplified in her fragmented presence—or entirely missing—closed off from her 
own voice in her absence. Yet the varied ways in which the role of the mistress is 
deployed in early modern literature suggests that as a term, the “Petrarchan mistress” 
loses the coherence that critics often impose on it. Rarely ever all there or all missing, the 
figure of the mistress instead signifies a more unstable, liminal mode—an absent 
presence—that results in far more complex, contested representations of women. This 
project seeks to interrogate the complexities of the Petrarchan mistress and to examine 
                                                 
1
 William Shakespeare, sonnet 130, in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. J. M. 
Tobin, 2
nd
 ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997). 
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the Petrarchan mistress as a role that is negotiated rather than simply inhabited as a 
prison.  
What follows is a history of the term Petrarchism and its variants from the early 
modern period through today. I trace the ways in which the anxieties about defining—and 
placing boundaries around—the term lead to the construction of the Petrarchan mistress 
as an oversimplified figure. Finally, I suggest alternate ways to read Petrarchan discourse, 
looking at how embracing its instability can open up new possibilities for seeing the 
complexities with which Petrarchism represents female figures. 
 
Petrarchism: A History of the Term 
What is Petrarchism? On the surface, it is seems like a straightforward term 
referring the body of literature that imitates Petrarch and his writings, especially the Rime 
sparse. Its characteristics are easily recognizable by any scholar of the early modern 
period. Petrarchan literature favors the sonnet form, it makes frequent use of literary 
devices like the oxymoron, and it centers on two major characters, the masochistic male 
lover and the cruel female beloved. Yet on further inspection, the term reveals its own 
instability. Not all sonnets are Petrarchan, and not all Petrarchan works are sonnets; not 
all works that use literary devices like the oxymoron are necessarily Petrarchan; and not 
all Petrarchan works operate within the gender binary established in the Rime sparse. 
What at first announces itself as a discrete field of work with unique literary properties 
reveals itself as an inchoate discourse with no clear boundaries. 
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The history of the term “Petrarchism” tells the story of writers who grapple 
with—and often try to compensate for—this instability. One way writers have imposed 
coherence on the field is to separate good imitators of Petrarch from the bad. Ironically, 
the word “Petrarchist” in Italian, Spanish, and French was used in the sixteenth century to 
designate those who could not imitate Petrarch well, essentially grounding Petrarchism in 
its own impossibility. In 1558, for instance, Joachim du Bellay published the satirical 
poem, “Contre les Pétrarquistes” in his collection, Divers Jeux Rustiques. In the poem, du 
Bellay mocks Petrarchists for using stale clichés and for their insincerity:  
J’ay oublié l’art de pétrarquizer, 
Je veulx d’Amour franchement deviser, 
Sans vous flatter, et sans me déguizer:  
Ceulx qui font tant de plaintes,  
N’ont pas le quart d’une vraye amitié, 
Et n’ont pas tant de peine la moitié, 
Comme leurs yeux, pour vous faire pitié, 
Jettent de larmes feintes. 
 
[I've abandoned the Petrarchan art, 
I want honestly spoken love, 
Without flattering you, and without disguising myself: 
Those filled with complaints, 
Don't have a quarter of true fondness, 
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And lack by half true pain, 
As their eyes, to make you pity them, 
Offer false tears.]
2
 
Du Bellay characterizes Petrarchists as frauds, describing them as lacking “true fondness” 
or “true pain” and only exhibiting “false tears” and “disguises.” John Florio’s translation 
of Michel de Montaigne’s essays similarly disparages “fantasticall, new-fangled, 
Spagniolized, and Petrarchisticall elevations.”
3
 Petrarchism, then, has its roots in anti-
Petrarchism; far from a neutral term, it signifies the difficulty—perhaps the 
impossibility—of ever successfully imitating Petrarch.
4
  
In the nineteenth century, the term “Petrarchist” retained the connotation of cheap 
imitation. In 1896, W.P. Ker expresses the anxiety that an “ideal” in literature can be 
endlessly debased, and he uses Petrarchism as the prime example to illustrate his case: 
“An ideal, defined or described in set terms, is an ideal without any responsibility and 
without any privilege. It may be picked up and traded on by any fool or hypocrite. . . . A 
definite ideal, and the terms of its definition, may belong to any one and be turned to any 
use. So the ideal of Petrarch was formulated and abused by the Petrarchists.”
5
 
                                                 
2
 Joachim du Bellay, “Contre les Pétrarquistes,” in Divers Jeux Rustiques, ed. Verdun L Saulnier (Lille: 
Librairie Giard, 1947), 70-71. Many thanks to Matthew Heitzman, who generously translated this poem 
into English. 
3
 Michel de Montaigne, The Essayes, Or Morall, Politike, and Millitarie Discourses, trans. Iohn Florio 
(London: Val. Sims for Edward Blount, 1603), bk. 2, chap. 10, p. 238.  
4
 See Heather Dubrow, Echoes of Desire: English Petrarchism and Its Counterdiscourses (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1995); and Yvonne Hoggan, “Anti-Petrarchism in Joachim du Bellay’s ‘Divers 
Jeux Rustiques,’” The Modern Language Review 74, no. 4 (1979): 806-819. Hoggan notes du Bellay’s 
indebtedness to Cornelio Castaldi da Feltre’s poem, “Contro i Petrarchisti,” which attacks Petrarch’s 
“slavish imitators” (807). Hoggan argues that “whereas Italian anti-Petrarchists accused Petrarchan poets of 
being thieves, du Bellay accuses them of being liars” (808). 
5
 W.P. Ker, Epic and Romance: Essays on Medieval Literature (1896; reprint, London: Macmillan, 1908), 
202-203. 
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Petrarchism, in Ker’s formulation, is the abuse rather than the imitation of Petrarch. Ker 
imposes an artificial stability on a body of literature—“the ideal of Petrarch”—by valuing 
it against the inferior copies produced by “the Petrarchists.”  
The development of Petrarchism in English criticism, in fact, revolved around the 
concept of value. The term “Petrarchism” emerged in English at the same time as the 
discipline of “English” was developing in universities.
6
 As Terry Eagleton argues, the 
concept of English literature has always been ideological: “What was at stake in English 
studies was less English literature than English literature: our great ‘national poets’ 
Shakespeare and Milton, the sense of an ‘organic’ national tradition and identity to which 
new recruits could be admitted by the study of humane letters.”
7
 Petrarchism is a product 
of this emerging literary system, and the term was used to chart the development of 
English literature from its unrefined beginnings to its culmination in greatness. In 1902, 
Lewis Einstein writes, “The Petrarchan movement was slow at the start to take root in 
England; neither its language nor its ideas proved congenial at first. Its very conceits 
were misinterpreted in the beginning by the slow-witted English, who took its stock of 
lovers’ pangs and sufferings quite literally.”
8
  
Yet the “slow” start of the “slow-witted English” of the early sixteenth century 
grows, for critics like Einstein, into the flowering of the Petrarchism of the late sixteenth 
                                                 
6
 The Oxford English Dictionary Online (2010) lists many variants of the term, including “Petrarchal,” 
“Petrarchan,” “Petrarchanism,” Petrarchesque,” “Petrarchian,” “Petrarchist,” “Petrarchistical,” and 
“Petrarquize.” Although a few variants of the word occurred in the early modern period, such as Florio’s 
“Petrarchisticall” (OED Online, s.v. “Petrarchistical”), most variants first appeared in the nineteenth 
century, when Petrarchism began to be considered a category of literature and a field of study. 
7
 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 
28. 
8
 Lewis Einstein, The Italian Renaissance in England (New York: Columbia University Press, 1902), 329-
30. 
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and early seventeenth centuries. In his introduction to an 1895 anthology of Elizabethan 
lyrics, Felix Schelling writes disparagingly of “the classical mania” and the “superficial 
Italianism” of the early sixteenth century only to assert the poetic achievement of 
Petrarchan poets later in the English Renaissance:  
The cultivation of the sonnet had, on the other hand, a beneficial effect on 
the English Lyric, as it demanded a greater attention to the minutiae of 
form, a greater regard for unity, and, from the somewhat dignified tread of 
its decasyllables, a greater care in the molding of the thought of the lyric 
in distinction from the quality of mere song. In the hands of Sidney, 
Spenser, Daniel, and Shakespeare, the sonnet reached an artistic height 
which was not surpassed until the conception of the scope of its subject 
was widened, and the beauty of the stricter Petrarchan form was reasserted 
by Milton, to be practiced by Wordsworth and Dante Gabriel Rossetti.
9
  
With his use of capital letters, Schelling reifies “the English Lyric” and signals his 
nationalistic conception of the importance of Petrarchism in English history. Petrarchism 
becomes not a kind of imitation, not even a foreign influence anymore, but a signifier of 
Englishness. In Schelling’s assessment, Petrarchism transformed the lyric from “mere 
song” to “artistic height.” Unlike its earlier incarnations, “Petrarchan” comes to mean 
greatness rather than triteness, authenticity rather than a sham. 
Yet the authenticity of English Petrarchism remained uncertain because it was 
always in the shadow of the authentic original, Petrarch himself. Critics at the turn of the 
                                                 
9
 Felix E. Schelling, introduction to A Book of Elizabethan Lyrics (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1895), xi, 
xx-xxi. 
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century established boundaries around Petrarchism by essentializing Petrarch as the ideal 
who could be imitated but never reproduced. In 1906, Peter Borghesi writes, “The 
refinement of [Petrarch’s] ideas is often in striking contrast with that of his century, 
because really he anticipates the refinement of the Sixteenth. His poems are perfect in 
form and wonderfully smooth and harmonious: his style is extraordinarily polished and 
graceful: his thoughts excel in tenderness, delicacy, and charm.”
10
 For Borghesi, Petrarch 
is the über-poet, a man whose greatness can be pursued but never achieved: “Not one of 
[the Petrarchists] had the real genius to perceive the greatest beauties of Petrarch’s poetry 
therefore not one of them could have equalled him. Nevertheless Wyatt both translated 
and imitated him successfully, although his imagination is simpler and less profound than 
Petrarch’s and although Petrarch’s art is inimitable.”
11
 The contradictions in this 
statement suggest the degree to which Borghesi wrestles with the instability of 
Petrarchism as a term. Borghesi wants Petrarch to be an ideal that can be imitated, and he 
argues that Petrarch is a force that brings “refinement” to the sixteenth century and to 
poets like Wyatt who “both translated and imitated him successfully.” Yet he expresses 
anxiety that imitation will unravel the essence of Petrarch. His statement that “Petrarch’s 
art is inimitable” again makes Petrarchism an impossibility at the very moment that he 
asserts that Petrarchism exists.  
The critical assessments of English Petrarchan poets at the turn of the century 
reveal the concerns that Petrarch’s essence will be diluted if poets are too successful at 
                                                 
10
 Peter Borghesi, Petrarch and His Influence on English Literature (Bologna: Nicholas Zanichelli, 1906), 
30. 
11
 Borghesi, Petrarch and His Influence, 38. 
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mastering his features. For Einstein, Wyatt “could not compare with [Petrarch] in skill, 
and the conceits he attempted were clumsy and ill-fitting as a rule. Even the sonnet form 
he reproduced but feebly, the rhymes being often bad and the metrical effects by no 
means easy.”
12
 Borghesi calls Wyatt “very deficient” and “inferior,” arguing that “in his 
translations from Petrarch he found himself constantly at a loss: he began to translate 
some of Petrarch’s sonnets, but he ended them using ideas of his own. This fact also 
proves to us that Wyatt knew he was not able to render adequately his master’s 
creations.”
13
 Even poets who supposedly represent Petrarchan greatness in Renaissance 
England, like Sidney, fail to live up completely to the original. Einstein states, “Sidney’s 
poetry, however, in spite of the elements of imitation, differed from Petrarch’s; there was 
in it more life and vigor, and also less art.”
14
 In their moves to distinguish Petrarchists 
from Petrarch, these critics seek to retain the concept of a true, original, and impenetrable 
Petrarchan ideal. 
More recent scholars often betray the same anxieties about Petrarchan 
authenticity. Like his predecessors, Thomas Greene in The Light in Troy (1982) holds 
Petrarch as an authentic ideal—the essence of perfection—that can never be truly 
imitated. Apologizing for having “lingered so long over Petrarch,” Greene justifies his 
dalliance with the following encomium of Petrarch: 
Because he was a figure of immense significance, both as poet and as 
reader of history, for the civilization of the following centuries, the 
                                                 
12
 Einstein, The Italian Renaissance, 326. 
13
 Borghesi, Petrarch and His Influence, 57, 45. 
14
 Einstein, The Italian Renaissance, 337. 
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particular behavior of his poems as diachronic constructs is of greater 
moment than their number or even their undisputed intrinsic value would 
warrant. For Petrarch left as a legacy to the European Renaissance not 
only his books but the vision of history for which each imitative poem 
served as speculum. He left a legacy that was double-edged generally for a 
culture and privately for each humanist poet. The remainder of this study 
will be devoted primarily to individual poetic responses to Petrarch’s 
difficult legacy, which of course ceased to be purely Petrarchan once the 
humanist movement proper gathered headway. His special privilege lies in 
that transitive role for which he deliberately cast himself and which he 
accepted responsibly, assuming in good faith the burden one carries to 
cross a threshold.
15
  
Just as Borghesi argues that “The refinement of [Petrarch’s] ideas is often in striking 
contrast with that of his century, because really he anticipates the refinement of the 
Sixteenth,” so does Greene assert Petrarch’s legacy, which “served as a speculum” for 
each imitation that followed. And yet just as Borghesi argues that “Petrarch’s art is 
inimitable,” so does Greene assert that poems after Petrarch “of course ceased to be 
purely Petrarchan once the humanist movement proper gathered headway.” Although 
Greene’s book is about distinguishing between successful and failed imitations in the 
Renaissance, he suggests here that all imitations—all Petrarchan poems—are in a sense 
failures because they can be only a shadow of the “pure,” ideal Petrarch that came before 
                                                 
15
 Thomas M. Greene, The Light in Troy: Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1982), 145-46. 
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them. In Greene’s analysis, Petrarchism is a term that collapses under its own weight, 
always emerging as a failure at the very moment it emerges at all. 
Of course, Greene insists that there are successful imitations—those that are 
furthest away from their source, those with the most innovation and new thought. Unlike 
critics at the turn of the twentieth century, who criticized Petrarchists who strayed far 
from, in Borghesi’s words, their “master’s creations,” Greene values those translations 
that express originality. In his chapter on Wyatt, Greene argues, “It has to be stated at the 
outset that the body of Petrarchan imitations contains both distinguished and mediocre 
poetry, work highly characteristic of Wyatt’s idiolect and work that is close to colorless. 
The interest here will be directed to those versions where the idiolect is most distinctly 
heard, the historical consciousness most active, and where patterns of distancing can be 
most coherently described.”
16
 Yet in maintaining the distinction between good and bad 
Petrarchism, Greene resembles his predecessors much more than he departs from them. 
Greene, in fact, echoes earlier critics’ judgment of Wyatt as a “deficient” or “inferior” 
poet when he writes about what he deems one of Wyatt’s “weaker” poems, “In Spain”: 
“That couplet, like the poem as a whole, fails to do anything with Petrarch’s anguish of 
temporality; there is no equivalent anguish, no equivalent sense of time in Wyatt, nor is 
there any transformation into something else; there is simply a deadening of Petrarch’s 
pathos. There is a clash of cultures not under artistic control.”
17
 Although he criticizes 
Wyatt for failing to make a “transformation” in this poem, Greene’s real disapproval 
seems to lie in his sense that he does not live up to “Petrarch’s anguish” or “Petrarch’s 
                                                 
16
 Greene, The Light in Troy, 247. 
17
 Greene, The Light in Troy, 244. 
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pathos.” Again, Petrarchism materializes only in its own impossibility—only in the 
moments that highlight its inability to match the construct of ideal perfection in Petrarch. 
Ultimately, Greene’s project resembles those of the turn of the century in its 
attempts to establish boundaries around what otherwise would be an unstable literary 
discourse. In the book’s opening, Greene asserts that “We have not been adept as literary 
critics at accounting for imitative successes as against the many failures, or at recognizing 
the variety of strategies imitative writers pursued. The present study sets out to sketch 
suggestions which might solidify a little these areas of insecurity.”
18
 Greene’s statement 
suggests that rather than describing a literary field, scholars of Petrarchism are more 
often interested in assigning value to literary works—deeming them successes or 
failures—in order to stabilize a discourse whose amorphous nature makes them 
uncomfortable. Greene’s wish to “solidify a little these areas of insecurity” speaks to the 
discomfort that the instability of Petrarchism as a body of literature generates. 
Like Greene, writers of encyclopedia entries on Petrarchism wrestle with its 
uncertain boundaries. Usually, these entries begin by casting a wide net: Petrarchism is 
the imitation of Petrarch’s writings. Yet as they continue, they reveal the same anxieties 
about where Petrarchism begins and where it ends and about who is a good Petrarchist 
and who is a bad one. In her entry for the Encyclopedia of the Renaissance (1999), Fiora 
Bassanese begins by noting Petrarch’s “astonishing literary importance for more than 
three centuries throughout Europe,” writing about the ways in which Pietro Bembo’s 
                                                 
18
 Greene, The Light in Troy, 1. 
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works “launched Petrarch as a paragon of good taste rather than of artifice.”
19
 Yet her 
more neutral descriptions of Petrarch’s influence quickly move to value judgments: 
“Imitation allowed for a secure grasp of the mechanics of prosody, but in many disciples 
it led to mediocrity and repetition rather than authenticity and originality. Art often gave 
way to parroting, psychological insight to clichés.”
20
 Like earlier critics, Bassanese holds 
Petrarch as an “authentic” ideal, and her designation of certain Petrarchists as “mediocre” 
in fact helps constitute the identity of the “authentic” Petrarchists. 
Even critics who acknowledge the constructed nature of Petrarchism as a term 
still express the need to demarcate the limits of Petrarchism. In his entry for Tudor 
England: An Encyclopedia (2001), for instance, Thomas Roche concedes that “What we 
now call Petrarchanism is a fabrication of literary historians” but goes on to claim that 
“the essence of Petrarchanism is the analysis of human desire, its objects, and its ends.”
21
 
While he begins by calling Petrarchism a fabrication, he moves toward pinpointing an 
essence—yet, ironically, this “essence” is so broad that it includes just about any kind of 
literature imaginable. At the end of his entry, as if to rein in the term, Roche identifies 
what he sees as a fallacy in the criticism of Petrarchism: 
Petrarchanism has often been identified with the blazon, a short poem 
enumerating and praising the physical attributes of the lady—the hair, the 
eyes, the nose, the mouth, the breasts—but in point of fact, Petrarch never 
wrote such a poem, although the possibilities of creating such a pastiche 
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exited in Petrarch. . . . It is a mistake to call Shakespeare’s sonnet [130] 
“anti-Petrarchan” because it merely uses devices evident in Petrarch and 
formalized by the French for comic effect.
22
  
Like the critics at the turn of the twentieth century, Roche reveals his anxiety about the 
boundaries of Petrarchism by imposing limits on what is real Petrarchism and what critics 
only “mistakenly” believe is Petrarchism. Roche’s statement is odd, not only because 
Petrarch does frequently catalogue Laura’s body parts, but also because excluding the 
blazon from Petrarchism would exclude most of what is regarded as Petrarchan literature 
from Petrarchism. At the end of the article, the reader is left with a definition of 
Petrarchism both unrealistically broad and unrealistically narrow, suggesting that 
attempts to define Petrarchism only further unravel the coherence of the concept. 
Some critics do recognize the diffuse nature of Petrarchism. Roland Greene 
argues that “Petrarchism is neither static nor one sort of thing,” and William Kennedy 
remarks that “When you’ve read one Petrarchan sonnet sequence, you haven’t read them 
all.”
23
 Yet even Greene’s and Kennedy’s studies examine only lyric sequences, and when 
critics try to push open the definition of Petrarchism—even just a little—they often face 
stiff questioning. In his review of Gordon Braden’s Petrarchan Love and the Continental 
Renaissance, for instance, Alan Nagel questions Braden’s categorization of Sor Juana de 
la Cruz’s poetry as Petrarchan: “Why, we may ask, is oxymoron necessarily a Petrarchist 
signature (odi et amo, wrote Catullus)? . . . Are all sonnets Petrarchist? . . . When Sor 
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Juana chooses ‘the enforced service of him I do not want,’ is she any more Petrarchan 
than Augustinian or Pauline, or is she merely confirming her convent’s duties? How 
broad a stroke may Petrarch brush?”
24
 While these questions are not entirely unfair, they 
also speak to the same anxiety about losing control over Petrarchism as a term. Nagel’s 
doubts about the reach of Petrarchism here point to fears that Petrarchism will dissipate 
until it disappears completely or loses all coherence. Yet any coherence Petrarchism had 
since its inception has always been artificial, contradictory, and contested.  
 
Constructing the Petrarchan Mistress 
Criticism that has so often reified Petrarchism has also produced essentialist 
readings of one of its central characters, the mistress. Modern scholars have widely 
interpreted the figure of the Petrarchan mistress as one that limits women by objectifying 
and silencing them. Yet this type of analysis has roots in much earlier criticism on 
Petrarchism. Early modern texts, especially anti-Petrarchan poems, often depict 
Petrarchan praise as grotesque caricatures of women. Du Bellay mocks the “Perles, 
crystal, marbre, et ivoyre encor [Pearls, crystals, marble, or even ivory]” of these 
mistresses “De semblables oultrages [As seemingly outrageous],” and Shakespeare 
famously highlights the hairs like “black wires” and breath that “reeks” of the mistress to 
ridicule the shallow “false compare” of Petrarchan sonnets.
25
  As the term Petrarchism 
developed at the turn of the twentieth century, critics maintain that the mistress is a 
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superficial character, and just as these critics anxiously place boundaries around 
Petrarchism as a body of literature, so do they demarcate the limits of the Petrarchan 
lady. In 1902, Einstein writes, “Convention demanded certain things; the Petrarchan lady 
was to be as beautiful and virtuous as she was cold and indifferent to her lover. The type 
never varied; she possessed no individuality, no life nor movement; she was, in fact, a 
stationary sun, radiating all happiness yet insensible of her own attraction.”
26
 Four years 
later, Borghesi argues, “In all these sonnets the external beauty of the mistress absorbs 
more the attention of the poet than does the greatness and richness of her mind. She was 
rather a thing than a person.”
27
 These critics rightly point to some of the limitations 
imposed on this role, but they rigidly see the role as nothing but limitations. 
Modern feminist critics echo their forebears, who described the Petrarchan 
mistress as a lifeless “thing,” by focusing on the restrictive qualities of the role. Nancy 
Vickers emphasizes the fragmented nature of Laura’s depiction, pointing out that “We 
never see in the Rime sparse a complete picture of Laura” and that “Laura is always 
presented as a part or parts of a woman . . . Her textures are those of metals and stones; 
her image is that of a collection of exquisitely beautiful disassociated objects.”
28
 Vickers 
concludes that “bodies fetishized by a poetic voice logically do not have a voice of their 
own; the world of making words, of making texts, is not theirs.”
29
 Like Einstein’s 
description of the lady who is “beautiful and virtuous” yet who “possessed no 
individuality,” Vickers looks to the devastating consequences that mistress worship 
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produces. Similarly, Gary Waller argues that “Petrarchism was, historically, 
predominantly a male discourse” and that the beloved “is the object by means of which 
[the suitor] can indulge his anguish, his pleas, his manipulations. . . . In no sense is she 
ever an agent: she has no choice but to be sexualized, and she is not accorded reciprocal 
power.”
30
 For Vickers and Waller, as for earlier critics, Petrarchism is a rigidly 
exclusionary discourse, one that inhibits complex representations of women, but its 
boundaries certainly are clear: Petrarchism pays attention to the complexity of its male 
characters, but diminishes the complexity of its female characters. 
Following this line of thinking, critics often view any power that the Petrarchan 
mistress seems to possess as illusory, something that exists only to feed back into the 
male speaker’s mastery. In their analysis of Philip Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, Ann 
Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass argue that “Stella, as subject or agent, is absorbed 
into the performances of the I-speaker; she becomes his subject (in the sense of ‘topic’) 
and also the instrument through which he studies himself.”
31
 And for Thomas Greene, the 
female “love-object is typically apprehended and contained in an incomplete process of 
assimilation by an ego itself struggling for self-definition, self-understanding and self-
expansion.”
32
 Whether they see the speaker as masterful or perverse, scholars such as 
these characterize Petrarchism as a male discourse—one that explores male suffering, 
male fetishism, and male skillfulness at the expense of female subjectivity. 
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Yet the rigidity with which Petrarchism is interpreted ironically makes it more 
difficult for critics to accommodate the complex ways with which women are 
represented—and do the representing—in Petrarchan discourse. For one, critics struggle 
to contend with women writers, such as Vittoria Colonna, Louise Labé, and Mary Wroth, 
who chose to write their own Petrarchan sonnets. If women are always objectified or 
silenced by Petrarchism, then they are always outside of it, and critics often use the 
language of “rebelling,” “rewriting,” or “confronting” to depict the ways women engage 
with Petrarchism. Ilona Bell, for instance, argues that the only way that women of the 
early modern period can write within Petrarchism is by writing against it. Bell focuses on 
“Elizabethan women writers who reappropriate the conventions of the Petrarchan lyric 
and the Ovidean complaint to wage and conceal a rebellion against those aspects of male 
poetic tradition which might otherwise reduce them to the object of male desire.”
33
 And 
Barbara Lewalski argues that Jacobean women writers “rewrite discourses which repress 
or diminish women—patriarchy, gender hierarchy, Petrarchism, Pauline marriage theory, 
and more—by redefining or extending their terms or infusing them with new meaning: 
this is the way any orthodoxy is first opened to revisionism.”
34
 To these critics, women 
must take an oppositional stance against Petrarchism to be engaged with it at all; 
Petrarchism remains an artificially coherent discourse that women must subvert if they 
want to find a place in it. 
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For some, Petrarchism is so inflexible that women who try their hand at it mostly 
fail. In her encyclopedia entry on Petrarchism, Bassanese writes,  
Like all sixteenth-century versifiers, women had to confront the power of 
tradition, which was both written by and directed to men. The better poets 
developed strategies to overcome the exclusion of women authors from 
literary tradition without overturning the Petrarchan model that indirectly 
validated their work. Some, like Gaspara Stampa and Vittoria Colonna, 
stayed close to the model while using its language and imagery to propose 
feminine variants and interpretations. Other female practitioners, however, 
were unable to escape the masculine worldview inherent to Petrarchism 
and lost their sexual identity and individual voice to the dominant style.
35
  
Because she sees sexual identity as something women essentially possess rather than 
something that is culturally constructed, Bassanese represents women as extremely 
vulnerable to the “power” of Petrarchism. Like critics throughout the twentieth century, 
Bassanese looks at Petrarchism as possessing an essence, and this view works to the 
detriment of being able to see women as part of Petrarchism in any complex way. 
Petrarchism is something women must “confront,” “overturn,” or “escape,” but it can 
never be something to which women belong in the first place. For Petrarchism to be as 
“masculine” and “dominant” as Bassanese suggests, women can be seen only as 
something other and something inferior. 
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Some critics have challenged the widespread essentializing of the Petrarchan 
mistress, opening up ways to read the role as multiple and even contradictory. In her 
postmodern reading of Petrarch and some of his successors—Wyatt, Donne, and 
Marvell—Barbara Estrin, for instance, sees Petrarchism as an “anamorphic” genre that 
produces numerous, competing versions of the Laura figure. Estrin argues that in some 
Petrarchan lyrics “the woman imagined for the poem . . . recasts the space of her 
imagining to change the genre of the poem and to challenge the gender binarisms 
Petrarchism ordinarily demands.”
36
 Heather Dubrow acknowledges the uncertain scope 
of the term Petrarchism, writing that “both Petrarchism and the reactions against it prove 
notoriously hard to define.”
37
 She argues that the voice of the Petrarchan mistress 
comprises “varied and even contradictory registers” and that Petrarchism “repeatedly 
challenges the boundaries between characteristics that might be gendered masculine and 
feminine.”
38
 Yet even these studies, which look to the slipperiness of gender within 
Petrarchism, still largely treat Petrarchism as a coherent genre. While both Estrin and 
Dubrow produce nuanced readings of Petrarchan instability, they still confine their 
studies to lyric poetry, suggesting that the boundaries of Petrarchism are fairly secure. 
This study seeks to open up the concept of Petrarchism; rather than assuming it is 
a discrete body of literature, Disappearing Acts looks at Petrarchism as a looser set of 
conventions, forms, and especially roles that are appropriated in other contexts. This 
project argues that the move to reify Petrarchism often results in the reification of the 
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Petrarchan mistress as well. Referring to Petrarchism not as a coherent genre, and 
certainly not as the means to designate literature intrinsically “good” or “bad,” this study 
uses the term as one that announces its own incoherence in its promiscuous intermingling 
with other discourses. Examining the varied ways in which the Petrarchan mistress is 
deployed highlights this role as a role—not as a stable gender identity, but as a means 
through which the inconsistencies of gender identity are revealed. A figure that 
conspicuously announces both its presence and its own erasure, the Petrarchan mistress 
puts pressure on the various cultural systems in which she is represented, contesting the 
gender stability they seek to impose. 
Crucial to exposing the constructed nature of gender is the absence or elusiveness 
of the Petrarchan mistress. Often seen only as a body—a sun, a star—or, more recently, 
as a collection of body parts, the Petrarchan mistress is also significant for the ways in 
which her body can never be completely located. Gender, as Judith Butler describes it, is 
the illusion created by acts of the body: “Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a 
set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to 
produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.”
39
 The desirable body of 
the Petrarchan mistress produces such an appearance, especially for critics who have 
described her as a coherent identity. Yet the constant inaccessibility of this body disrupts 
that coherence by exposing its artificiality—or, at the very least, by rendering it an 
illusion impossible to obtain. Butler argues, “When the disorganization and 
disaggregation of the field of bodies disrupt the regulatory fiction of heterosexual 
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coherence, it seems that the expressive model loses its descriptive force. That regulatory 
ideal is then exposed as a norm and a fiction that disguises itself as a developmental law 
regulating the sexual field that it purports to describe.”
40
 The figure of the Petrarchan 
mistress can thus be seen as performative in two ways: through its bodily acts and 
gestures, it sustains the illusion of coherent gender identity, yet through its frequent 
absences or evasions—its very state of in-betweenness—it disrupts that coherence. The 
figure both constructs the idea of authenticity and exposes the ways in which that idea of 
authenticity is itself a construct. 
This study situates itself in those moments of disruption, when the figure of the 
Petrarchan mistress is deployed in ways that complicate gender coherence in other early 
modern contexts. I look at women as neither “inside” nor “outside” of Petrarchism, but 
instead as represented by a complex conjunction of discourses. I especially seek those 
moments when Petrarchan language intersects with other cultural discourses in early 
modern England and works to disentangle concepts of stable, essential, or authentic 
gender identity. Chapter One looks at the overlap between Reformist ideas and 
Petrarchism in the 1530s and 1540s, when both of these discourses first came to England. 
I examine the relationship between the concept of the elusive “absent presence” of 
Christ’s body in the Eucharist and the elusive, “absent presence” of the desirable beloved 
in circulating collections of poetry, and I look at the examinations of Anne Askew, a 
Protestant martyr under Henry VIII’s reign, as a particularly vivid intersection between 
Reformist and Petrarchan cultures. This chapter suggests that her representation as an 
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inscrutable, evasive, and yet desirable figure draws from both the Reformist and 
Petrarchan cultures that inform the text and that the persona produced in the examinations 
contests some of the rigid formulations of gender identity in Reformation England.  
Chapter Two interrogates the concept of the female double, pairing Edmund 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene with the writings of Elizabeth I and Mary Queen of Scots. I 
suggest that early modern female sovereignty is constructed from both the theory of the 
king’s two bodies and from the idea of the Petrarchan female double, and I argue that 
female sovereigns of the sixteenth century both secure and imperil their authenticity by 
comparing themselves to a false double. This chapter argues that both Elizabeth’s and 
Mary’s attempts to prove their authenticity as part of the corporate body politic rely 
heavily on constructing the other as a false, Petrarchan double, and I look at the ways in 
which The Faerie Queene similarly imagines ideal, legitimate queens—such as Una, 
Britomart, and Mercilla—only by describing, and ultimately eliminating, their counterfeit 
doubles—Duessa, Radigund, and Lucifera. Of course, the very process of doubling these 
female characters calls into question the distinctions between them and suggests that the 
very concept of authenticity—along with the concept of the body politic—is itself a 
fraud. Yet the obsessive anxiety about authenticating a true female self points to the 
cultural currency of the idea of the counterfeit woman—its potential to undermine as well 
as (tenuously) uphold a woman in power.  
Chapter Three examines the relationship between Petrarchism and the figure of 
the ghost in early modern England. Officially, Protestants argued that ghosts were 
Catholic superstitions, “old wives’ tales” designed to inflict terror onto children. Yet the 
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Protestant tracts about ghost stories also reveal them to be a space of illicit pleasure—
precisely because of their unreal status. This chapter argues that the figure of the ghost is 
a way to explore illicit pleasure in Petrarchan literature as well. I contend that the figure 
of the ghost intersects with the figure of the Petrarchan mistress in ways that challenge 
conventional definitions of the mistress. I consider Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale in 
relation to the female complaint, a popular genre appended to sonnet sequences in which 
a ghost complains about her fate. I argue that a female speaker who complains from the 
grave constitutes a different kind of absent presence than that ascribed to the icy, distant 
Petrarchan beloved of the sonnets. As a ghost, a female figure can evoke full bodily and 
sensual presence—the unfulfilled fantasy of the sonnet speaker—while maintaining her 
characteristic unavailability. The status of a ghost allows the Petrarchan mistress to be 
both virtuous and loose, desirable and desiring, admirable and wanton. This chapter 
argues that just as the ghostly status of the female speakers of the complaint poems 
enables them to justify (or advertise) their transgressive lives, so does Hermione’s 
ghostly status at the end of the play enable her to return from her immobilized position to 
perform a Petrarchan role in which she speaks her own desires. 
Chapter Four looks at Mary Wroth’s examination of the term constancy in both 
her prose romance The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania and her appended sonnet 
sequence, Pamphilia to Amphilanthus. I argue that while Pamphilia in the sonnets 
proclaims her constancy like so many sonnet speakers who came before her, the prose 
romance complicates the suggestion that she can adopt such a singular identity. At the 
end of the sonnets, Pamphilia suggests that she has triumphed over her trials of love, and 
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critics have argued that Wroth reappropriates the term constancy, making it a heroic 
virtue for women. Yet the varied uses of constancy in the Urania trouble the idea that 
Pamphilia’s identification with constancy is secure—or even desirable. Wroth reveals 
that the term has a complex history and that it circulates in multiple discourses, including 
martyrology, which emphasized martyrs’ constancy through pain, and humanism, which 
valued the stoic concept constantia as a way to conquer emotions. Wroth explores the 
tensions created by this term’s varied connotations, adopting the humanist mode of 
debate to test the term’s value and exploring the possibility that constancy is an identity 
trap for women. Although Pamphilia defends constancy, Wroth reveals the 
contradictions, dangers, and even absurdities of embracing constancy, and she posits the 
term as one strained by both historical and literary convention. Wroth suggests that while 
the conventions of a sonnet sequence enable the easy declaration of constancy, the 
conventions of prose romance expose the same term to be a tenuous fiction. 
Rather than see Petrarchism as a monolithic discourse that women must fight or 
resist, this study attends to the complexities with which Petrarchism—in its many 
incarnations—already represents female figures. It does not suggest that Petrarchan 
representations of women are necessarily positive or empowering, but it does suggest that 
they are more flexible than once thought and that they can be appropriated in situations 
not considered, to borrow Thomas Greene's language, “purely Petrarchan.” The figure of 
the Petrarchan mistress points to the elasticity of both Petrarchism itself and of gender 
identity in early modern England, pushing critics to open up ways of thinking about the 
complex possibilities of representing women in a Petrarchan framework.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Absent Presence: Women and the Elusive Body in Reformation England 
 
One thing on the minds of both Petrarchan poets and Protestant Reformers in 
sixteenth-century England was the question of material presence. Petrarchism and the 
Reformation have rarely been examined in conjunction, yet both discourses obsessively 
return to the idea of absent presence, a presence that can never be fully, materially there 
yet can never be completely absent either. For Petrarchan writers, the desire for the 
perpetually inaccessible mistress shapes their articulation of an absent presence, and for 
Reformists, the desire for a spiritual rather than corporeal connection with Christ compels 
them to assert Christ’s absent presence in the Eucharist. Although one discourse is 
secular and the other religious, writers from both traditions share the same language. In 
both discourses, the body becomes most viable at the moment in which it disappears.  
This chapter will examine the intersections between Petrarchism and 
Protestantism, two discourses that developed at the same time—and often in the same 
spaces—in England during the 1530s and 1540s. Although the absent Petrarchan mistress 
and the absent body of Christ are not identical concepts, a look at them together suggests 
the extent to which both Petrarchism and Protestantism rely on elusive bodies for their 
rhetorical effects. It also reveals the extent to which women participated in these genres. 
Far from excluding women, the emphasis on elusive bodies actually enabled women to 
articulate their voices in intellectual life, allowing them to assert a presence while 
maintaining inaccessibility at the same time. In what follows, I will look at Anne 
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Askew’s Examinations as an especially vivid intersection between Petrarchism and 
Protestantism. A martyr who was executed in 1546 for her Reformist beliefs, particularly 
her rejection of Christ’s real presence in the Eucharist, Askew has attracted recent critical 
attention for her ironic use of scripture and her opaque writing style. Yet while critics 
have situated her text within a Protestant framework, the elusive persona that emerges in 
the Examinations is also constituted by Petrarchan culture. Askew’s narratives, in fact, 
enact the classic Petrarchan scenario in which frustrated men seek access to an 
unavailable woman only to be denied that access. Of course, the elusive character, 
“Askew,” and the elusive body of Christ are not the same thing, but their appearance in 
the Examinations in the very same moments suggests a deep entanglement between 
Petrarchism and Protestantism during a tumultuous time in English history. 
 
“Ydill Poeses” and Books of Prayers 
Although most scholars have not looked at Petrarchism and Protestantism 
together,
1
 evidence from the time period suggests that their shared spaces abound. At the 
beginning of Elizabeth I’s reign, for instance, a Protestant chaplain named William 
Latymer wrote a biography of his former patron, Anne Boleyn, perhaps as an attempt to 
secure patronage from her mother, the new queen. In his account, which focuses on 
Boleyn’s reign as queen, Latymer includes many anecdotes that portray Boleyn as a 
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pious, Reform-minded woman. One anecdote recalls Boleyn’s interaction with her cousin 
and maid of honor Mary Shelton. Shelton was one of at least three women in Henry’s 
court to be involved with the Devonshire manuscript, a manuscript of Petrarchan verse 
that circulated during the 1530s and included some of Wyatt’s poems. According to 
Latymer, Boleyn scolded Shelton for writing “ydill poeses” into her prayerbook: 
After that there was a booke of prayers whiche belonged to one of her 
maydes of honour called Mrs Mary Shelton presented unto her highnes 
where in ware writton certeyne ydill poeses. . . . At the length the pensive 
gentilwoman (to whome the booke appertayned) was discovered. 
Wherupon the quene her majestie, calling her before her presence, 
wonderfull rebuked her that wold permitte suche wantone toyes in her 
book of prayers, which she termed a myrroure or glasse wherin she might 
learne to addresse her wandering thoughtes; and upon this occasione 
commaunded the mother of the maydons to have a more vigilante eye to 
her charge to thende that at all tymes and in tyme of prayers especially 
they might comely and vertuously behave their selfes.
2
 
This anecdote is suggestive in at least two important ways. First, it reveals the proximity 
of Petrarchan and Reformist writing. Although scholars debate the extent of Boleyn’s 
Reformist leanings, and although Boleyn was probably more likely to produce Petrarchan 
poetry than police it, Latymer’s account suggests that these discourses—far from being 
insulated from one another—occurred in the same spaces and among the same people—
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and sometimes on the very same page. Shelton’s practice of writing Petrarchan verse into 
the blank spaces of religious books was not, in fact, unusual. After Henry VIII’s death, 
for instance, Thomas Seymour secretly courted and eventually married Katherine Parr, 
and during his courtship he composed a love poem in the back of Parr’s volume of A 
Sermon of Saint Chrysostome. In the poem, Seymour presses the reluctant Parr to “Set 
doubts aside / And to some sporting fall.” Using carpe diem language, he urges Parr, 
whom he addresses as “fair nymph,” to yield to him, and he assures her that he banishes 
“suspicion.”
3
 While there is no direct relationship between the ancient Greek writer 
Chrysostome, whose writings were employed by a number of Protestant reformers in 
support of their beliefs, and Seymour’s courtly love poem, the placement of this poem 
reveals the intimacy between Petrarchism and the Reformation. 
The Devonshire manuscript, the primary manuscript with which Shelton is 
associated, is actually one of the only manuscript collections of the period that contains 
courtly lyrics alone.
4
 Most courtly poetry, according to Arthur Marotti, was composed 
and transcribed onto blank spaces of miscellaneous collections: “Lyrics were often 
transcribed in available odd spaces, including flyleaves of books and manuscripts of 
various kinds.”
5
 The transcription of Petrarchan lyrics in England grew out of a tradition 
of fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century commonplace books and other miscellanies in 
which love lyrics were juxtaposed with material as diverse as religious poetry, medieval 
                                                 
3
 Quoted in Susan E. James, Kateryn Parr: The Making of a Queen (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999),  
413. 
4
 Julia Boffey, Manuscripts of English Courtly Love Lyrics in the Later Middle Ages (Woodbridge, UK: 
D.S. Brewer, 1985), 7. 
5
 Arthur F. Marotti, Manuscript, Print, and the English Renaissance Lyric (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1995), 22. 
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romances, recipes, and aphorisms.
6
 Petrarchism and the Reformation developed side by 
side rather than apart from one another in England during the 1530s and 1540s, when 
Petrarch’s translators and evangelicals abounded in London, often composing their 
poems alongside one another. Thomas Wyatt and Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, wrote 
Petrarchan lyrics at the same time as they participated in the Protestant practice of 
Biblical translation. The Arundel Harington manuscript, which contains poetry from the 
1540s to the 1620s, includes Wyatt’s Petrarchan poems along with his penitential psalms 
and Surrey’s Petrarchan poems along with his translations of Ecclesiastes.
7
 
One place where both Petrarchan writers and Reformists wrote prolifically was in 
prison. George Blage, for example, a Reformist who was nearly burned as a heretic 
alongside Anne Askew, was also a Petrarchan poet who composed and collected poems 
in what is now known as the Blage manuscript, one of the source texts for Wyatt’s lyrics. 
Pardoned at the last moment by Henry VIII, who referred to Blage as his “pygge,”
8
 Blage 
went on to compile his manuscript, which includes poems that lament the “vnkyndnes / 
                                                 
6
 Marotti, Manuscript, 18. See also David R. Parker, The Commonplace Book in Tudor London: An 
Examination of BL MSS Egerton 1995, Harley 2252, Lansdowne 762, and Oxford Balliol College MS 354 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998). 
7
 Ruth Hughey, ed., The Arundel Harington Manuscript of Tudor Poetry, 2 vols. (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1960). 
8
 John Foxe. Acts and Monuments […]. The Variorum Edition (1570 edition), [online]. (hriOnline, 
Sheffield), p. 1427. Available from: http://www.hrionline.shef.ac.uk/foxe/. [Accessed 6.23.2010]. Unless 
otherwise noted, all citations are taken from the 1570 edition and are recorded parenthetically within the 
text by page number. I am aware that other individuals besides Foxe, including the printer John Day, 
greatly contributed to the authorial function in this text. I use Foxe’s name as a convenient marker for all 
the collaborative elements that shaped the text. For a discussion on Foxe’s role as “author-compiler” of 
Acts and Monuments, see John N. King, Foxe’s “Book of Martyrs” and Early Modern Print Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), esp. chap. 1, “The Compilation of the Book.” I choose to 
cite primarily from the 1570 edition because Foxe greatly expanded his text from the first edition in 1563 
and added many illustrations, including the one of Cicelie Ormes discussed below. 
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Of my mystres” along with Reformist poems such as “Only the Elect on the Sabbath doth 
praye.”
9
 In one of the poems, Blage writes about his anticipated martyrdom:  
A voyce I haue and yk a will to wayle 
and fro my yes salt teers adoun doo rounne 
mi wyt I want mi sensis aal doo fayle 
my brethe it feintes, my hart it feel it downe 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
and I O Lord in to thi handes do yield 
my faythefull soul apoynted now of the 
this Lyfe to leue thoro fier in smythefild 
bi whiche I shawl be rid of my leve 
to the o chryst whiche in the heauen only 
bi the father on the ryght hand dothe syt
10
 
In the Blage manuscript, Petrarchan lover and Protestant martyr are one and the same. 
The line between “ydill poeses” and books of prayer becomes remarkably thin, for the 
opening section of this religious poem—in which Blage complains of his salty tears, his 
lacking wit, his failing senses, and his fainting breath—is indistinguishable from the 
Petrarchan love poems that surround it. Only further down the poem does Blage reveal 
                                                 
9
 Blage Manuscript, Trinity College Library, Dublin, MS 160 (D.2.7), fols. 63, 153. Some of the poems 
from this manuscript are printed in Kenneth Muir, ed., Sir Thomas Wyatt and His Circle: Unpublished 
Poems Edited from the Blage Manuscript, English Reprints Series 18 (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1961). Interestingly, Muir includes only Petrarchan poems and omits religious poems from his 
selection. A few of Blage’s poems omitted from this collection are printed in the “Commentary” section of 
Thomas Wyatt, Collected Poems of Sir Thomas Wyatt, ed. Kenneth Muir and Patricia Thomson (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1969), 390-415. 
10
 Blage Manuscript, fols. 101, 103. Blage signs this poem “G.B.” 
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that his subject is his pending death for his religious beliefs. Blage scorns his enemies, 
praying to God that he will “destroy ther wourkes in twinklinge of an ie” and articulating 
the Reformist belief for which he is condemned to die: Christ’s body is absent in the 
Eucharist, present in “heaven only / bi the father on the right hand.”
11
 
Latymer’s anecdote about Boleyn and Shelton is suggestive also because at the 
heart of this intersection between the Reformation and Petrarchism are two women. 
Although the Reformation and Petrarchism have been seen as largely male domains, the 
manuscript with which these women were associated—the Devonshire manuscript—
suggests these discourses enabled female participation. Shelton, for example, possessed 
the manuscript for many years, transcribing its contents and composing lines of poetry 
herself. Mary Fitzroy, Surrey’s sister, also transcribed poems in the manuscript, and she 
patronized the most influential martyrologists of the English Reformation, John Foxe and 
John Bale, employing Foxe as a tutor to Surrey’s children.
12
  
Although Latymer portrays Boleyn as opposed to the “ydill poeses” that Shelton 
transcribed, historical evidence suggests that she was involved in both Reformist and 
Petrarchan circles. Educated as a young girl in the humanist French court and influenced 
by figures such as Marguerite de Navarre,
13
 Boleyn promoted Reformist practices such as 
Biblical translation, and according to Foxe, she brought controversial texts such as Simon 
Fish’s Supplication for the Beggars and William Tyndale’s Obedience of a Christian 
                                                 
11
 Blage Manuscript, fol. 103. 
12
 See W.A. Sessions, Henry Howard, the Poet Earl of Surrey: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 64; John N. King, English Reformation Literature: The Tudor Origins of the Protestant Tradition 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 106; and Helen Baron, “Mary (Howard) Fitzroy’s Hand 
in the Devonshire Manuscript,” The Review of English Studies 45, no. 179 (1994): 318-35. 
13
 Retha M. Warnicke, The Rise and Fall of Anne Boleyn: Family Politics at the Court of Henry VIII 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). See esp. chap. 1, “Boleyn Origins.” 
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Man to the English court (1153). She patronized a number of Protestant Reformers at 
court, such as Nicholas Udall, and Maria Dowling argues that Boleyn’s actions suggest 
that she desired “to direct Henry’s religious policy into more radical channels.”
14
 Yet 
Boleyn was also involved in the circle that produced the Devonshire manuscript. 
According to Raymond Southall, she made at least two entries into the manuscript: “an 
expression of affection (‘amer ann i,’ i.e. love, Anne) on f. 56” and the signature “‘an’ at 
the foot of f. 69.” She also possibly entered the riddle that concludes “I ama yowrs an” as 
an answer to Wyatt’s poem, “What wourde is that.”
15
 Both the Reformist and Petrarchan 
circles with which Anne was involved proved dangerous and eventually deadly, but they 
did enable her contribution to political and literary culture. 
Scholars have well documented the ways in which the English Reformation 
opened up new ways for women to participate in intellectual life.
16
 Despite the fact that 
Protestant teachings support patriarchal authority with their strong emphasis on marriage, 
the Protestant values of literacy and an individual’s relationship with God prompted some 
women to seek access to God unmediated by male authority, particularly in the nascent 
years of the Reformation. Retha Warnicke points out that of all the martyrs in Foxe’s Acts 
                                                 
14
 Maria Dowling, “The Gospel and the Court: Reformation Under Henry VIII,” in Protestantism and the 
Fational Church in Sixteenth Century England, ed. Peter Lake and Maria Dowling (London: Croom Helm, 
1987), 52. 
15
 Raymond Southall, The Courtly Maker: An Essay on the Poetry of Wyatt and His Contemporaries (New 
York: Basil Blackwell, 1964), 17-18. 
16
 This is not to say that Catholicism failed to provide any opportunities for women to participate in literary 
and political culture; many nuns, for instance, contributed to a rich body of translations and other 
documents. For the influence of Protestantism on women, see, for example, Patricia Crawford, “The 
Reformation,” in Women and Religion in England 1500-1720 (London: Routledge, 1993), 26-37; Diane 
Willen, “Women and Religion in Early Modern England,” in Women in Reformation and Counter-
Reformation Europe: Public and Private Worlds, ed. Sherrin Marshall (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1989), 140-65; and Margaret Patterson Hannay, ed., Silent But for the Word: Tudor Women as 
Patrons, Translators, and Writers of Religious Works (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1985). 
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and Monuments, an astonishing one-fifth of them are women.
17
 Petrarchism, however, 
seems to be a discourse less conducive to women’s participation. Long seen as a genre 
about male subjectivity, critics like Nancy Vickers have influentially argued that 
Petrarchism prevents female agency by objectifying women with rhetorical conventions 
like the blazon that break women’s bodies into pieces.
18
  
Yet Petrarchism emerges as a discourse less about the female body than about the 
female body’s inaccessibility. Petrarchan poems routinely express desire for the beloved 
only to find the beloved out of reach. For instance, the Devonshire manuscript contains a 
poem attributed to Wyatt in which the first letters of each stanza spell SHELTVN. In the 
poem, Wyatt’s speaker complains that he must “serue and suffer styll allwaye” until “she 
knowythe the cawse of all my payn.”
19
 Beneath the poem is a three-line response 
attributed to Shelton: “ondesyerd sarwes / reqwer no hyar / mary mary shelton.”
20
 Paul 
Remley argues that this retort “provides a remarkable example of an overtly critical 
rejoinder to a courtly lyric by a contemporary reader who is almost certainly the intended 
recipient of the verse” and that Shelton’s contributions to the Devonshire manuscript 
“convey her disillusionment with some of the inequities of her day, particularly in 
relations between the sexes.”
21
  
                                                 
17
 Retha M. Warnicke, Women of the English Renaissance and Reformation (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1983), 74. 
18
 Nancy J. Vickers, “Diana Described: Scattered Woman and Scattered Rhyme,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 2 
(1981): 265-79. 
19
 Thomas Wyatt, Collected Poems of Sir Thomas Wyatt, ed. Kenneth Muir and Patricia Thomson 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1969), poem CLXV. All subsequent references to Wyatt’s poems 
will be to this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text by poem number. 
20
 Quoted in Paul G. Remley, “Mary Shelton and Her Tudor Literary Milieu,” in Rethinking the Henrician 
Era: Essays on Early Tudor Texts and Contexts, ed. Peter C. Herman (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1994), 50. 
21
 Remley, “Mary Shelton,” 50, 47. 
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More than a critique or a protest of gender relations, however, Shelton’s verse 
plays right into the conventions of the genre. Her female speaker refuses the answer 
Wyatt’s speaker desires, instead deeming his sorrows undeserved and requiring no hire, 
or reward. Her role as cruel mistress who scorns her lover is produced by the genre 
within which she writes, a genre that legitimates her ambiguous power. Often, critics 
argue that the only way that women of the early modern period can write within 
Petrarchism is by writing against it. Yet as Shelton’s rejecting speaker demonstrates, 
women within Petrarchism are not always so easy to objectify. Instead, the “doubleness” 
or “fickleness” of which male writers so often accuse women can actually work to their 
advantage as strategies of evasiveness. Shelton gains access to literary culture by 
performing the very disembodied presence that many critics say denies her a voice. 
Women do not have to get outside of Petrarchism to gain authority, but can use 
Petrarchan conventions to perform their inaccessibility. 
 
A Place All Voyde 
 Scholars have long argued that in Petrarchan poetry, the male subject emerges as 
the primary focus and any female character functions only as an object of the struggling 
male self. Yet from the beginnings of English Petrarchism, female characters are often 
represented as resisting the kind of closure that the speaker seeks. In Wyatt’s translation 
of one of Petrarch’s poems, for instance, a male speaker summons his “froward master,” 
Love, before the judge Reason, whom Wyatt translates as “that Quene.” In a familiar 
Petrarchan scenario, the speaker lays out his grievances against his master, claiming that 
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he has wasted “pleasant dayes” in “serving this false lyer so deceaveable” and that the 
central enticement that his master offered, “a woman,” was a false promise. Love defends 
himself, arguing that he lifted the speaker from “that art / That selleth wordes, and 
maketh a clattering knyght; / And of my welth I gave him the delight.” After a long 
debate, Love demands a “sentence” from the queen, and Wyatt ends the poem: 
At last, boethe, eche for himself, concluded,  
I trembling; but he, with small reverence: 
“Lo, thus, as we have nowe eche othre accused, 
Dere lady, we wayte onely thy sentence.” 
She, smyling: “after thissaid audience, 
It liketh me” (quod she) “to have herd your question: 
But lenger tyme doth aske resolution.” (VIII) 
Unlike Petrarch, Wyatt makes this final moment of uncertainty an explicitly gendered 
one. Although the speaker introduces Love as his “olde dere En’mye,” the end of the 
poem makes clear that the true threat against him is female. By translating Reason as a 
“Quene,” Wyatt incorporates the Petrarchan mistress as a character in this poem, 
suggesting that she has the ability to resist closure, hold power relations open, and reduce 
the male speaker to “trembling.” Wyatt highlights the extent to which Petrarchism relies 
on the performance of female elusiveness—what Wyatt would call “dowblenes” or 
“vncertaintye”—for its effects.
22
 When Wyatt’s queen smiles, she performs her own 
inaccessibility and flexes her ability to perpetuate the “trembling” speaker’s suffering. 
                                                 
22
 See, for example, “What vaileth trouth” (II), “Alas the greiff” (V), and “Gyve place” (CCXVI) in Wyatt, 
Collected Poems for instances of these words. 
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Wyatt is not the first to emphasize the smiling mistress (Laura smiles frequently in the 
Rime sparse), but for Wyatt, as for later English Petrarchan writers, the female smile 
provokes highly charged anxiety about the inability to interpret a woman’s body or to 
access what may or may not be lurking underneath. When Laura smiles in the Rime 
sparse, she is “sweet” or “angelic,” but when Wyatt’s queen smiles, she is ambiguous, 
cruel, and powerful.
23
  
The cruelty of women is, of course, a commonplace misogynist trope in 
Petrarchan poetry. The Devonshire manuscript, for example, features many poems that 
argue that women escape men’s control because they are by nature double, slippery, and 
untrustworthy. An anonymous poet writes,  
To dere is bowght the doblenes 
     That perith owte in trowthes sted; 
For faut of faith newfangilnes 
     Is cheff ruler in womanhed.
24
 
The speaker’s conclusion about women’s inherent “faut of faith” is undoubtedly negative. 
Yet far from enabling male speakers to possess the women they desire, their 
“newfangilnes” ensures that they remain out of reach, difficult to locate, and impossible 
to interpret. Another poem from the Devonshire manuscript reads, 
To men that knows ye not,  
     Ye may aper to be,  
                                                 
23
 See, for example, Francesco Petrarch, poems 17, 126, and 149, in Petrarch’s Lyric Poems: The “Rime 
sparse” and Other Lyrics, trans. and ed. Robert M. Durling (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1976). 
24
 Kenneth Muir, “Unpublished Poems in the Devonshire MS,” Proceedings of the Leeds Philosophical 
Society, Literary and Historical Section 6 (1947): 273. 
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Ffol clen and withowt spot, 
     But sewarly unto me 
So ys yowar wonted kynd 
By proffer so sewarly knowen. 
That I wel not be blynd, 
     Myn ys shall be myn owen.
25
 
The speaker attempts to reclaim power over his own eyes, yet in doing so, he articulates 
the fear that women can never be what they “aper.” He claims that “I wel not be that man 
/ That so shal the devowar,” yet instead of asserting power over her, he promises only to 
avert his gaze.
26
 While the poem feeds into familiar misogynist fears that women are 
deceptive, it also implies that women will always remain beyond male possession. 
Petrarchism is often interpreted as a mode that displays male ownership of the 
female body, yet poems such as these demonstrate the ways in which Petrarchan 
discourse allows—even requires—the female body to escape male control. The female 
smile is one recurring trope that signals women’s command of their own bodies by 
rendering them unreadable to the men who desire them. The smiling mistress persists in 
English Petrarchism throughout the sixteenth century as a figure of inscrutability. Surrey, 
for instance, writes of a male lover tricked by the bodily gestures of his beloved:  
     Then to retain him stil, she wrasteth new her grace, 
And smileth, lo, as though she would forthwith the man embrace. 
     But when the proofe is made to try such lokes withal, 
                                                 
25
 Muir, “Unpublished Poems,” 273. 
26
 Muir, “Unpublished Poems,” 274. 
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He findeth then the place all voyde, and fraighted full of gall. 
     Lorde, what abuse is this! who can such women praise 
That for their glory do devise to use such crafty wayes!
27
 
What the lover thought would be a woman he could possess turns out to be an absence—
a “place all voyde.” Her smile signals his powerlessness to interpret her body. Instead of 
a term that signifies her female passivity, “her grace” becomes a malleable, unstable 
construct that gives the mistress the upper hand in the relationship and keeps her body an 
enigma. Even when Surrey extensively catalogues the female body in other poems, the 
blazons more often point to what the speaker cannot have rather than what he obtains:  
But since ye knew I did youe love and serve  
Your golden treese was clad alway in blacke,  
Your smilyng lokes were hid thus evermore,  
All that withdrawne that I did crave so sore.
28
 
Significantly, the beloved’s tresses and her smiles appear in the poem only when they 
disappear for the speaker. As soon as the speaker’s beloved realizes that she is desired, 
she exercises her newfound power over the speaker by withholding her body from him. 
Instead of closing off power relations by objectifying the female beloved, the poem 
leaves them indeterminately open. 
Later in the century, during the sonnet sequence craze of the 1590s, smiling 
women continue to be synonymous with women who cruelly reject their lovers and who 
                                                 
27
 Henry Howard, Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey: Poems, ed. Emrys Jones (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), poem 21. 
28
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deny them access to their bodies. In Barnabe Barnes’s Parthenophil and Parthenophe, 
the speaker laments, “Ay me Parthenophe smiles at my teares, / I neither take my rest by 
day, or night: / Her cruell loues in me such heate haue kindled.”
29
 In Giles Fletcher’s 
Licia, the speaker similarly complains, “I look'd (fayre Love) and you my love lookt 
fayre, / I sigh'd for love, and you for sport did smyle. / Your smyles were such as did 
perfume the ayre, / And this perfumed did my heart beguyle.”
30
 And in William Percy’s 
Sonnets to the Fairest Coelia, his speaker concludes one of his sonnets by saying, “Ay 
me, Ah no, teares, words, throbs all in vaine, / She scornes my dole, and smileth at my 
paine.”
31
 In other moments, a woman’s smile signifies not simply her cruel rejection but 
also her power to disarm the men around her. In book 2 of The Faerie Queene, Phaedria 
is able to get Guyon and Cymochles to stop fighting only after “she sweetly smyld.”
32
 
Female personifications, like Wyatt’s queen, also smile as a sign of their doubleness or 
unreliability. In Mathew Grove’s The Historie of Pelops and Hippodamia, Grove begins 
one poem by blaming the world’s problems on Fortune and her untrustworthy smile: 
“Whom fortune doth most smilingly aduance / Those sonest doth she cast vnto the 
ground / Unequall hap she holdeth still by chaunce, / For to extoll, or else defame by 
sound.”
33
 The frequency of these tropes suggests that Petrarchism is a mode that depends 
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 Barnabe Barnes, sestine 5, in Parthenophil and Parthenophe: A Critical Edition, ed. Victor A. Doyno 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), 127. 
30
 Giles Fletcher, sonnet 44, in Licia [Cambridge: John Legat, 1593], 45. 
31
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32
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33
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on the elusive Petrarchan mistress; as Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass state, 
once male “desire is filled,” the Petrarchan mistress “loses all value.”
34
 
Some scholars insist, however, that any exercise of female authority only feeds 
back into the authority of the male speaker. Wendy Wall, for instance, calls early modern 
authorship a “masculinized notion,” and she argues that “in the potent cultural and 
literary discourse of Petrarchism, . . . the woman often functioned as a trope for social 
prestige and poetic laurels.”
35
 Yet from the beginnings of Petrarchan literature in 
England, women functioned not only as characters written by male authors but also as 
writers themselves as well as transcribers and participants in manuscript culture. Some 
scholars have contested the idea that early modern Petrarchism was an exclusively male 
terrain. Ilona Bell examines the role women played in Petrarchan poetry as “writers, 
readers, and interlocutors, actively engaged in dialogue with men and other women,” and 
Mary Moore, looking at the number of women who did write Petrarchan poetry, argues 
that “particular traits” of the genre actually “invite female imitation” and that “its 
sometimes slippery gender roles opened a gap in prohibitions against early modern 
women’s writing, self-development, and subjectivity.”
 36
 The indeterminacy with which 
women are represented in the Petrarchan mode suggests that instead of closing women 
off, the genre requires their involvement and disrupts secure dichotomies of gender. 
                                                 
34
 Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, “The Politics of Astrophil and Stella,” Studies in English 
Literature, 1500-1900 24, no. 1 (1984): 67. 
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The surviving manuscripts from the period suggest that far from being solely 
fictive objects of desire, women participated in the very genre that some scholars say 
excludes them. In his survey of the manuscript system in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Arthur Marotti notes that “women figure in important ways as the owners, 
compilers, and contributors to the manuscript miscellanies and poetry anthologies.”
37
 The 
Devonshire manuscript, for instance, includes, along with its contributions by Shelton 
and Fitzroy, a poetic exchange between Margaret Douglas and Thomas Howard, who 
were imprisoned because their clandestine engagement made their claims to the throne 
too strong.
38
 In her poems, Douglas takes on a role usually reserved for men, that of a 
lover who cannot achieve union with her beloved: 
I may well say with joyfull harte 
   As neuer woman myght say beforn 
That I haue takyn to my part 
   The faythfullyst louer that ever was born.
39
 
Douglas’s assertions reveal the extent to which her position as a woman within the 
system of Petrarchan poetry is not fixed at all. Embracing her role as a desiring subject 
and swearing “To loue hym best vnto my graue,” Douglas suggests that her gendered 
place in Petrarchism is malleable. Rather than being incorporated into Howard’s 
subjectivity, Douglas asserts at the end of the poem her hope to incorporate him into her 
poetic world: “Unto god dayly I make my prayer / To bryng vs shortly both in one lyne.” 
                                                 
37
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The kind of poetic exchange that Douglas has with Howard is common in the 
early modern period and is part of a tradition of “answer” poems that circulate during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England.
40
 The speaker of the answer poem is 
usually female, rejecting a male lover’s pursuit from the previous poem. For instance, in 
the Blage manuscript, a male speaker demands,  
Madame, I you requyere  
No longer tyme detrack;  
Let truth in you aper,   
And geve me that I lak.  
In the following poem, a female speaker retorts,  
Your ffolyshe fayned hast  
Ffull small effecte shall tak;  
Your wordes in vayne ye wrast;  
Ye get not that ye lack.
41
  
Like the “place all voyde” that Surrey’s speaker finds when he pursues his beloved, the 
female speaker finds voice in this literary system only by articulating her inaccessibility. 
Paradoxically, she comes into being at the moment when she denies her material 
presence—“Ye get not that ye lack”—to her male suitor. In effect, she becomes the 
absent presence that the male speaker seeks in order to find voice at all. 
                                                 
40
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Petrarchism, then, rather than just rendering women objectified in their 
materiality, disrupts any clear ideas of material presence. Representations of the female 
body not only made women erotic commodities in Petrarchan literature, but they also 
exposed the difficulty of interpreting those bodies and often their very incoherence. 
Surviving poetry from the period indicates that women as well as men manipulated 
generic conventions to their advantage and that women could appropriate misogynist 
conventions to wield authority.  
 
A Piece of Bread 
Although scholars have examined the relationship between Petrarchism and other 
early modern discourses—those of patronage and colonialism, for example—
Reformation writing, until only recently, has not been one of them. Marotti, for instance, 
argues that love poetry was not about love, but about frustrated male courtiers: “Love 
lyrics could express figuratively the realities of suit, service, and recompense with which 
ambitious men were insistently concerned as well as the frustrations and disappointments 
experienced in socially competitive environments.”
42
 And Roland Greene argues for the 
colonial implications of Petrarchan literature, making a case for Petrarchism “as a widely 
adopted template in the discourse of discovery.”
43
  
A close look at Reformist views on transubstantiation also reveals a strong link to 
Petrarchism in its intense obsession with the question of bodily presence. Like Petrarchan 
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writers, Reformist writers focus on—and are willing to die for—the tension between 
bodily absence and presence. Just as the Petrarchan mistress is always unavailable but 
never fully absent, so for Reformist writers, the presence of Christ is adamantly not 
material in —yet never spiritually absent from—the bread that in the Catholic tradition 
purports to be his body. In works that argue against transubstantiation, Reformists 
repeatedly take the position—for which many of them would be burned during Mary’s 
reign—that Christ’s body, if it is in Heaven as recorded by the scriptures, cannot be in 
two places at once. In a response to Stephen Gardiner’s defense of transubstantiation, for 
example, John Hooper insists that “if Christ haue atrew body it must occopy place, in the 
sacrament it occopyyth no place then it folowith it is not there.”
44
 Similarly, a Marian 
martyr whose name Foxe records as “the wife of one called Prest” stresses that the bread 
can be only a remembrance and not Christ’s body itself: 
Then diuers of the Priests had her in handlyng, persuading her to leaue her 
wicked opinion about the Sacrament of the altar, the naturall body and 
bloud of our Sauiour Christ. But she made them aunswere that it was 
nothyng, but very bread and wyne, and that they might be ashamed to say 
that a peece of bread should be turned by a man into the naturall body of 
Christ, which bread doth vinow, and mice oftentimes doe eate it, and it 
doth mould and is burned: And (said she) Gods owne body will not be so 
handled nor kept in prison, or boxes, or aumbries. Let it be your God: it 
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shall not be myne: for my Sauiour sitteth on the right hand of God and 
doth pray for me. And to make that Sacramentall or significatiue bread 
instituted for a remembraunce, the very body of Christ, and to worship it, 
it is very foolishnes and deuilish disceate. (2250) 
Reformers like these carefully argue, however, that although Christ is physically absent, 
he is spiritually present. Hooper states that “Thowgh Christ be Absent bodely from his 
churche, yet with his ayed. Helpe and consolacion he is present in sprit which sufficit 
untill the end of the worold, where as we shall se his glorious body in dead really and 
corporally that now haue but a signe and sacrament thereof which sufficithe to kepe that 
holy sacrifice in memorie.”
45
 And Thomas Cranmer, also responding to Gardiner, argues, 
“And therfore you gather of my sayings vniustly, that Christ is in deede absent, for I say 
(according to Gods worde and the doctrine of the olde writers) that Christ is present in his 
sacramentes, as they teach also that he is present in his worde, when he worketh mightely 
by the same, in the hartes of the hearers.”
46
 Christ achieves, in these writers’ arguments, 
an “absent presence” similar to that of the Petrarchan mistress, a presence that is not there 
but that is nevertheless palpable. 
Of course, the language on which Reformist writers rely to make their case for 
this “absent presence” is inevitably corporeal. Like Petrarchan writers who obsessively 
praise the beloved’s breasts, eyes, and hands only to find them missing, Reformist writers 
depend on the language of the body to argue for Christ’s “bodiless” presence in the 
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Eucharist. In Hooper’s tract, although the Eucharist is “an inuisible miracle,” Hooper’s 
goal is to “to take away the uele of blyndenys.”
47
 And John Frith says that “I nether wyll 
nor can cease to speake / for the worde of God boylyth in my bodye / lyke a feruent fyere 
/ and wyll nedes haue an issue and breakyth oute / whan occasion ys geuyn.”
48
 Yet in 
insisting on a presence that is spiritual, these Reformist writers argue for a radically 
unstable idea of presence. In his absent presence, Christ acquires a kind of doubleness in 
that he can and cannot be felt, seen, or ingested. Like Petrarchan poets, Reformers 
passionately devoted themselves to what remained just out of their corporeal reach. 
Significantly, at moments when Reformers—particularly women Reformers—
denied the Catholic doctrine of real presence, crises of gender often occurred. For 
example, Foxe records in Acts and Monuments the examinations of Elizabeth Young, a 
Reformist who smuggled Protestant books into England during Mary’s reign. Over the 
course of her interrogations, as Catholic officials question Young about her involvement 
with the book trade and about her beliefs regarding transubstantiation, Roger Cholmley, a 
privy councilor under Mary, begins to doubt Young’s female gender, saying to Bishop 
Bonner, “xx. pound it is a man in a womans clothes: xx. pound it is a man” (2270). 
Cholmley’s accusation seems nonsensical and random, yet his skepticism about her 
female body intersects precisely with the moment at which she casts her own skepticism 
on Christ’s corporeality. For Cholmley, Young’s destabilization of Christ’s presence 
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leads him to question the stability of her own gendered presence. A few moments later, 
Young asserts, “I beleue that in the holy Sacrament of Christes body and bloud, which he 
did institute and ordeine and left among hys Disciples the night before he was betrayed, 
when I do receaue this Sacrament in faith and spirite, I do receiue Christ.” Cholmley 
immediately interjects, “Ah whore? spirite and fayth whore?” (2270). The coherence of 
Young’s gender identity has completely unraveled for Cholmley, who accuses her of 
being a transvestite and a whore at the same time.
49
 Young’s adherence to her 
sacramentarian beliefs produces for her Catholic opponents an instance in which clear 
categories of gender and the body come undone.  
The examinations of Alice Driver, another Marian martyr whose interrogations 
Foxe includes in Acts and Monuments, also disturb gender binaries. Driver, who like a 
Petrarchan mistress infuriates her interrogators by “comming into the place where she 
should be examined with a smiling countenaunce” (2247), outsmarts her Catholic 
opponents by getting them to admit that a sacrament is “the signe of an holy thing” 
(2248). Outraged and feeling as though he has been tricked, one of her interrogators, a 
scholar from Cambridge named George Gascoigne, asserts that Driver is wrong: “Then 
stood vp Doctor Gascoyne, and sayd, she was deceaued: for there were three churches: 
the malignant church, the church militant, and the church trimphant. So he would fayne 
haue made matter, but he could not tell which way.” When Driver demands that he “shew 
                                                 
49
 For a reading of Elizabeth’s Young’s examinations in the context of the transvestite English theater, see 
Steven Mullaney, “Reforming Resistance: Class, Gender, and Legitimacy in Foxe’s Book of Martyrs,” in 
Print, Manuscript, and Performance: The Changing Relations of the Media in Early Modern England, ed. 
Arthur F. Marotti and Michael D. Bristol (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000), 235-51. 
  
49 
 
 
the place where it is written,” Gascoigne cannot and feels forced to assert that “I am as 
good a Doctour as you” (2248). 
Driver’s success in undercutting Gascoigne’s masculine authority leads her even 
more forcefully to assert her own authority: 
Haue you no more to say? God be honored. You be not able to resist the 
spirit of God in me a poore woman. I was an honest poore mans daughter, 
neuer brought vp in the Vniuersitie as you haue bene, but I haue driuen the 
plough before my father many a tyme (I thanke God): yet notwithstanding 
in the defence of Gods truth, and in the cause of my master Christ, by his 
grace I will set my foote agaynst the foote of any of you all in the 
maintenaunce and defence of the same: and if I had a thousand lyues, it 
should go for payment therof. (2248) 
Although she cites her legitimacy in her presence as “a poore woman,” she is also an 
authority as masculine as the “doctors” next to her, having “driuen the plough before my 
father many a tyme” and being willing to “set my foote agaynst the foote of any of you.” 
Driver’s performance during her interrogations disables the male/female binary that her 
examiners, who frequently address her as “woman,” seek to uphold. By the end, it is 
unclear who possesses the more masculine qualities: the doctors from Cambridge who are 
caught in their own ignorance about scriptural text, or Driver herself, who demonstrates 
her physical and intellectual vigor by challenging their beliefs. 
It is moments like these—ones that obfuscate clear gender distinctions during 
intense debates about Christ’s material presence—that we find in Askew’s Examinations. 
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Askew’s text is a rich site for investigating these intersections between Petrarchism and 
Reformation martyrology, particularly in the nascent years of the 1540s when both these 
discourses were emerging in England for the first time. Askew’s text is embedded within 
the commentary of John Bale and John Foxe, both of whom use the corporeal language of 
the Petrarchan mistress to characterize the first major female martyr in Reformation 
England. Yet writing from a religious tradition that values text over body, immateriality 
over materiality, Askew points to the elusiveness of all bodies. Through her religious and 
gendered subject position, Askew suggests the ways in which both Petrarchism and 
Reformation martyrology are about bodily elision as much as bodily presence. Far from 
just an erotic commodity, Askew obscures the accessibility of her own body and presents 
a persona who eludes the desires of her interrogators. 
 
“And than I smyled” 
Anne Askew’s Examinations vividly enact the interplay between Petrarchism and 
the Reformation, particularly from a female perspective. Askew was a committed 
Reformist who denied the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and she was executed 
in 1546 for violating the Acts of the Six Articles, which reestablished Catholic doctrine 
as law in England in 1539. Scholars have commented on Askew’s smart and ironic use of 
scriptural text during her interrogations. Yet Askew’s connections to the court have been 
less examined. She had familial connections, for example, with Catherine Willoughby, 
Duchess of Suffolk, a member of Katherine Parr’s Reformist circle of women who was, 
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like Askew, from Lincolnshire.
50
 Askew’s text includes an account of her inquisitors’ 
attempt to force Askew—through torture—to implicate those associated with Parr: “Then 
they asked me of my ladye of Sothfolke, my ladye of Sussex, my ladye of Hertforde, my 
ladye Dennye, and my ladye Fizwyllyams. I sayd, if I shuld pronounce anye thynge 
agaynst them, that I were not hable to prove it.”
51
 It is unlikely that Catholic authorities, 
who sought to incriminate the Protestant Parr, would have taken such extreme measures 
against Askew were it not for these courtly connections.  
Moreover, Askew’s poem following the Examinations quotes directly from 
Surrey’s paraphrase of Ecclesiastes, showing that she had access to manuscripts—most of 
which contained a mix of religious and love poetry—that circulated at court.
52
 While it is 
often assumed that Askew was “a woman who read deeply (but not broadly) in 
English,”
53
 it is unlikely that she was insulated from Petrarchan discourse given the 
nature of manuscript circulation at the time. Her exposure to Petrarchan poetry shaped the 
elusiveness of her representation, and the resulting character, “Anne Askew,” is 
constituted by the overlapping discourses of Petrarchism and the Reformation, both of 
which articulate a presence that can never be fully present. The Examinations suggest that 
Askew is a figure who can achieve voice only at the moment when she disappears. 
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Since Askew’s emergence into the critical landscape in the 1980s, scholars have 
puzzled over her apparent slipperiness as a subject. As Joan Pong Linton asks, “Why was 
she reticent when she had the means to strike back at her persecutors in the forum of 
public opinion?”
54
 For some, Askew’s elusiveness suggests a nascent individualism that 
forms in resistance to the systems that oppress her. Elaine Beilin writes, “By showing 
herself to be not a weak woman, but a vanquisher of the papist foe, a learned, honest, 
God-fearing, Scripture-loving comrade in the faith, Askew was seeking to disclose her 
true identity,” and Kimberly Coles argues that in contrast to the writings of fellow 
Protestant reformers like Bale and Frith, which strive to articulate a creed of 
Protestantism, “Askew’s written narrative indicates a radical, and radically individual, 
faith. . . . She speaks for herself alone.”
55
 For others, Askew is a product of other 
authorial figures. Thomas Freeman and Sarah Wall argue that Askew’s text should be 
seen as a construction of both Bale and Foxe: “The formulation ‘Anne Askew’s 
Examinations’ is actually a misnomer; the text we have might more properly be called 
Bale’s Examinations of Anne Askew or Foxe’s Examinations of Anne Askew, and so forth. 
An autograph manuscript of Askew’s text has never been found. . . . Her voice only exists 
as it has been constructed by Bale and Foxe.”
56
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Arguments such as these focus much of their energy on trying to locate the 
identity of Askew the writer. Yet in a system of collaborative manuscript circulation, 
authorial identity becomes nearly impossible to pin down definitively. Like the female 
speaker in the answer poem of the Blage manuscript, who may not have even been 
written by a woman, “Askew” the writer will always be a vexed term, and like so many 
early modern writers, a term to be put in quotation marks.
57
 Looking at “Askew” the 
character, however, gets around the urgency of that question. An analysis of the ways in 
which her enigmatic persona—however collaboratively produced—is constituted by both 
the Petrarchan and the Reformist discourses that informed her creation illuminates the 
complexity of the literary and political system in which the real Askew lived, suffered, 
and died. It also highlights the complicated place of female voice in the early modern 
period, a place that negated as soon as articulated. Askew’s text suggests that, 
paradoxically, a woman must speak through this kind of “place all voyde” to speak at all. 
Scholars have also emphasized the ways in which Askew’s character diverges 
from representations of Askew by her editors, Bale and Foxe. While the “Askew” of the 
Examinations is an enigmatic figure, rarely using the language of the body, Bale and 
Foxe obsess about bodily details and suggest that she is a weak instrument made strong 
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through God. Yet what critics have failed to realize is that these modes of representation 
are actually two sides of the same coin. Bale and Foxe demonstrate influence of 
Petrarchism on them when they catalogue the body parts of Askew and other martyrs, 
especially female ones, yet their use of rhetorical devices like the blazon only points to 
the thing they can never fully possess. Like Wyatt, Surrey, and other contemporary 
Petrarchan poets, Bale and Foxe write about the erotic features of the beloved at the 
moment at which they cannot have her. Askew remains a perpetually desirable enigma, 
and this inaccessibility constitutes Askew’s entry point through which she can participate 
in the intellectual life of her culture. 
It is true that Bale’s contrasts to Askew are quite evident. In his preface to the first 
examinacyon, for instance, Bale focuses on the very moments of bodily torture that 
Askew minimizes, comparing her typologically to the early Christian martyr, Blandina: 
Blandina never faynted in torment. No more ded Anne Askewe in sprete, 
whan she was so terrybly racked of Wrysleye the chaunceller and Ryche, 
that the strynges of her armes and eyes were peryshed. Blandina deryded 
the cruelte of the tyrauntes. So ded Anne Askewe the madnesse of the 
Byshoppes and their speche men. Reade burnynge plates of yron and of 
brasse had Blandina put to her sydes.  
So had Anne Askew the flamynge brandes of fyre. (11) 
For Bale, Askew’s martyrdom manifests itself in its most spectacular moments of pain. 
While he praises both Blandina’s and Askew’s verbal derision of their tormentors, Bale 
also situates their power in the brokenness of their bodies—the “strynges” of Askew’s 
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arms and eyes and their mutilation through fire. Emphasizing that Askew was “yonge and 
tender” like Blandina (10), Bale draws attention to her innocence, frailty, and sexuality. 
Yet Bale’s excessive bodily details lead only to what he does not know. When 
Askew fails to provide crucial familial details about herself, for instance, Bale tries to fill 
them in, but his language questions his certainty: 
Notwithstandynge the marryage ones past, she demeaned her selfe lyke a 
Christen wyfe, and had by hym (as I am infourmed) ii. chyldren. In 
processe of tyme by oft readynge of the sacred Bible, she fell clerelye 
from all olde superstycyons of papystrye, to a perfyght beleve in Jhesus 
Christ. Wherby she so offended the prestes (as is to be seane afore) that he 
at their suggestion, vyolentlye drove her oute of hys howse. Whereupon 
she thought her selfe free from that uncomelye kynde of coacted 
marryage, by thys doctryne of S. Paule 1. Cor. 7. If a faytfull woman have 
an unbelevynge husbande, whych wyll not tarrye with her, she may leave 
hym. For a brother or syster is not in subjeccyon to soch, specyallye where 
as the marryage afore is unlawfull. Upon thys occasion (I heare saye) she 
sought of the law a dyvorcement from hym, namelye and above all, 
bycause he so cruellye drove her out of hys howse in despyght of Christes 
veryte. (92-3) 
Eager to resituate Askew within domestic roles, Bale emphasizes her demeanor as a 
“Christen wife” and her role as a mother, despite the fact that he obtains this information 
secondhand. His parenthetical qualifications like “as I am infourmed” and “as is to be 
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seane afore” betray his uncertainty about the facts (facts that he admits are “heare saye”), 
and his emphasis on these material aspects of Askew’s femininity suggests his anxiety 
about Askew’s radical departure from traditional female roles. Ultimately, he has 
difficulty placing her, both figuratively and literally, admitting, “What was done with the 
Ashes of Anne Askewe and her companyons, I can not yet tell” (12). For Bale, Askew 
retains value not only as an erotic commodity, but also as a figure who can never be 
completely located—as one whose ashes have disappeared. 
Foxe, too, grounds the power and emotional appeal of Askew’s story in her 
violated body, yet also like Bale, the appeal of Askew and other female martyrs lies in 
their inaccessibility. The Petrarchan influences on Foxe’s storytelling are clear in many 
moments of Acts and Monuments. In his description, for instance, of the Marian martyr 
Cicelie Ormes, who was executed for her Protestant beliefs in 1557, Foxe calls attention 
to the last moments of her burning: 
Then she came to the stake and laid her hand on it, and said: welcome the 
crosse of Christ. Which being done, she loking on her hand, & seing it 
blacked with the stake, she wiped it vpon her smocke, for she was burnt at 
the same stake that Simon Miller & Elizab. Cooper was burned at. Then 
after she had touched it with her hand, she came and kissed it, and sayd 
welcome the sweete crosse of Christ, and so gaue her selfe to be bound 
thereto. After the tormentors had kindled the fire to her, she said: My soule 
doth magnifie the Lord, and my spirite reioyceth in God my Sauiour, and 
in so saying, she set her hands together right against her brest, casting her 
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eyes and head vpward, and so stoode, heauing vp her handes by little and 
litle, till the very sinowes of her armes brast asunder, and then they fell: 
but she yelded her life vnto the Lord as quietly as she had ben in a 
slumber, or as one feeling no paine: So wonderfully did the Lorde worke 
wyth her: hys name therefore be praysed for euermore, Amen. (2219) 
While Foxe’s description of Ormes does conform to a long Christian tradition in which, 
according to Susannah Brietz Monta, “martyrs should be brave and patient, composed, 
long-suffering, even joyful,”
58
 the text here also conforms to Petrarchan conventions 
similar to the ones adopted by Wyatt and Surrey in the 1530s. Foxe lingers on Ormes’s 
individual body parts—in particular, her hands, eyes, and breasts—and characterizes her 
as a conventional “fair” Petrarchan mistress. Foxe emphasizes the whiteness of her hand, 
for example, when he notes that “loking on her hand, & seing it blacked with the stake, 
she wiped it vpon her smocke.”
59
 Ormes’s kissing of the cross, in which she welcomes 
the “sweete crosse of Christ,” draws attention to her lips as well as her erotic potential.  
The accompanying woodcut, first present in the 1570 edition of Acts and 
Monuments, corroborates this Petrarchan vision. Her nipples protruding prominently 
through her garment and her hair draping around her shoulder, Ormes is an object of 
desire. Her blazoned body becomes homologous to her blazing body; Ormes’s 
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fragmented body parts are at once idealized and commodified, delicate and grotesque. 
Foxe thus provides a vivid example here of the relationship that Vickers sees between 
violence and the blazoned female body in which the “stylized fragmentation and 
reification of the female body” provides an arena in which men play their battles—in 
Foxe’s case, an epic battle between the Reformers and the Catholic Church.
60
 Foxe’s 
account of Ormes’s death reveals the extent to which Petrarchism and Reformation 
martyrology both rely a great deal on the broken female body as an authorizing strategy. 
Yet all the talk about Ormes’s body inevitably leads to an absence—a moment 
when her body turns to ash. Despite the detailed and grotesque cataloguing of body parts, 
most martyrs in Acts and Monuments become inaccessible at the moment they burn. Foxe 
emphasizes, for instance, Askew’s broken, sexually violated body only to point to its 
dissolution. Foxe first printed Askew’s account in his Latin Rerum Ecclesia Gestarum 
Commentarii, published in 1559. Appended to his introduction to Askew is a eulogy, “In 
Annae Askevae Constantissimae foeminae & martyris bustum, Epitaphium Sapphicum, 
I.F.” (“Epitaph in Sapphic Verse upon the tomb of the most steadfast woman and martyr 
Anne Askew”). In the poem, Foxe focuses on Askew’s sexuality: 
O warder, whose wicked hands are drenched in blood, why 
do you vainly stretch her limbs on the rack and violently  
tear apart a virtuous girl better far than you? 
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
The executioner comes forth, seething with ruthless fury:  
her tendons untied, the woman lies tied up to make her  
betray her partners in religion. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Her limbs are forced apart; her bones are broken, severed 
from their joints; nothing in that chaste body is left intact.
61
 
Like a Petrarchan mistress, Askew is praised for both her chastity and her body torn 
apart. Foxe asserts her sexual purity—“that chaste body”—only to emphasize its 
violation. His images suggest the violence of sexual assault (“her limbs on the rack,” “her 
tendons untied,” “Her limbs . . . forced apart), recuperating this violence into a vehicle for 
the Protestant Reformation.
62
 Yet toward the end of the poem, Foxe writes, “So she who 
could not otherwise be overcome by instruments / of torture is at last dissolved by death 
in the flames, / and her ashes are blessed with life everlasting.”
63
 Despite the obsession 
with her erotic body, in the end Askew’s body—“dissolved by death”—is out of reach 
and perpetually desirable—something that Foxe cannot possess in its material presence. 
It is precisely this emphasis on elusiveness that brings Askew’s persona into 
being. From her very first sentences, Askew announces her presence in the text in a move 
that simultaneously withdraws it:  
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To satisfie your expectation, good people (sayth she) this was my first 
examynacyon in the yeare of oure Lorde M. D. xlv and in the moneth of 
Marche, first Christofer dare examyned me at Sadlers hall, beynge one of 
the quest, and asked yf I ded not beleve that the sacrament hangynge over 
the aultre was the verye bodye of Christ reallye. Then I demaunded thys 
question of hym, wherfore S. Steven was stoned to deathe? And he sayde, 
he coulde not tell. Then I answered, that no more wolde I assoyle hys 
vayne questyon. (19-20) 
On the one hand, Askew clearly situates herself squarely within the Reformist 
community, directly addressing the “good people” of the same faith and outsmarting her 
interrogators with a reference to Saint Steven, the martyr who was killed for claiming that 
God does not dwell in temples made with hands—a reason similar to the ones for which 
Protestant martyrs of the sixteenth century died. Yet significantly, Askew addresses the 
examiner’s question about the presence of Christ’s body with a refusal to answer at all: 
“no more wolde I assoyle hys vayne questyon.” At the moment that the materiality of 
Christ’s body comes into question, so does the materiality of Askew’s presence as a 
desired female subject. Askew’s character behaves much like a Petrarchan mistress, 
rejecting her suitor by refusing to give him access to her material presence. Like the 
female speaker of the answer poem, who tells her suitor, “Your wordes in vayne ye 
wrast; / Ye get not that ye lack,” or like Mary Shelton, who refuses to answer Wyatt’s 
“ondesyerd sarwes,” Askew asserts her presence only by withholding it. 
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Askew’s male contemporaries who wrote about their interrogations address the 
same issue of transubstantiation, but they do not represent themselves with the same 
elusiveness. John Frith, for example, wrote an account of his examinations that occurred 
shortly before his death in 1533 in A boke made by Iohn Frith, a book that Askew 
mentions in the Examinations. In this book, Frith represents himself as directly 
confronting the challenge posed by his adversaries: “Well sayd they / do you not thincke / 
that hys very naturall body / bothe flesshe and bloude ys really contayned vnder the 
sacrament / and there actually present / besyde all similitudes. No sayd I / I do not so 
thincke.”
64
 He concludes his treatise matter-of-factly: 
The cause of my deathe is this / because I can not in consciens abiure and 
swere / that our prelates opinion of the sacrament (that is / that the 
substaunce of brede and wine is verely chaunged in to the fleshe and 
bloude of our sauiour Iesus Christ) is an vndouted / article of the faythe / 
necessary to be beleauid vnder the paine of dampnacyon.
65
 
Frith’s interrogators seek to bend him toward their will, but Frith quickly and clearly 
denies their claims and asserts allegiance to his faith. Although his interrogators, like 
Askew’s, seek to uncover their prisoner’s theological beliefs, Frith, as a male figure, does 
not perform the role of elusive mistress that is available to Askew as a female figure.  
In contrast to Frith’s text, the Examinations represent Askew’s interrogators as 
insatiably desiring subjects and Askew as a figure impossible to pin down.
66
 Christopher 
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Dare “requyred moche to knowe therin my meaninge” (24); Bishop Bonner demands that 
Askew “utter the bottom of my harte” (44); John Standish “byd me saye my mynde” 
(54); and William Paget “desyred me to speake my mynde to hym” (99). Unlike Frith, 
who is direct in his replies, Askew responds with silence, more questions, or answers 
like, “That I have sayd to my lorde of London, I have sayd” (54), even when what she 
had said before is not clear at all. Represented as never fully available to those who so 
desperately want her innermost thoughts, Askew’s character maintains a tension between 
being a present, speaking subject, and an absent, inaccessible persona. 
The Examinations frequently question, in fact, the very coherence of the 
interiority that Askew’s interrogators seek. In one of the most provocative moments of 
the text, Askew responds to her questioners not only with silence but also with a smile:  
Besydes thys my lorde mayre layed one thynge unto my charge, which 
was never spoken of me, but of them. And that was, whether a mouse 
eatynge the hoste, receyved God or no? Thys questyon ded I never aske, 
but in dede they asked it of me, wherunto I made them no answere, but 
smyled. (27) 
In a swift stroke, Askew’s character becomes charged with the very ambiguous power 
that legitimates the cruel, smiling mistress of Petrarchan poetry. A smile is, of course, a 
bodily sign, but one that is impossible to interpret with any certainty. Askew’s smile 
suggests the illegibility of the female body—and also the control a female subject can 
gain from that very position of illegibility. Her smile could be read as a sign of 
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condescension, of intellectual superiority, or even of the absurdity of the question. But 
her interrogators—or her readers, for that matter—can never know for sure.  
Askew smiles in moments when her character wishes to signal the kind of 
doubleness that pervades the poetry of Wyatt, Surrey, and their contemporaries. She 
smiles for the second time in the lattre examinacyon, again at a moment in which her 
sacramentarian beliefs come under fire. In the lattre examinacyon, Askew is more direct 
about her Reformist beliefs, stating outright, “And as for that ye call your God, is but a 
pece of breade. For a more profe thereof (marke it whan ye lyst), lete it lye in the boxe 
but iii. monthes, and it wyll be moulde, and so turne to nothynge that is good. Whereupon 
I am persuaded, that it can not be God” (111). Yet despite her directness, Askew remains 
at least partly elusive: 
After that they wylled me to have a prest. And than I smyled. Then they 
asked me, if it were not good? I sayd, I wolde confesse my fawtes to God. 
For I was sure that he wolde heare me with faver. And so we were 
condempned without a quest. (112) 
Rejecting of course the Catholic practice of confession, Askew does so in a manner that 
infuriates her interrogators. Like Wyatt’s queen, Askew frustrates resolution at the 
moment when her male interlocutors desire it. When they seek access to the innermost 
secrets of her conscience, Askew denies them that access by signifying her body with a 
sign impossible to interpret. Her faults are interpretable only when she is in the company 
of God—only, that is, when her body is irrelevant. 
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It is this doubleness with which Askew responds to her opponents—often more 
than her Reformist beliefs—that frustrates them. For example, when Bonner tries to get 
Askew to sign a recantation, Askew agrees, but adds to the document, “I Anne Askewe 
do beleve all maner thynges contayned in the faythe of the Catholyck churche” (62). 
Because in the early days of the Reformation both Catholics and Reformists applied the 
term “Catholic” to describe their beliefs, the word loses its fixed meaning in Askew’s 
statement, and the doubleness is not lost on Bonner: “Then because I ded adde unto it, the 
Catholyck church, he flonge into hys chambre in a great furye” (62). Askew’s ambiguity 
gives her power, even if that power is only temporary and cannot prevent what will 
eventually happen to her body. Askew’s body is eventually tortured and executed for her 
beliefs, but her character in the Examinations remains an absent presence—an enigma 
that can frustrate her male interlocutors at the very moments they desire her. 
Askew sustains her ambiguity through her persistent references to her own 
gender, and she prevents resolution by making the category of “woman” incoherent to her 
interrogators. When her examiners return to the issue of transubstantiation, pressing her 
again to answer whether a “beast” can ingest divinity, Askew uses the laws against 
women to her advantage: 
Fortly he asked me, if the host shuld fall, and a beast ded eate it, whether 
the beast ded receyve God or no? I answered, Seynge ye have taken the 
paynes to aske thys questyon, I desyre yow also to take so moche payne 
more, as to assoyle it your selfe. For I wyll not do it, bycause I perceyve 
ye come to tempte me. And he sayd, it was agaynst the ordre of scoles, 
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that he whych asked the questyon, shuld answere it. I tolde hym, I was but 
a woman, and knewe not the course of scoles. (34) 
Again, at the moment in which Askew’s interrogators demand that Askew affirm the 
material presence of Christ’s body, Askew avoids doing so by pointing to the slipperiness 
of her material presence as a woman. While Bale takes Askew’s profession of womanly 
ignorance at face value (“Thys hongrye wolfe practyseth by all craftye wayes possyble, to 
sucke the bloude of thys innocent lambe” [36]), Askew makes it clear that she plays the 
role of woman only when it can frustrate her opponents. From the first lines of her text 
she demonstrates her exegetical knowledge and her ability to outmatch her interrogators’ 
use of scripture, yet she justifies her reticence with Biblical and early modern norms of 
feminine conduct. The text suggests that Askew can appear—and disappear—as a woman 
at her will throughout the examinations. 
Later in the first examinacyon she again points to the incoherence of gender 
norms, saying, “Then he asked me, whye I had so fewe wordes? And I answered. God 
hath geven me the gyfte of knowlege, but not of utteraunce. And Salomon sayth, that a 
woman of fewe wordes, is a gyfte of God, Prover. 19” (51). At once expressing the ideal 
of female silence and showcasing her scriptural interpretation, Askew exposes the ways 
in which gender operates not as a stable bodily condition but as a set of competing 
representations that can be exploited for different effects. Almost immediately after 
quoting scripture to justify her silence, Askew claims that, “beynge a woman,” she does 
not have the capacity to interpret the Bible at all: “And then doctor Standish desyered my 
lorde, to byd me saye my mynde, concernynge that same text of S. Paule. I answered, that 
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it was agaynst saynt Paules lernynge, that I beynge a woman, shuld interprete the 
scriptures, specyallye where so manye wyse lerned men were” (54). Askew’s statement 
unravels the coherence of gender identity before her interrogators’ eyes. Quoting Paul’s 
injunction against female preaching while at the same time using that injunction to avoid 
speaking her mind about scripture, Askew demonstrates that the very means of 
forbidding women’s access to scripture paradoxically require them to be familiar with 
and interpret scripture. Askew is able to defer as a woman to the “wyse lerned men” only 
because she has an intricate knowledge of scripture in the first place. 
Even in moments of intense bodily pain, Askew represents herself with a degree 
of ambiguity that suggests that her torturers can never fully possess her body—even 
when they physically do. In one of the most remarked upon moments in the 
Examinations, Askew describes the torture that she endured for refusing to implicate the 
women in Parr’s circle, and she reports what happened in compressed language: 
Then they sayd, there were of the counsell that ded maynteyne me. And I 
sayd, no. Then they ded put me on the racke, bycause I confessed no 
ladyes nor gentyllwomen to be of my opynyon, and theron they kepte me a 
longe tyme. And bycause I laye styll and ded not crye, my lorde 
Chauncellour and master Ryche, toke peynes to racke me their owne 
handes, tyll I was nygh dead. (127) 
Like so many other Reformation martyrs, Askew emphasizes her patient suffering: “I 
laye styll and ded not crye.” The language of the body becomes more prominent here 
than in any other moment in the text. Scholars such as James Truman argue that the 
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language here is infused with sexual violence and that “the perception of her torture as 
rape authorizes [Askew’s] resistant voice.”
67
 Yet more than a helpless victim, Askew is 
represented as one who evades her desiring subjects’ full control. Askew focuses on the 
insatiable desire of her torturers, who “toke peynes to racke me their owne handes,” but 
she also suggests that she slips through their grasp: 
Then the lyefetenaunt caused me to be loused from the racke. 
Incontynentlye I swounded, and then they recovered me agayne. After that 
I sate ii. longe houres reasonynge with my lorde Chauncellour upon the 
bare floore, where as he with manye flatterynge wordes, persuaded me to 
leave my opynyon. But my lorde God (I thanke hys everlastynge 
goodnesse) gave me grace to persever, and wyll do (I hope) to the verye 
ende. (130) 
Despite the chancellor’s “flaterynge wordes,” Askew refuses to give her torturers the 
information they seek. Askew’s character does not even tell the reader what transpired 
while she was “reasonynge with my lorde Chauncellour upon the bare floore” during 
those “ii. longe houres.” The text fails to articulate fully this highly dramatic moment, 
and Askew’s presence escapes the interrogators’ and the readers’ control. Askew 
becomes curiously disembodied even at a time of intense physical pain. The text suggests 
that Askew can “persever” as a voice only if her body remains difficult to locate. 
The Examinations suggest, then, that Askew’s ability as a female figure to 
participate in literary and political culture depends on the very disappearing acts in her 
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text that render her body difficult to pin down. Askew’s sustained tension between 
absence and presence—her enigmatic persona—emerges as deeply informed by both the 
Petrarchan and Reformist discourses that shape it. Askew’s depiction as an elusive 
female subject draws from the Petrarchan tropes—the smiling, the silence, the obstinacy 
toward desiring male figures—that pervade her character’s responses. Yet it also draws 
from Askew’s skepticism about material presence and her Reformist belief that one 
cannot “take Christ for the materyall thynge that he is sygnyfyed by” (99). Askew writes 
in the lattre examinacyon that “ye shall fynde playnelye, that the thynges whych are 
seane are temporall, but they that are not seane are everlastynge” (90). Askew’s character 
is one that can never be “seane” in full focus, but always one who is suggestive of a 
presence much more powerful than her bodily one alone. 
 
A Coy Dame 
Askew’s representation as an elusive female subject means, of course, that she 
was vulnerable to critique not only for her Reformist beliefs but also for the very courtly 
doubleness that helped afford her authority in the Examinations. Wyatt and his 
contemporaries pay no compliment to women when they accuse them of being cruel or 
double, but draw from a long tradition of viewing women as untrustworthy, unfaithful, 
and deceptive. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Askew incurred 
pejorative manifestations of the very strategies that enabled her to outmaneuver her 
interrogators. The Jesuit Robert Parsons, a member of the underground Catholic network 
in England, writes of Askew in 1604,  
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For that she was a coy dame, and of very euill fame for wantonnesse: in 
that she left the company of her husband, Maister Kyme, to gad vp & 
downe the countrey a ghospelling & ghossipinge where she might, & 
ought not. And this for diuers yeares before her imprisonment; but 
especially she delighted to be in London neere the court. . . . By all which, 
and by the publike opinion and fame, that was of her lightnesse & liberty 
in that behalfe: euery man may ghesse, what Iuuencula she was & how fitt 
for Bales pen, & for Fox his Calendar. And the proud & presumptuous 
answers, quips, and nips, which she gaue both in matter of Religion, & 
otherwise to the Kings Councell, and Bishops, when they examined her, 
and dealt with her seriously for her amendment: do well shew her 
intollerable arrogancy.
68
  
The “coyness” that Askew’s character exhibits in the Examinations becomes a liability 
when read through her enemies. Askew’s agility in evading her interrogators’ questions 
becomes “wantonnesse” and “arrogancy,” and even her silence becomes loquacious when 
Parsons emphasizes her “ghospelling & ghossipinge” around the country. Her 
“presumptuous answers” suggest to Parsons that she is a sexually loose girl, a Iuuencula 
or a young cow. Yet even in his vehement critique of Askew, Parsons exposes his 
inability to contain the threat that Askew’s coyness unleashes. The “quips, and nips” that 
Askew delivers to her examiners and the “arrogancy” she suggests through her silences 
remain “intolerable” even sixty years later. Askew’s elusiveness kept the power relations 
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open indefinitely in a situation that might have excluded her participation, enabling her to 
have a voice by maintaining bodily enigma. Whether viewed as a heretic or a champion 
of faith, Askew remained formidable in the public eye and difficult to locate completely. 
Interestingly, the Examinations end not on a note of certainty but on one of 
gender ambiguity. In “The Balade whych Anne Askewe made and sange whan she was in 
Newgate,” which is appended to Bale’s editions of the Examinations, Askew offers her 
readers an intriguing moment of cross-dressing:  
Lyke as the armed knyght 
Appoynted to the fielde 
With thys worlde wyll I fyght 
And fayth shall be my shielde. (149) 
An androgynous knight, Askew constitutes her identity as a fighter for her faith by the 
armor she dons rather than the body beneath it. Like Elizabeth Young, who is accused of 
being “a man in a womans clothes,” Askew generates gender uncertainty in upholding 
her Reformist beliefs. The poem suggests that Askew retains control by operating within 
the courtly and Reformist conventions that make her identity difficult to situate. 
Critics often highlight this poem for its allusion to Surrey’s translation of 
Ecclesiastes and for the ways in which both Askew and Surrey offer a thinly veiled 
indictment of Henry VIII’s tyranny: 
I sawe a ryall trone 
Where Justyce shuld have sytt 
But in her stede was one 
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Of modye cruell wytt. 
Absorpt was rygtwysnesse 
As of the ragynge floude 
Sathan in hys excesse. 
Sucte up the gyltelesse bloude. (150) 
Here, Henry’s policies have allowed the devil to occupy the royal throne. Even worse, 
Henry possibly represents “Sathan” himself, who is responsible for the “gyltelesse 
bloude” of Askew and of the martyrs that came before her. Yet the poem suggests that 
the most effective way for Askew—as a courtly woman—to assert a combative voice 
against Henry’s oppression is to speak within the generic modes that render her female 
body inscrutable. Not just a victim of religious oppression, Askew keeps her ability to 
continue to fight her opponents—to continue to articulate a voice—by avoiding the 
reification of her body that was destined to perish for her beliefs. 
Askew remains, then, for both contemporary figures and modern critics, a figure 
of such fascination partly because of the ways in which the Examinations prevent clear 
resolution of her martyrdom by maintaining the ambiguity of her gender and of her body. 
Her character is enabled by the conventions of Petrarchism and the Reformation—
discourses that both unsettle material subjectivity. Although as readers, we may, like 
Petrarchan lovers or like her interrogators, desire access to what lies behind her silences 
or behind her armor of faith, the Examinations ensure Askew’s continued power as a 
speaking voice by preventing us from ever reaching it. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Queenship and the Female Counterfeit in Early Modern England 
 
 One of the most striking aspects of the trial of Mary Queen of Scots in 1586 is 
Elizabeth’s absence. Contemporary documents place special emphasis on Elizabeth’s 
missing body. Her absence is conspicuous, staged by the prominence of her empty chair. 
A drawing of the trial depicts at the very top of the page Elizabeth’s empty chair, 
physically larger than the figure of Mary to its right in the doorway.
1
 And the official 
record of the trial notes, “At the upper end of the Chamber was placed a chair for the 
Queen of England, under a cloth of estate. Over-against it, below and more remote, near 
the transom or beam that ran cross the room, stood a chair for the Queen of Scots.”
2
 
Elizabeth’s invisibility is triumphant at this moment, demonstrating her authenticity as 
queen. Mary, on the other hand, despite her physical presence, her tears, and her frequent 
assertions that she is “an absolute Queen” and thus exempt from the laws of England, is 
condemned as a traitor.
3
 
How can we understand Elizabeth’s unwillingness to be in the same room with 
Mary, which she maintained throughout Mary’s nineteen-year captivity in England and 
which climaxed in the powerful symbol of her empty chair? Historians have often 
interpreted Elizabeth’s rejections of Mary’s repeated requests to meet in person as an 
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example either of her extreme cold-heartedness—her “realpolitik” attitude toward her 
cousin, as P.J. Holmes puts it—or of her fear of Mary’s charm.
4
 Jane Dunn argues that 
Elizabeth “grew increasingly distant and aloof, fearful of what she believed was Mary’s 
almost magical power to enchant, already exaggerated in her imagination and fuelled 
with the stories of others.”
5
 Yet the complexity of Elizabeth’s stance toward Mary—her 
refusal to see her and yet her insistence in her letters and speeches of sisterly proximity—
suggests that more is at work here than just Elizabeth’s political ruthlessness or Mary’s 
personal charm. Why was Mary’s proximity so physically threatening yet so 
metaphorically necessary for Elizabeth’s power? This chapter seeks to put into a larger 
context Elizabeth’s relationship with Mary and to interrogate the framework for their 
sustained tension between absence and presence. 
One cultural force certainly at work is Elizabeth’s ability to separate herself from 
her body natural. Elizabeth is pure body politic at this moment, the intangible corporate 
entity that stands for her sovereignty, and this intangibility establishes both her 
legitimacy as queen and her superiority over Mary (whose chair was “below and more 
remote” than Elizabeth’s empty one). More than any of the English kings that came 
before her, Elizabeth constantly negotiated the theory of the king’s two bodies, 
separating, as many scholars have argued, her male body politic from her female body 
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natural in order to strengthen the shaky authority of female sovereignty.
6
 In her well-
known Tilbury speech in 1588, Elizabeth says to her troops, “I know I have the body but 
of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and stomach of a king and a king of 
England too.”
7
 Elizabeth famously suggests here that her place in the invisible body 
politic can compensate for her corporeal female presence. 
Yet while scholars have long assumed the body politic to be male,
8
 Elizabeth’s 
absence in the trial of Mary Queen of Scots—keenly reflected in her sister figure—
suggests that the concept also incorporates elements that are specifically female. Critics 
have in fact questioned the male/female binary of the king’s two bodies, looking at how 
Elizabeth blurs gender roles in complicated ways,
9
 and Marie Axton points out that the 
first publication to detail the idea of the body politic in English was actually a pamphlet 
that uses the theory to defend the right of Mary Queen of Scots from charges of duplicity, 
asserting her right to the English throne as well as her right as a woman to rule.
10
 First 
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published in 1569 despite Elizabeth’s suppression of materials sympathetic to Mary,
11
 
John Leslie’s A defence of the honour of the right highe, mightye and noble Princesse 
Marie Quene of Scotland complicates the idea that the theory of the king’s two bodies 
was one that Elizabeth alone manipulated to her own benefit, and it also implies that the 
theory hinges on contemporary gender anxieties—particularly the fear of the female 
duplicity—just as much as on the theological concepts from which the theory stems.
12
 
This chapter posits that Elizabeth’s and Mary’s struggles over their female 
sovereignty can be fully understood only by examining their intersections with another 
discourse equally concerned with the doubleness of women: Petrarchism. Part of what 
makes a Petrarchan mistress elusive is the difficulty of determining a real mistress from a 
false, or counterfeit, one. Language of counterfeiting is of course not limited to 
Petrarchism—Shakespearean characters like Richard III and Falstaff, who were known 
for their duplicity, were accused of “counterfeiting” their behavior, for example
13
—but 
anxiety about counterfeiting became particularly intense when the counterfeit in question 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the king’s two bodies in Richard II (24-41). Yet Plowden’s Reports were originally written in French 
and were not translated into English until the seventeenth century. Axton criticizes Kantorowicz for failing 
to “explore the Elizabethan setting [of the theory of the king’s two bodies] in any depth,” and her book 
considers “in more detail the political circumstances in which the concept flourished” (15). She asserts, 
“Through Leslie’s printed pamphlet Plowden’s interpretation of history by means of the king’s two bodies 
reached a wide range of English readers” (20). 
11
 James Emerson Phillips, Images of a Queen: Mary Stuart in Sixteenth-Century Literature (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), 89. 
12
 John Leslie, A defence of the honour of the right highe, mightye and noble Princesse Marie Quene of 
Scotlande and dowager of France, with a declaration aswell of her right, title & intereste to the succession 
of the crowne of Englande, as that the regimente of women ys conformable to the lawe of God and nature 
(London: Eusebius Dicaeophile, 1569). All subsequent references to this pamphlet will be cited by page 
number parenthetically in the text. 
13
 See 1 Henry VI, when Somerset tells Richard, “’Tis not for fear, but anger, that thy cheeks / Blush for 
pure shame to counterfeit our roses” (The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. J. M. 
Tobin, 2
nd
 ed. [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997], 2.4.65-66); and 1 Henry IV, when Falstaff says to Prince 
Harry, “Counterfeit? I lie, I am no counterfeit. To die is to be a counterfeit, for he is but the counterfeit of a 
man who hath not the life of a man” (5.4.114-17). 
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was a woman. Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene, for instance, imagines legitimate 
Petrarchan mistresses/queens—Una, Florimell, Britomart, Mercilla—only by describing, 
and ultimately eliminating, their counterfeit doubles—Duessa, False Florimell, Radigund, 
Lucifera. Of course, the very process of doubling these female characters calls into 
question the distinctions between them and suggests that both the concept of authenticity 
and the concept of the body politic are frauds. Yet the anxiety about authenticating a true 
female self in Petrarchan literature points to the cultural currency of the concept of the 
counterfeit woman—its potential to undermine as well as (tenuously) uphold the idea of a 
woman in power. Elizabeth could show herself as the legitimate female sovereign only in 
relation to a counterfeit double, Mary Queen of Scots.
14
 
The leitmotif that runs through Leslie’s pamphlet is, in fact, the idea of the 
counterfeit. Leslie argues that any evidence that his opponents produce against Mary’s 
claim to the throne—including the letters and poems incriminating Mary, Henry VIII’s 
will barring his sister Margaret’s descendants from the throne, and the laws of nature 
cited to prove that women’s rule is monstrous—is counterfeit. He insists that Mary Queen 
of Scots is the real thing: the true heir to the throne and a part of the invisible body politic 
to which Elizabeth lays claim. Leslie’s anxious insistence on Mary’s authenticity as 
queen and yet his claim that the queen is so easily counterfeited highlight the 
intersections between the discourses about female sovereignty and the discourses about 
the false Petrarchan woman. The absent presence of Elizabeth during Mary’s trial, the 
                                                 
14
 See Mary Thomas Crane, Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), for a reading of how the courtly lyric was used to 
demonstrate a sense of authenticity, “to assert a feeling presence, a genuine speaking voice engendered by 
desire and pain” (156). Crane argues that the courtly lyric existed in tension with the humanist tradition of 
aphoristic poetry, particulary in Wyatt’s lyrics. 
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charges against Mary that she is a false counterfeit, and the long, painful exchange 
between the two queens in which Mary pleads to Elizabeth to allow her to authenticate 
herself before her—all of these cultural expressions suggest that Petrarchism is at play 
when one of the most important questions in early modern England—that of who is the 
real queen—is being decided. 
Scholars have long noted Elizabeth’s use of Petrarchan conventions throughout 
her reign. Susan Frye, for instance, argues that in Elizabeth’s own Petrarchan lyrics, 
Elizabeth creates distance between her and her courtiers, sending “a clear if ironic 
message to her ‘suitors’ to leave her alone.”
15
 Yet Elizabeth’s relationship to Petrarchism 
is more than just a tool for managing her male courtiers. It is also a high stakes cultural 
discourse that she needs to survive as a female sovereign. Elizabeth’s correspondence 
with Mary Queen of Scots and her handling of her trial suggest that she recognizes that to 
prove her authenticity as a queen, she must prove her authenticity as a woman—which 
involves holding up and eventually eliminating her counterfeit double. To do so, she 
carefully stages both her absence and presence, performing the role of the elusive 
Petrarchan mistress to make sure that she is not the one who materializes as the 
counterfeit double and that she is not the one who disappears in the end. 
This chapter will examine sixteenth-century discourses on female counterfeits, 
looking at how the anxiety about a woman’s ability to rule intersects with the anxiety 
                                                 
15
 Frye, Elizabeth I, 110. See also Louis Adrian Montrose, who focuses on Elizabeth’s courtiers’ use of 
Petrarchan language, which he argues “provided her (male) subjects with a flexible medium—at once 
humble, elegant, and intimate—in which they could supplicate and inveigle their royal mistress, and in 
which they could project and symbolically master the condition of their subjection to a female ruler” (“The 
Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text,” in Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts, ed. Patricia Parker 
and David Quint [Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986], 325-26). 
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about determining a true woman from a false one. I argue that the theory of the king’s 
two bodies is not only a “crypto-theological” medieval concept
16
 but also a concept that 
overlaps with sixteenth-century ideas about the elusive Petrarchan mistress. I look at a 
variety of texts that deal with the question of female sovereignty, suggesting that the 
debate about the body politic—about whether a person is part of a larger, invisible, 
sovereign corporation—becomes most charged when the body in question is female.  
 
Leslie’s Defense of Mary 
Published the year after Mary fled to England in 1568 and became a prisoner of 
Elizabeth, Leslie’s pamphlet makes three claims about Mary: that she is a true woman, 
innocent of the charges against her; that she is a true sovereign, next in line to the English 
throne; and that women have the right to rule because true women could be true 
sovereigns. His threefold argument reveals the proximity of the anxieties about 
sovereignty and about women. On the one hand, Leslie’s argument about Mary’s 
authenticity props up her validity as a sovereign, but on the other, it calls into question 
the entire idea of sovereignty, which can be determined only by holding up other versions 
of Mary—like those in the love letters supposedly written by her—as counterfeits. 
Leslie published his pamphlet in response to a number of controversies, both 
recent and longstanding, surrounding Mary. The most recent controversy was the murder 
of Mary’s second husband, Lord Darnley, in 1567. Mary’s opponents, including her 
illegitimate half-brother, the earl of Moray, accused Mary of conspiring to murder 
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 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 16. 
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Darnley with the earl of Bothwell, whom she hastily married shortly after Darnley’s 
death. At the time of the pamphlet’s publication, Mary had sought refuge in England 
from those who had driven her out of Scotland, and she found herself a prisoner of 
Elizabeth. One of the primary pieces of evidence Mary’s opponents used against her was 
a set of love letters and sonnets now called the Casket Letters, supposedly written by 
Mary to Bothwell. In these papers, the female speaker professes her love for Bothwell 
and her jealousy of Bothwell’s wife.
17
 Moray’s use of the Casket Letters as the main 
evidence of Mary’s guilt suggests that Mary’s threat derives not only from her potential 
role as a murderer but also from her role as Petrarchan mistress—a false, deceiving 
female lover. Leslie argues that these documents are forgeries, a situation that many 
historians today believe is probable,
18
 but regardless of their validity, they point to the 
strong cultural anxiety about the doubleness of women. 
Leslie’s pamphlet also addresses the longstanding controversies over Mary’s 
place in the succession of the English throne as well as her ability as a woman to rule. 
Despite many tactical disadvantages, Mary insisted on her right to inherit England’s 
crown throughout her entire life, rejecting the Treaty of Edinburgh, which would have 
barred Mary from wearing English arms. Yet Elizabeth, refusing to name any successors 
and particularly reluctant to name one who is Catholic, denied Mary’s right on the 
grounds that she is a foreigner (Mary was born in Scotland and raised in France) and on 
the grounds that Henry VIII disinherited any descendents of his sister Margaret, of whom 
                                                 
17
 Before Bothwell married Mary, he was married to Jane Gordon. Bothwell’s marriage to Gordon was 
nullified one week before his marriage to Mary. 
18
 See, for example, Retha M. Warnicke, Mary Queen of Scots (London: Routledge, 2006), 200-201; and 
A.E. MacRobert, Mary, Queen of Scots and the Casket Letters (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002). 
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Mary was one. Finally, Leslie responds to the recent “poysoned pestiferous pamflett” 
(“To the gentle Reader,” 2v)—most certainly John Knox’s The First Blast of the Trumpet 
against the Monstrvovs regiment of women (1558), which argues that women should 
never be able to rule over men because they are “vnconstant, variable, cruell and lacking 
the spirit of counsel and regiment.”
19
 Leslie’s pamphlet thus addresses two intersecting 
cultural fears in Tudor England: the difficulty of distinguishing a true sovereign from a 
false one, and the difficulty of distinguishing a true woman from a false one. 
A fierce advocate for Mary, Leslie writes the pamphlet primarily to prove Mary’s 
authenticity—as a loyal wife, as an heir to the English throne, and as a woman fit to rule. 
On the one hand, Leslie points to Mary’s female body as evidence for this authenticity, 
looking at the material conditions of the gender roles Mary plays. Leslie emphasizes 
Mary’s innocence in the murder of Darnley because women, he claims, are incapable of 
such brutality. He insists that her “sexe naturallye abhorrethe suche butcherlye practyzes” 
(3v), and he argues that Mary grieved appropriately for her husband as women are meant 
to do: “They, as women most commonlie do take theire honour and cheif dignitie of 
theyre husbands. . . . And yet did this good gentle ladie bemone, even such a notable 
time, enioinge and vsinge none other then candle light, as was knowen to all the nobilitie 
of Scotlande” (14r-v). Leslie highlights the physical conditions of Mary’s mourning—the 
bemoaning, the use of candlelight—as proof of her genuine grief.  
Leslie also uses Mary’s gender as evidence of her true place in the succession, 
emphasizing Mary’s proximity to Elizabeth:  
                                                 
19
 John Knox, The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrvovs regiment of women ([Geneva], 1558), 
10r. 
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For this Ladye and Quene ys her most nighe neighbour by place: And her 
nighe cosen and sister by bloude. She ys a Quene, and therefore this were 
a fitt benefitt for her relief from a Quene. Yea she ys, as yt were her 
dawghter, bothe by dawghterlye reuerence she bearethe her maiestie, and 
by reason she ys of God called to the daughters place in the succession of 
the crowne. (“To the gentle Reader”)  
A cousin, sister, and daughter to Elizabeth, Mary becomes, through Leslie’s logic, the 
inevitable heir to Elizabeth with her multiplying familial associations.
20
 Leslie 
underscores Mary’s likeness to Elizabeth by using some of the same strategies that 
Elizabeth herself used to garner support from her people, including stressing Mary’s 
motherly characteristics.
21
 He argues that she cannot have murdered Darnley because of 
her nurturing behavior toward him:  
for besids all other respects thowghe they Were not farre differente in 
yeares, she was to him not onlie a loyall Prince, a louinge and deare wyfe, 
but a most carefull and tendre mother with all, . . . Where, as also at diuers 
other places, especiallie at Edenborowghe, she from time to time most 
louingelie entertayned, and most tenderlie cherisshed him euer, eauen to 
the verie laste howre, that euer she sawe him. (6v-7r)  
                                                 
20
 Elizabeth also invokes a variety of kinship relations as a way of securing power. See Kimberly Anne 
Coles, who argues that “by claiming an excess of kinship she could undermine the necessity to make 
exogamous kinship ties” (“‘Perfect hole’: Elizabeth I, Spenser, and Chaste Productions,” English Literary 
Renaissance 32, no. 1 [2002]: 39). 
21
 For an analysis of the ways in which Elizabeth used tropes of motherhood to her advantage, see Christine 
Coch, “‘Mother of my Contreye’: Elizabeth I and Tudor Constructions of Motherhood,” English Literary 
Renaissance 26, no. 3 (1996): 423-50. 
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Interestingly, Leslie uses the positive connotations of the gender roles Mary plays to 
authenticate her as both woman and queen. Mary’s trueness as a woman—as a “deare 
wyfe,” and “tendre mother”—bleeds into her trueness as a sovereign—as a “loyall 
Prince,” “cosen,” “sister,” and “dawghter” to Elizabeth. 
Just as much as Leslie links Mary’s female body to her authenticity as a 
sovereign, though, he also uses Mary’s bodilessness—her invisible body politic—to 
prove her place in the succession. Leslie dismisses, for instance, charges that Mary 
cannot succeed to the English throne because she is a foreigner by arguing that as a 
sovereign, Mary is not subject to the common law that bars ordinary citizens from 
inheriting English property if they are foreign born. Leslie contends that  
the argumentes and proufes which we meane to alleage and bringe forthe 
for the confirmation of her right and title in succession, (as heire 
apparente) to the crowne of Englande, are gathered and grownded vpon 
the lawes of God and nature, and not onlie receaued in the ciuill pollicies 
of other nations, but also in the olde lawes and customes of our owne 
contrey. (55v) 
Just as nature governs Mary’s role as a woman, whose “sexe naturallye abhorrethe suche 
butcherlye practyzes” as murder (3v), nature also governs her role as sovereign, which is 
larger than the role of a private person. Articulating Edmund Plowden’s ideas about the 
king’s two bodies, Leslie argues that Mary is part of a corporate body politic and as such, 
she is not subject to the ordinary rule of law:  
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I saye that there ys a greate difference betwene the kinges right and the 
right of others. And that the title of the crowne of this realme ys not 
subiecte to the rules and principles of the common lawe of this realme as 
to be ruled and tried after suche order and course as the inheritance of 
priuate personnes ys by the same. (56v) 
In Leslie’s view, Mary cannot be considered foreign if her body natural is taken out of 
the equation because “the kinge cometh to the crowne not onlie by discente, but also and 
cheifelie by succession, as vnto a corporation” (61v). Mary’s physical body is not what 
actually inherits the crown and so it becomes impossible, according to Leslie, to 
invalidate Mary’s sovereignty through that body. 
The problem with Leslie’s argument about Mary’s authenticity is that his primary 
rebuttal to critics who claim they have proof of Mary’s treasonous activities is that it is 
remarkably easy to counterfeit Mary’s presence. He denies that Mary wrote the Casket 
Letters, arguing,  
Thincke ye that wise & experte men are ignorante, howe perelouse and 
daungerouse a matter yt ys, to fasten any good prouf vpon collation of 
lettres, and howe easie yt ys to some men to imitate & counterfaite any 
character? . . . As thowghe manie in Scotlande coulde not expresse and 
resemble, and counterfeite in theire writinge, the Quenes verie character? 
(11v-12r) 
Paradoxically, Mary’s very authenticity rests on the fact that she can be duplicated, 
forged, or copied.  
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Leslie asserts that no kingship can be validated based on the physical documents 
it produces. He questions the validity of Henry VIII’s statute disinheriting his sister 
Margaret’s descendants, arguing that there is no way to prove whether or not the 
document is a forgery:  
The monumentes of all antiquitie, the memorie of all ages, and of our 
owne age, and daylie experience can tell and shewe vs manye lamentable 
examples of manye a good and lawfull testamente by vndewe and craftie 
meanes, by false and suborned witnesses, by the couuetous bearinge and 
maintenance of suche as be in auctoritie quite vndone and ouerthrowne. 
(93r)  
Leslie says that a king could never produce any document that threatens the body politic, 
for “the kinge as kinge coulde not dispose the crowne by his will And was in this behalfe 
but an arbiter and comissioner” (108r). Thus in Leslie’s pamphlet, we find the concept of 
sovereignty—when the sovereign is female—strained between the idea that she is 
validated by her physical presence—her tears for her dead husband, her motherly care for 
her people, her sisterly love for Elizabeth—and the idea that that she can never be 
validated by her physical presence because she is part of an invisible body politic.  
The very transmission of the Casket Letters rendered it impossible to trace the 
originals—and thus impossible to determine authenticity. In what Retha Warnicke calls a 
“bizarre publication record,” Mary’s love letters became translated, multiplied, and 
altered all while the so-called originals disappeared.
22
 The first transmission of the letters 
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occurred when in 1568 Moray sent to English commissioners translations of the letters—
supposedly written originally in French, which Mary could fluently write—in Scots, 
which Mary could speak but not write. Why the letters were sent in Scots to the English 
commissioners, who could read French, remains a mystery to scholars, and some believe 
that this action suggests that the originals were in Scots after all. Ironically, the 
commissioners took these letters as evidence of Mary’s duplicity, even though they could 
not have been written in “her owne hand”:  
Afterwardes they shewed unto us one horrible and longe lettre of her owne 
hand, as they saye, contayning foule matteir and abhominable, to be either 
thowght of, or to be written by a prince, . . . The said lettres and ballades 
do discover suche inordinate And filthie love betwene her and Bothaill, 
her loothesomnes and abhorringe of her husband that was murdered, in 
suche sorte, as every good and godlie man cannot but detest and abhorre 
the same. And theis men heare do constantly affirme the said lettres and 
other writinges which they produce, of her owne hand, to be of her owne 
hand in dede, and do offer to sweare and take their othe thereupon the 
matteir conteyned in them beinge suche as coulde hardely be invented or 
devised by anie other then by her selfe . . . And as it is harde to 
counterfeite so manie, so the matteir of them, and the manner how theis 
men came by them, is suche, as it semethe that God (in whose sight 
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murder and bludshed of the innocent is abhominable) wolde not permitte 
the same to be hidde or concealed.
23
 
Their testimony calls into question the methods by which authenticity is gauged. 
Although the only evidence that these letters are in Mary’s “owne hand” comes from the 
Scottish messengers (“as they saye”), the titillating content (“foule matteir” and “filthie 
love”) becomes solid proof. The commissioners find it impossible that “so many” letters 
(eight) could be counterfeited, but they find it certain that a woman could be duplicitous. 
When the Casket Letters made it into print, they were further removed from any 
sense of original authenticity. George Buchanan first printed the letters in his Latin work 
condemning Mary in 1571. This work was soon translated into Anglicized Scots as Ane 
Detectiovn of the duinges of Marie Quene of Scottes.
24
 The letters were printed in French 
only in 1572 in what Warnicke calls “bad translations of the Scots, which seem to be 
versions of Buchanan’s Latin renditions of the originals.”
25
 Eventually, the casket itself—
the “small guilt coffer” that was produced at Westminster in 1568 as evidence of Mary’s 
love affair with Bothwell
26
—disappeared, and all that was left of the letters were the 
various versions that circulated in published form. Whether they are counterfeits, as 
Leslie claims, or not, their distance from the purported originals obscures the idea that an 
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authentic female queen can ever be located. Both Leslie and his detractors make their 
argument about Mary based on that which cannot be discovered—in Leslie’s case, the 
invisible body politic, and in her detractors’ case, the missing letters.  
As Leslie’s pamphlet nears the end, it becomes questionable, despite his efforts to 
prove Mary’s authenticity, whether authenticity can ever be determined at all. Even a law 
of nature—on which the theory of the king’s two bodies rests—can apparently be 
counterfeited. When Leslie attacks those who argue that women who rule go against the 
law of nature, he claims that this law of nature is actually a counterfeit:  
This counterfeate lawe of nature neither ys, nor euer was, nor as farre as 
reason maye reache to, euer shalbe. Yt shalbe inowghe for vs to 
o[ver]throwe & caste vnderfote this counterfeate lawe: to shewe and proue 
that women haue from time to time borne princelie regimente in the moste 
notable partes in the worlde (129r-v) 
Leslie goes cites numerous examples of women—from the biblical Deborah to the 
Amazons—who reigned successfully, arguing that they prove any law of nature that bars 
women from rule to be false. Yet although Leslie clings to an idea of a transcendent 
natural law, his very concept of a “counterfeate lawe” points to the contingency of all 
laws. Constance Jordan argues, “Leslie, in fact, conceives of the law of nature as a 
product of historical process.”
27
 Far from establishing authenticity, Leslie’s pamphlet 
introduces the idea of competing laws of nature, suggesting that a law’s validity can shift. 
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Leslie’s argument, then, that that the Scottish rebels will be exposed for their 
plainly counterfeit activity becomes problematic. Leslie writes that “They shall at lenghte 
finde owte, and throwghlie perceaue and knowe, theis mens dealings and doings, Who as 
yet cover theire fowle filthie lienge, detestable practizes, and traiterous enormities, withe 
suche a visarde of counterfeite false fained holines” (19v). Yet this is precisely the 
argument that Mary’s detractors use against her. Buchanan’s Ane Detectiovn argues that 
after Darnley was killed, Mary  
beganne to set hir face, and with counterfaiting of mournyng she labored 
to appease the hartes of the grudgynge pepill. . . . Quhen of the forty dayes 
that are apoyntit for the mournnynge, scarce twelue wer yet fully past, and 
the counterfaityng wald nat frame half handsomely, & to disclose hir true 
affections so soone she was somewhat ashamit, at length takyng hart of 
grace vnto hir, and neglectyng sic trifles, she commeth to her own byace, 
and openly sheweth hir owne naturall conditions. (E2v-E3r) 
Like Leslie, who argues that the Scottish rebels’ counterfeit practices will become 
evident, Buchanan contends that Mary’s counterfeit mourning quickly became 
transparent. Both writers claim how easy it is to counterfeit a woman, yet both insist how 
easy it is to recognize a counterfeit woman, calling into question whether female 
authenticity can be established at all. Their reasoning reveals the contingency of 
authenticity, which can be evident only in the speech acts that declare it. 
The nature of Leslie and Buchanan’s dispute over Mary—whether her mourning 
for Darnley is real or not—engages in a contemporary anxiety about determining the 
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authenticity of human passions, especially in women. Timothy Bright’s A Treatise of 
Melancholie (1586) attempts to provide a physiological explanation for why people do 
things like sigh, sob, blush, and cry. In his chapter, “The causes of teares, and their 
saltnesse,” Bright explains what produces crying, and although his treatise addresses 
melancholy in general, this chapter addresses mainly women, providing a humoral 
explanation of why women and children “are apt to teares”: “They are almost altogether 
of a moist, rare, and tender body, especially of brayne and heart, which both being of that 
temper, carie the rest of the parts into like disposition: this is the cause why children are 
more apt to weepe, then those that are of greater yeares, and women more then men, the 
one hauing by youth the body moist, rare, & soft, the other by sex.”
28
 Bright details the 
bodily process through which tears are produced, emphasizing the passivity of the person 
crying: after the body “gathereth in one her spirits, and bloud, & calleth them in,” the 
brain must release the “contracted substance, signifieth by shower of tears” (146-47). 
Bright insists on the authenticity of tears, “for tears cannot be counterfetted, because they 
rise not of any action or facultie voluntarie, but naturall” (148). 
Yet despite Bright’s descriptions of the naturalness of tears, his treatise reveals 
anxiety about whether or not melancholy can be feigned.
29
 One of the purposes of his text 
is to determine “what the difference is betwixt natural melancholie, and that heauy hande 
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Vautrollier, with an introduction by Hardin Craig (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 143-44, 
hereafter cited parenthetically in the text by page number. 
29
 For a reading of the contradictions in Bright’s treatise, see Mary Thomas Crane, Shakespeare’s Brain: 
Reading with Cognitive Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 120-24. Crane argues, 
“In his attempts to uphold both a material theory of humoral psychology and an idealizing theory of an 
immaterial and transcendent soul, Bright includes lengthy, often contradictory descriptions of the internal 
workings of body, soul, and mind” (120). My reading of Bright is influenced by Crane’s. 
  
90 
 
of God vpon the afflicted conscience, tormented with remorse of sinne, & feare of his 
iudgement” (“The Epistle Dedicatorie,” 3v). Bright attempts to separate those who have 
an involuntary reaction from those who have an invisible, sinister reason for appearing 
melancholic. And although Bright attempts to hold these two categories apart, many early 
modern writers—who express deep suspicion of women’s tears—question whether or not 
people could really tell the difference. While tears often indicate the sincerity of the 
tormented Petrarchan lover, for instance, the tears of the beloved generate uncertainty or 
even proof of falseness. As Othello becomes convinced of Desdemona’s faithlessness, he 
exclaims, “O, devil, devil! / If that the earth could teem with woman’s tears, / Each drop 
she falls would prove a crocodile.”
30
 Bright’s insistence that tears must be real and yet his 
anxiety that grief may be false participate in this cultural unease about locating the 
authenticity of a woman’s behavior. The grief of Mary Queen of Scots—ardently 
defended by Leslie and ardently dismissed by Buchanan—calls into question the ability 
ever fully to secure the authority of a female queen, especially when that authority is so 
dependent on proving the authenticity of female behavior. 
Ultimately, Leslie’s defense of Mary as an authentic woman and queen reveals 
the vexed entanglement between those two concepts. Leslie’s treatise exposes the 
contradictions inherent in trying to prove female authenticity. While on the one hand, 
Mary’s feminine conduct serves as evidence of her true role as queen, the easy 
duplication of this conduct threatens to undermine her very sovereignty. While Leslie 
insists that the counterfeits of Mary only further certify her queenly position, the text 
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reveals the tension in early modern culture between desiring validation in the female 
body and fearing that the female body—with its inherent duplicity—can never validate 
anything at all. Leslie’s anxiety about counterfeits, particularly as they apply to female 
behavior, suggests that the idea of female sovereignty is both threatened and propped up 
by the idea that there is a counterfeit woman with which to contrast the real one. 
 
The Face of Falsehood: Spenser’s Faerie Queene 
Just as Leslie’s pamphlet interrogates whether a woman can be validated as a real 
sovereign or not, Petrarchan literature throughout the sixteenth century repeatedly dwells 
on the question of how to determine the authenticity of a beloved mistress. The poems in 
Richard Tottel’s Songes and Sonettes, which were printed in eleven editions from 1557 to 
1587, both obsessively praise the Petrarchan mistress and lament her falseness.
31
 The 
collection often juxtaposes poems with opposing reactions to women’s beauty. In one of 
Surrey’s poems, for instance, the speaker praises the beauty of Geraldine:  
Honsdon did first present her to mine iyen: 
Bright is her hewe, and Geraldine she hight. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Her beauty of kinde, her vertues from above.  
Happy is he, that can obtain her love.
32
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In the following poem, the speaker insists that female beauty is just a trap:  
Brittle beautie, that nature made so fraile, 
Wherof the gift is small, and short the season, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Slipper in sliding as is an eles taile, 
Hard to attaine, once gotten not geason, 
Jewel of jeopardie that perill doth assaile, 
False and untrue, enticed oft to treason.
33
  
In its treatment of the Petrarchan mistress, the collection suggests the impossibility of 
establishing true beauty from false, real women from those with “cloked doublenesse.”
34
  
In the 1580s and 1590s, when writers revived interest in Petrarchan poetry, the 
trope of the duplicitous woman often became literalized as sonneteers struggled to 
distinguish true mistresses from false doubles. One way that a sonneteer demonstrates the 
authenticity of his mistress is to introduce a false one who tries to entice him away. Yet in 
doing so, he exposes the close proximity of the real and the false mistress, who, after all, 
look exactly alike. In Barnabe Barnes’s Parthenophil and Parthenophe (1593), the 
speaker tells of his heart, represented as an unsuspecting “youthfull squier,” who cannot 
distinguish the real mistress (Parthenophe) from the “false mistresse” (Laya): 
It chaunced after, that an youthfull squier, 
Such as in courting, could the crafty guise, 
Beheld light Laya, shee with fresh desier, 
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Hoping th’atchieuement of some richer prise: 
Drew to the Courtier, who with tender kisse, 
(As are their guilefull fashions which dissemble) 
First him saluted, then with forged blisse 
Of doubtlesse hope, sweete wordes by pause did tremble. 
So whiles shee sleightly gloas'd, with her new pray, 
Mine hartes eye tending his false mistrisse traine: 
Vnyoak’t himselfe, & closely scap’t away, 
And to Parthenophe did poast amaine 
For liberall pardon, which she did obtaine: 
And iudge (Parthenophe) for thou canst tell, 
That his escape from Laya, pleas’d mee well.
35
 
Barnes’s speaker, who helplessly watches the situation unfold, insists that the counterfeit 
woman is deceptive but ultimately exposes that her “tender kisse” and “sweete wordes” 
are indistinguishable from those coming from the real thing. Although the squire comes 
to his senses, rushing back to Parthenophe for “liberall pardon,” the speaker elides 
exactly what it is that tips him off to Laya’s guile, suggesting that Parthenophe’s 
authenticity may be more slippery than the speaker admits. 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene offers the most extended treatment of female 
counterfeits in the sixteenth century. His poem registers the intertwined anxiety about 
assessing the authenticity of a Petrarchan mistress and of a female queen. Of course, the 
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authenticity of the poem’s namesake, the Faerie Queene, remains suspended because she 
is never present or even named.
36
 Present only through her tantalizing traces (like the 
imprint she leaves after Arthur’s dream) and endlessly pursued by Arthur, the Faerie 
Queene represents the ultimate elusive Petrarchan mistress. The figures who supposedly 
do reflect/refract Gloriana—such as Una, Florimell, Belphoebe, Britomart, and 
Mercilla—are all curiously doubled, suggesting that the only way to legitimate these 
sovereign women is to hold them against their false Petrarchan twins. Yet just as it 
remains impossible to determine whether the tears of Mary Queen of Scots are true or 
forged, the line between the doubled women fails to remain firm throughout the epic 
poem, and the false doubles threaten as much as validate their true versions. Ultimately, 
female authority for the characters of the Faerie Queene remains just as elusive as 
Gloriana herself—reliant on, yet never secured by, the shadow of female duplicity. 
Spenser alerts his readers to his interest in doubled female bodies before the poem 
even begins in his letter to Raleigh: 
In that Faery Queene I meane glory in my generall intention, but in my 
particular I conceiue the most excellent and glorious person of our 
soueraine the Queene, and her kingdome in Faery land. And yet in some 
places els, I doe otherwise shadow her. For considering she beareth two 
persons, the one of a most royall Queene or Empresse, the other of a most 
vertuous and beautifull Lady, this latter part in some places I doe expresse 
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in Belphoebe, fashioning her name according to your owne excellent 
conceipt of Cynthia, (Phoebe and Cynthia being both names of Diana.)
37
 
Referring to the concept of the king’s two bodies, Spenser suggests the extent to which 
Petrarchism is an integral component of female sovereignty. Belphoebe, the only 
character Spenser specifically names as “shadowing” Elizabeth, is depicted as a desirable 
Petrarchan mistress in the excessive blazons that describe her and in her ability to 
frustrate the men, like Timias, who fall in love with her.
38
  
Yet the two bodies that seem to interest Spenser the most are not the body politic 
and body natural, but the numerous examples of doubled Petrarchan female characters 
throughout the poem. Mary Villeponteaux, for example, argues that although Elizabeth’s 
use of the theory of the king’s two bodies ostensibly compensated for her weaker female 
body natural, in actuality, public interest in the body natural was much stronger: “in 
Spenser’s attempts to represent his queen, the private body usually supersedes the public 
one.”
39
And these private bodies multiply when Spenser represents female authority; for 
every good woman the poem depicts, a mirrored bad one emerges. At one point in the 
poem, Spenser alludes to his anxiety about concentrating so much of his poem on 
                                                 
37
 Edmund Spenser, “Letter to Raleigh,” in The Faerie Queene, 2
nd
 ed., ed. A.C. Hamilton (London: 
Pearson, 2001), 716. All references to the poem come from this edition and will be cited parenthetically in 
the text by book, canto, and stanza number. 
38
 For a discussion on the blazons used to describe Belphoebe, see Montrose, “The Elizabethan Subject,” 
326-28. 
39
 Mary Villeponteaux, “‘Not as women wonted be’: Spenser’s Amazon Queen,” in Dissing Elizabeth: 
Fegative Representations of Gloriana, ed. Julia M. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 
210. Montrose suggests that Belphoebe but not Gloriana appears as a character “at least in part because the 
beautiful and virtuous lady is more manipulable by the conventions of literary representation—notably 
those associated with Petrarchism—than is the empress, that erotic conventions structure Elizabethan 
relations of power in ways advantageous to the writing subject” (“The Elizabethan Subject,” 325). 
  
96 
 
“wanton” women (3.9.1), but he justifies his focus on these women by arguing that they 
make the good women seem even better: 
But neuer let th’ensample of the bad 
Offend the good: for good by paragone 
Of euill, may more notably be rad, 
As white seemes fayrer, macht with blacke attone; 
Ne all are shamed by the fault of one: 
For lo in heuen, whereas all goodnes is, 
Emongst the Angels, a whole legione 
Of wicked Sprightes did fall from happy blis;  
What wonder then, if one of women all did mis? (3.9.2) 
Spenser articulates one of the key anxieties of the poem—the difficulty of interpreting 
good from bad—and this stanza indicates the gendered inflection of this anxiety—the 
fear that bad women can tarnish good simply through their proximity. Spenser maintains 
the difference between good and bad, yet he suggests that the only way to recognize good 
is to hold it up to its opposite. The depiction of good women and their doubles in the 
poem highlights the precarious position of female authority, at once legitimated and 
threatened by “th’ensample of the bad.” 
Spenser’s initial treatment of female counterfeits comes at the very opening of the 
poem in the first canto of book 1. Here we meet a “louely Lady,” the prototype of the 
mistress in the Faerie Queene, and Spenser emphasizes both her sovereign and 
Petrarchan qualities from the outset (1.1.4). The yet unnamed Una “by descent from 
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Royall lynage came / Of ancient Kinges and Queenes” (1.1.5), and she also displays the 
characteristic Petrarchan white skin, “much whiter” than even the Asse who is “more 
white then snow” (1.1.4). Yet Una does not fully come into being until Archimago 
creates the false Una that tricks Redcrosse; as A.C. Hamilton observes, “She is named 
only now when her double appears” (1.1.45n). Spenser’s use of the language of 
counterfeiting suggests the extent to which the false Una—“th’ensample of the bad”—
validates the real Una’s goodness with her stark contrast. Spenser describes her “false 
shewes” and her “feigned hew” (1.1.46.), and her wanton behavior makes Una’s chastity 
more apparent—her whiteness easier to “be rad.” 
Yet the problem with false Una is that she so closely resembles the real Una that 
the characters cannot tell the difference. Even Archimago, who creates the false Una, 
“Was nigh beguiled with so goodly sight” (1.1.45). Noting that the false Una is dressed 
“all in white” (1.1.45), Spenser does not make white “fayrer, macht with blacke attone,” 
but actually matches white with white. The false Una, “Most like that virgin true, which 
for her knight him took” (1.1.49.9), not only upholds the real Una with her wicked 
contrast but also threatens to take her down with her similarity. In the opening canto of 
the poem, Spenser signals the complex function of the female counterfeit. Una needs the 
false Una for her legitimacy—for her very naming in the poem—yet is made vulnerable 
by that same process. Una’s sovereignty rests on, in Leslie’s words, “howe easie yt ys to 
some men to imitate & counterfaite any character” (11v) yet can never be secured by the 
specter of her counterfeit double. 
  
98 
 
Of course, women are not the only characters who are doubled in the Faerie 
Queene. Archimago, for instance, convincingly poses as Redcrosse in book 1, and 
Artegall uses “counterfet disguise” in book 5 to get revenge against Adicia (5.8.25). Yet 
these doubles do not pose the same erotic threat that the female doubles pose. The false 
Una nearly melts Redcrosse’s “manly hart” with her wantonness (1.1.47), and she 
enrages Redcrosse to the point at which he almost kills her. The false Una’s convincing 
performance leaves Una alone and at the mercy of a lion—who, ironically, can recognize 
better than Redcrosse Una’s “simple truth” (1.3.6). 
Una is doubled yet again with the introduction of Duessa, another sexually 
threatening female character, in canto 2. The very names of the female protagonist and 
her rival—Una and Duessa—signal that female identity rests on the comparison to a 
counterfeit double. Singularity cannot exist without duplication. Interestingly, not only 
Una’s, but also Duessa’s sovereign status needs constant validation by the comparison to 
a female double. Like Una, Duessa claims to be “the sole daughter of an Emperour” in 
her story to Redcrosse (1.2.22). Yet Fradubio’s story reveals how insecure Duessa’s 
position is. Duessa is not satisfied with Fradubio’s assessment that “Fralissa was as faire, 
as faire mote bee, / And euer false Duessa seemde as faire as shee” (1.2.37). In order to 
prove her singularity, her role as “the fairest wight” (1.2.30), Duessa must invalidate her 
female rival by turning Fralissa’s beauty into “foule vgly forme” (1.2.38). Horrified by 
Fralissa’s “loathly visage” (1.2.39), Fradubio abandons her for Duessa. 
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Yet Fradubio’s glimpse at Duessa bathing further suggests the instability of 
Duessa’s singularity. Instead of a remarkable beauty, Fradubio spies a “filthy foule old 
woman”: 
Her neather partes misshapen, monstrous,  
Were hidd in water, that I could not see, 
But they did seeme more foule and hideous, 
Then womans shape man would beleeue to bee. (1.2.41) 
Just as Fradubio can exalt Duessa only when Fralissa is held up against her as ugly, so is 
Fralissa’s trueness apparent only when he sees Duessa’s monstrosity exposed. Curiously, 
though, Fradubio does not see Duessa’s nether parts at all. As Melinda Gough argues, 
“despite the knight’s (and perhaps even Spenser’s) intentions, Fradubio’s words only 
further frustrate interpretive certainty.”
40
 Duessa’s status as evil witch remains suspended 
in Fradubio’s equivocation, and the poem questions whether Duessa is really invalidated 
here as monstrous or whether her monstrosity is a product of Fradubio’s own anxieties. 
The extent to which Duessa’s role as a counterfeit legitimates Una also remains 
uncertain. Admittedly, unlike Fradubio, the characters clearly see Duessa’s exposed 
nether parts—where a “foxes taile” grows (1.8.48)—when she is stripped in canto 8. 
Spenser’s description of Duessa, with her bald head, her “teeth out of her rotten 
gummes,” her “sowre breath,” her “dried dugs,” and her “wrizled skin” (1.8.47), 
                                                 
40
 Melinda J. Gough, “‘Her filthy feature open showne’ in Ariosto, Spenser, and Much Ado about Fothing,” 
Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 39, no. 1 (1999): 50. 
  
100 
 
represents a grotesque version of the blazon,
41
 and Spenser again uses language of 
counterfeiting to emphasize that Duessa is a false version of Una: 
Which when the knights behend, amazd they were, 
And wondred at so fowle deformed wight. 
Such then (said Vna) as she seemeth here, 
Such is the face of falshood, such the sight 
Of fowle Duessa, when her borrowed light 
Is laid away, and counterfesaunce knowne. 
Thus when they had the witch disrobed quight, 
And all her filthy feature open showne, 
They let her goe at will, and wander waies vnknowne. (1.8.49) 
That Una is the one repudiating Duessa suggests how closely linked these characters are 
and what is at stake here for Una’s own reputation. If Duessa is “the face of falshood,” 
then Una must be the face of truth, and if Duessa’s beauty is “counterfesaunce,” then 
Una’s beauty must be real. Duessa’s disappearance from the canto implies that two 
women—two versions of one another—cannot be in the same space at the same time. 
One must be eliminated to authenticate the other. Yet the terms of Duessa’s 
elimination—banishment rather than death—render the resolution of this moment 
ambiguous. Duessa’s liberty to “wander waies vnknowne” questions whether a female 
double can ever be fully eliminated or whether a female sovereign can ever be fully 
validated. As Duessa reemerges in the letter at the end of book 1 and Una is left 
                                                 
41
 See Theresa M. Krier, Gazing on Secret Sights: Spenser, Classical Imitation, and the Decorums of Vision 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 134-35. 
  
101 
 
languishing when Redcrosse goes off on another adventure, the reader is left to wonder 
which female character really has sovereign power. Una is written out of the poem, while 
Duessa’s presence remains stubbornly persistent until her final elimination in book 5. 
Britomart’s encounter with Malecasta at the beginning of book 3 also illustrates 
the extent to which a Petrarchan double validates a female sovereign yet can never fully 
authenticate her. When Britomart encounters six knights fighting Redcrosse, she learns 
the reason that Redcrosse is “sore beset on euery side arownd” (3.1.21): he refuses to 
follow the rules established by the lady of the castle, Malecasta. The knights describe 
Malecasta as possessing “soueraine beautie,” yet this quality needs constant validation 
(3.1.26). Each knight that enters the castle, according to Malecasta’s law, must pledge 
lifelong service to her if he has no lady of his own and renounce his lady if he does: 
But if he haue a Lady or a Loue, 
Then must he her forgoe with fowle defame, 
Or els with vs by dint of sword approue, 
That she is fairer, then our fairest Dame, 
As did this knight, before ye hether came. (3.1.27) 
The contest that Redcrosse enters to prove Una’s beauty suggests that a woman’s fairness 
is a term always relative to another woman’s. Malecasta can remain “our fairest Dame” 
only by forcefully discrediting her competitors. Spenser’s description of Malecasta as 
having “soueraine beautie” suggests the link between these two concepts in early modern 
England. A character like Malecasta could hold onto her tenuous sovereignty only by 
proving her beauty—an equally tenuous characteristic. 
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Of course, Malecasta’s ploys to assert her authenticity actually prove nothing at 
all, and Spenser emphasizes throughout the episode the difficulty of determining 
Malecasta’s trueness as a woman. Spenser alerts the reader to one of Malecasta’s devious 
traits: her wandering eyes. He writes, 
She seemd a woman of great bountihed  
And of rare beautie, sauing that askaunce  
Her wanton eyes, ill signes of womanhed,  
Did roll too highly, and too often glaunce,  
Without regard of grace, or comely amenaunce. (3.1.41) 
Yet her apparent duplicity remains undetected by her visitors. When Britomart refuses to 
take off her armor, Malecasta (who finds herself attracted to Britomart) puts on a show of 
grief: 
And all attonce discouered her desire 
With sighes, and sobs, and plaints, and piteous griefe, 
The outward sparkes of her inburning fire; 
Which spent in vaine, at last she told her briefe, 
That but if she did lend her short reliefe, 
And doe her comfort, she mote algates dye. 
But the chaste damzell, that had neuer priefe 
Of such malengine and fine forgerye, 
Did easely beleeue her strong extremitye. (3.1.53) 
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Spenser attributes Malecasta’s persuasiveness to Britomart’s naïveté, arguing that 
Britomart was fooled only because she had no experience with such “fine forgerye.” Yet 
Spenser’s very description of Malecasta’s behavior suggests that there is no way to 
distinguish real from false grief. The “sighes, and sobs, and plaints” are the same terms 
used to describe female characters in the poem who really do grieve. Britomart, for one, 
grieves in the next canto for the vision of Artegall with “sad sighes,” “sorrowes deepe,” 
and “teares” (3.2.28) and later delivers a formal complaint about her desire (3.4.8-10). 
Spenser’s labeling of Malecasta’s grief as a “forgerye” recalls Buchanan’s accusation that 
Mary Queen of Scots displayed an “inconstant counterfeiting of mourning” for Darnley 
after he was murdered (M4r). Although Leslie fervently defends Mary’s grief as real, 
both the texts about Mary and Spenser’s poem suggest the impossibility of ever fully 
locating the boundary between real and false grief, constant and inconstant woman. 
Moreover, nothing in the poem actually suggests that Malecasta’s grief is forged 
at all. The events of the evening, if anything, point to the authenticity of Malecasta’s 
desire for Britomart and her real frustration at Britomart’s refusals. At the sight of 
Britomart, whom Malecasta believes is a man, Malecasta’s “fickle hart concieued hasty 
fyre, / Like sparkes of fire, that fall in sclender flex, / That shortly brent into extreme 
desyre” (3.1.47). Using the metaphor of fire, Spenser suggests that Malecasta’s passion 
may be intense or even wicked, but it is certainly not insincere. Spenser describes her 
desire as “falsed fancy” (3.1.47), but the poem indicates that the only thing false about 
Malecasta is her promiscuity. At dinner, Malecasta can barely contain her feelings for 
Britomart, aggressively shooting glances to woo her beloved: “And aye betweene the 
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cups, she did prepare / Way to her loue, and secret darts did throw; / But Britomart would 
not such guilfull message know” (3.1.51). With his insistence that Malecasta’s longings 
are false, guileful, and forged at the same time that he implies that Malecasta really wants 
Britomart, Spenser exposes the ways in which a woman can be a counterfeit only by the 
act of being labeled as one. Just as Mary Queen of Scots’s position as counterfeit woman 
depends on those asserting it, so does Malecasta’s position as a guileful woman remain 
suspended in the speech acts that make it so. 
In the end, even after Malecasta slips into Britomart’s bed to accost her beloved, 
Malecasta’s status as “fairest Dame” never gets resolved. Britomart quickly determines 
that she no longer wants to stay at a place “Where so loose life, and so vngentle trade / 
Was vsd of knights and Ladies seeming gent” (3.1.67), but Malecasta’s “soueraine 
beautie” remains an uncertain concept, always relative to the ladies she will hold up 
against her in the future. As Redcrosse and Britomart “tooke their steeds, and forth vpon 
their iourney went” (3.1.67), Malecasta stays at her castle forever to validate her fairness 
against the women whom her knights must disavow. 
The Petrarchan underpinnings of Spenser’s female doublings are even more 
apparent in the story of the two Florimells. Literally fleeing her Petrarchan suitors, the 
real Florimell embodies the characteristics of a Petrarchan mistress with her “faire yellow 
locks” (3.1.16), her “stedfast chastitie” (3.5.8), and her “snowy cheeke” (3.7.9). 
Described as “the fairest Dame aliue” (3.1.18), Florimell provokes aggressive desire from 
nearly every man with whom she comes into contact, from the lusty foster to even Arthur 
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himself, who wishes that Florimell “mote bee / His faery Queene” (3.4.54).
42
 Yet despite 
her apparent singularity as the pinnacle of beauty, Florimell’s status as “fairest Dame”—
like Malecasta’s—also has to be validated by an inferior double. The witch’s creation of 
the false, or snowy, Florimell for the enjoyment of her son parodies the Petrarchan 
standards by which Florimell’s beauty is assessed: 
In stead of eyes two burning lampes she set  
In siluer sockets, shyning like the skyes, 
And a quicke mouing Spirit did arret 
To stirre and roll them, like to womens eyes;  
In stead of yellow lockes she did deuyse, 
With golden wyre to weaue her curled head; 
Yet golden wyre was not so yellow thryse 
As Florimells fayre heare: and in the stead  
Of life, she put a Spright to rule the carcas dead. (3.8.7) 
A grotesque assemblage of female body parts, False Florimell, in Mihoko Suzuki’s 
words, “exposes the violent appropriation of woman implicit in the blason.”
43
 Spenser 
indicates that the Petrarchan lady is merely a male fantasy. Operated by a male spirit, 
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who knows how to imitate “the wyles of womens wits” (3.8.8.9), False Florimell is a 
character in drag, a puppet operated only to fulfill the desires of a lustful male onlooker.
44
 
Yet rather than simply validate the real Florimell’s status as “fairest Dame,” False 
Florimell only creates more confusion. Spenser implies that the real threat of her 
character is not that she is the opposite of Florimell, but that she is all too similar.
45
 Like 
Leslie, who insists on the ease with which Mary Queen of Scots can be duplicated, 
Spenser points to the trouble that can be caused by counterfeiting Florimell, arguing 
That euen Nature selfe enuide the same, 
And grudg’d to see the counterfet should shame 
The thing it selfe: In hand she boldly tooke 
To make another like the former Dame, 
Another Florimell, in shape and looke 
So liuely and so like, that many it mistooke. (3.8.5) 
Spenser challenges Leslie’s assertion that a counterfeit double will always be exposed—
that people will “throwghlie perceaue and knowe” the true woman from the false (19v)—
by revealing that the real Florimell is indistinguishable from False Florimell. As critics 
have pointed out, False Florimell, like the real Florimell, inspires desire from lustful and 
good men alike—from Braggadochio to Scudamore—and sometimes appears even more 
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authentic than Florimell herself, as when Marinell believes False Florimell is more true 
than the real one: “with fast fixed eies / He gazed still vpon that snowy mayd; / Whom 
euer as he did the more auize, / The more to be true Florimell he did surmize” (5.3.18). 
False Florimell represents a clear danger to the real one, suggesting that Florimell’s 
authenticity may be as flimsy as the golden wire posing as False Florimell’s hair. 
How, then, does Florimell’s authenticity become established in the poem if False 
Florimell is such a convincing Petrarchan beauty? Unlike Duessa, whose nether parts are 
grotesquely displayed, False Florimell never gets exposed. While Florimell’s girdle falls 
off False Florimell at Satyrane’s tournament (4.5.16-17), it falls off all the other women 
as well. Instead, False Florimell’s falseness—and by extension, Florimell’s trueness—
becomes established by a speech act, when Artegall declares at Florimell’s nuptials,  
As for this Ladie, which he sheweth here,  
Is not (I wager) Florimell at all;  
But some fayre Franion, fit for such a fere,  
That by misfortune in his hand did fall.  
For proofe whereof, he bad them Florimell forth call. (5.3.22)  
The “proofe” that Artegall seeks comes from setting the two Florimells next to one 
another, the “blushing” Florimell (5.3.23) against the “snowy” False Florimell (5.3.24): 
Then did he set her by that snowy one,  
Like the true saint beside the image set, 
Of both their beauties to make paragone, 
And triall, whether should the honor get.  
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Streight way so soone as both together met, 
Th’enchaunted Damzell vanisht into nought: 
Her snowy substance melted as with heat, 
Ne of that goodly hew remayned ought, 
But th’emptie girdle, which about her wast was wrought. (5.3.24) 
False Florimell’s last moments in the poem indicate that what sets her apart from 
Florimell is not her physical difference, but her very elimination. Only False Florimell’s 
literal disappearance can validate the real Florimell’s beauty, her place above the other 
women, and her right to marry Marinell. As Artegall crowns Florimell “fayrest 
Florimell” again by presenting her the girdle (5.3.27), Spenser suggests that the 
competition between two women must result in one’s woman’s eradication. When the 
two Florimells are in the same space together, one has to disappear. 
Ironically, the one who is “uncased” in this canto is not False Florimell, but 
Braggadochio. Artegall and the other jousters at Florimell’s wedding shave 
Braggadochio’s beard, defile his coat, and break his sword as a way of shaming him and 
asserting their own masculinity. Only after the threats of Braggadochio and False 
Florimell have been contained, Spenser claims, can the merrymaking resume:  
Now when these counterfeits were thus vncased  
Out of the foreside of their forgerie,  
And in the sight of all men cleane disgraced,  
All gan to iest and gibe full merilie  
At the remembrance of their knauerie. (5.3.39)  
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Yet this celebration at the end of the festivities feels uneasy for the reader, and the 
exposure of the counterfeits rests on the troubling incidents of disappearance and 
shaming. Spenser’s hasty resolution to the problems that persist through three books of 
the poem points to the fragility of Florimell’s authority, which relies on the precarious 
display of counterfeit doubles. 
The battle between Britomart and Radigund even more forcefully suggests the 
instability of female authenticity. Spenser’s use of Britomart and Radigund as doubles 
has long attracted critical attention.
46
 Some, like Louis Montrose, suggest that Radigund’s 
elimination contains the threat posed by Britomart’s Amazon qualities: “To behead 
Radigund is to curb what was perceived to be a female ruler’s natural inclination to 
capriciousness and thus to tyranny: the commonwealth is reformed by affirming the rule 
of law, as administered by a masculine political nation.”
47
 Others, like Suzuki, maintain 
that Radigund is portrayed sympathetically and that Radigund’s beheading “does not 
allow Spenser’s heroine simply to exorcize from herself the troubling qualities of tyranny 
and violence; she annihilates what is vital in herself as well as what is problematic, for 
the two are inextricably linked.”
48
 Yet Spenser’s use of Radigund as Britomart’s 
counterfeit double both validates and undermines Britomart’s position as sovereign. 
Britomart needs Radigund to authenticate her own female rule, yet as critics have pointed 
out, she problematically disappears from the poem shortly after she kills Radigund.  
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Moreover, Spenser’s depiction of these women suggests a close affinity between 
their Petrarchan desirability and their ability to rule. Their Petrarchan characteristics—
their fairness, their cruelty—both give them and threaten their positions of power. Of 
course, both characters embody the subject positions of the scorned male lover as much 
as the cruel mistress. In book 3, Britomart delivers a Petrarchan complaint about her 
desire for Artegall in which she laments that love and fortune, both blind, are guiding her 
against the tide and wind, and she prays for the god of the wind to bring her ship, “ere it 
be rent, / Vnto the gladsome port of her intent” (3.4.10).
49
 And Radigund is the scorned 
lover who creates her society of Amazons when she realizes that Bellodant “ne would / 
For ought or nought be wonne vnto her will” (5.4.30).  
Yet it is their positions as elusive Petrarchan mistresses that link Britomart and 
Radigund most forcefully. As critics have discussed, Spenser draws the most overt 
comparison between the two characters during their battles with Artegall when he knocks 
off their helmets to reveal their beauty. Both are depicted in terms of mingled blood and 
sweat—highlighting the red and white in their faces—and both are compared to the 
moon. And both paralyze Artegall to the point at which he cannot fight them anymore. 
As Susanne Woods notes, Radigund “wins, not because of her skill, but because of her 
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beauty.”
50
 While Britomart defeats Artegall once without her beauty, her Petrarchan 
features tip the balance in her favor in her encounter with him in book 4, canto 6, causing 
“trembling horrour” that “made ech member quake, and manly hart to quayle” (4.6.22). 
Just as the false Una threatens to unman Redcrosse with her seductive behavior, so does 
the beauty of Britomart and Radigund neutralize Artegall’s otherwise fierce masculinity. 
Spenser makes efforts to oppose the two women even as his descriptions collapse 
their distinctions. Justifying Artegall’s acquiescence to Radigund, Spenser writes, 
So was he ouercome, not ouercome, 
But to her yeelded of his owne accord; 
Yet was he iustly damned by the doome 
Of his owne mouth, that spake so warelesse word, 
To be her thrall, and seruice her afford. 
For though that he first victorie obtayned, 
Yet after by abandoning his sword, 
He wilfull lost, that he before attayned. 
No fayrer conquest, then that with goodwill is gayned. (5.5.17) 
Parsing the odd phrasing of this stanza, editors have also attempted to hold Britomart and 
Radigund apart. As Hamilton explains, “One difference is his prior agreement to be 
Radigund’s thrall if defeated. Another is that Britomart seeks his love, Radigund his 
servitude” (5.5.17n). Yet the assertion that Artegall was “ouercome, not ouercome” still 
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makes little sense. The doubleness of this phrase registers the doubleness of Britomart 
and Radigund in the poem, and although Spenser claims that Artegall “wilfull lost” to 
Radigund, the poem suggests that Artegall has much less agency in regards to these 
women. In the battle with Britomart, Spenser describes Artegall’s “powrelesse arme 
benumbd with secret feare” (4.6.21), and in battle with Radigund, Spenser notes that 
Artegall’s heart “Empierced was with pittifull regard” (5.5.13.2). Spenser suggests that 
much of their sovereign power stems from their Petrarchan ability cruelly to place 
Artegall under their subjection. 
As with the other Spenserian female doubles, though, only one can survive when 
they meet. In their climactic encounter, Spenser indicates that although Radigund’s 
sovereignty has been demonized in the poem, she can become truly illegitimate only 
through her elimination. As they meet face to face, Britomart and Radigund reveal their 
likeness even more intensely: “As when a Tygre and a Lionesse / Are met at spoyling of 
some hungry pray, / Both challenge it with equal greedinesse” (5.7.30). While as 
Hamilton observes, a tiger (representing Radigund) is “noted for its cruelty” and a lioness 
(representing Britomart) can be seen as “the royal beast” (5.7.30n), the emphasis on their 
similarity is striking: they challenge each other “with equal greedinesse.”
51
 The only way 
for Britomart to establish her authority is to kill her opponent: 
Where being layd, the wrothfull Britonesse 
Stayd not, till she came to her selfe againe, 
But in reuenge both of her loues distresse, 
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And her late vile reproch, though vaunted vaine, 
And also of her wound, which sore did paine, 
She with one stroke both head and helmet cleft. 
Which dreadfull sight, when all her warlike traine 
There present saw, each one of sence bereft, 
Fled fast into the towne, and her sole victor left. (5.7.34) 
“Sole victor left”: Spenser makes clear that there can be room for only one female 
sovereign, and Britomart’s victory establishes her authenticity by eliminating her rival. 
The way in which she defeats Radigund gives the sense of an execution; Britomart 
delivers the blow when Radigund is unconscious and has no chance to strike back.  
Only after Radigund is beheaded can Britomart fully assert her sovereignty and 
reign “as Princess” (5.7.42). Of course, her reign is short-lived and unpalatable to many 
critics, who view Britomart’s repeal of the “liberty of women” as exposing Spenser’s 
anxiety about female rule (5.7.42). Britomart also ceases to be desirable to Artegall in the 
very next canto, when Spenser asserts he is not susceptible to the “wondrous powre” of 
“wemens fairre aspect” (5.8.2). Artegall then “left his loue, albe her strong request, / 
Faire Britomart in languor and vnrest, / And rode him selfe vppon his first intent” (5.7.3). 
Like Una, left languishing by Redcrosse in book 1, Britomart is forced to put her desires 
on hold indefinitely, and she never returns in the poem.
52
 Britomart’s encounter with 
Radigund illustrates the very precariousness of female sovereignty in the early modern 
period. Britomart’s sovereignty depends on Radigund’s similarity and then elimination—
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yet the moment of sovereign assertion, the moment when Britomart remains the “sole 
victor left,” reveals sovereignty’s fragility.  
One of the most topical depictions of female sovereignty comes during Duessa’s 
trial in book 5. This episode, corresponding to the trial of Mary Queen of Scots, 
represents a clearly allegorical moment of the text. As in the real trial, Duessa is 
convicted for her crimes against the state, and as in Elizabeth’s speeches on Mary, 
Mercilla vacillates about executing a fellow queen. Yet as in all the other depictions of 
female doubles, the line between good queen and bad queen becomes quite thin. 
Mercilla’s legitimacy as a sovereign rests not only on her ability to eliminate Duessa but 
also on her very likeness to her. As John Staines argues, although critics have long 
assumed that Spenser’s depiction of Mercilla is merely a propaganda piece for Elizabeth, 
the episode also reveals how all political power is maintained through guileful rhetoric.
53
 
Far from simply demonstrating Mercilla’s sovereign transcendence, the trial of Duessa 
depicts how dependent Mercilla is on her female counterpart. 
Even before Duessa is introduced in the canto, the description of Mercilla’s court 
echoes that of another “mayden Queene”—Lucifera of book 1 (1.4.8). Spenser’s 
language depicts a space almost identical to Lucifera’s residence: both are “a stately 
pallace,” both have towers “glistering with gold,” and both feature queens over which “a 
cloth of state was spred” and who themselves shine “Glistring like gold” (1.4.4, 8; 5.9.21, 
28). Hamilton notes that such details “expose its parody in Lucifera’s ‘stately Pallace’” 
(5.9.21n), yet the verbatim descriptions suggest that neither court can fully parody the 
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other. Spenser’s assertions that Lucifera is “proud” (1.4.12) and that Mercilla is “Angel-
like” (5.9.29) are both founded on the same evidence, intimating that their opposition 
stems from their similarity rather than their difference. Mercilla and Lucifera are versions 
of one another, and as with the two Florimells, Mercilla’s legitimacy becomes established 
merely from setting her against her false double—and by naming Lucifera “proud”—
rather than by actually proving Lucifera’s inauthenticity. 
Duessa, too, appears remarkably similar to Mercilla rather than opposed to her. At 
first, Duessa gains support from the people attending the trial:  
Then was there brought, as prisoner to the barre,  
A Ladie of great countenance and place,  
But that she it with foule abuse did marre;  
Yet did appeare rare beautie in her face” (5.9.38)  
Not the exposed “wrinckled hag” of book 1 (1.8.46), Duessa’s beauty rivals Mercilla’s. 
And although Duessa’s prosecutor, Zele, charges her with beguiling many knights, the 
most serious charge against her is her likeness to Mercilla—her attempt to usurp the 
throne and take her place: “how for to depryue / Mercilla of her crowne, by her aspyred, / 
That she might it vnto her selfe deryue” (5.9.41). What is most threatening about Duessa 
is her interchangeability with Mercilla. 
 Despite Mercilla’s hesitation—the “perling drops” she sheds for Duessa 
(5.9.50)—it is clear that Duessa needs to be eliminated for Mercilla to endure as queen. 
Yet unlike the graphic execution of Radigund, the execution of Duessa almost slips by 
without notice. Her sentence left unresolved at the end of canto 9, it nearly evades 
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articulation at the beginning of canto 10. After three stanzas defending mercy, Spenser 
goes onto describe Duessa’s death in an equivocal way: 
Much more it praysed was of those two knights;  
The noble Prince, and righteous Artegall, 
When they had seene and heard a doome a rights 
Against Duessa, damned by them all; 
But by her tempred without griefe or gall, 
Till strong constraint did her thereto enforce. 
And yet euen then ruing her wilfull fall, 
With much more then needfull naturall remorse, 
And yeelding the last honour to her wretched corse. (5.10.4) 
This stanza effaces the complexities of the trial. Spenser represents Arthur and Artegall, 
who had previously taken opposing positions on Duessa’s sentence, as of the same mind 
here, praising her execution. Spenser also represents Duessa as almost volunteering for 
her death, noting her “wilfull fall.” Perhaps most striking about this stanza is the way in 
which Duessa dies—or does not die. Spenser never articulates the moment of her 
execution; instead, Duessa’s “wretched corse” just shows up in the last line. Just as Mary 
Queen of Scots was executed out of the public’s eye at Fotheringay Castle, so does 
Duessa quietly disappear, certifying Mercilla’s reign simply through her disappearing act. 
As Mercilla, too, disappears from the text at this moment, Spenser reminds the 
reader how tenuous female authority remains in early modern culture. Mercilla needs her 
Petrarchan double to secure her own sovereignty, but making her disappear also risks 
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eliminating her own rule. This danger perhaps explains Elizabeth’s nineteen-year 
procrastination in deciding to eliminate her own counterfeit double, Mary Queen of 
Scots, and it also points to the delicate dance that both queens performed to try to prove 
their authenticity and maintain a position of power. 
 
Like Two Milkmaids: Elizabeth and Mary 
Elizabeth’s first experience in female doubling came early in life when she was 
cast as the counterfeit woman. When Elizabeth was imprisoned by her sister, Mary 
Tudor, in 1554, her life was in grave danger. Accused of complicity in the Wyatt 
rebellion, whose leaders sought to assassinate Mary and put Elizabeth on the throne, 
Elizabeth could have easily been convicted and executed. As a Protestant heir to the 
throne, Elizabeth threatened everything Mary’s Catholic reign represented. Recognizing 
this threat, Elizabeth implored her sister in a letter to allow her plead her case in person:  
If any ever did try this old saying, “that a king’s word was more than 
another man’s oath,” I most humbly beseech your Majesty to verify it to 
me, and to remember your last promise and my last demand, that I be not 
condemned without answer and due proof, which it seems that I now am; 
for without cause proved, I am by your Council from you commanded to 
go to the Tower, a place more wanted for a false traitor than a true subject, 
. . . And therefore I humbly beseech your Majesty to let me answer afore 
yourself, and not suffer me to trust to your Councillors, yea, and that afore 
I go to the Tower, if it be possible; . . . I pray God the like evil persuasions 
  
118 
 
persuade not one sister against the other, and all for that they have heard 
false report, and the truth unknown.
54
 
Realizing the difficulty in distinguishing between “a false traitor and a true subject,” 
Elizabeth wants to make her presence known so that she does not, like False Florimell, 
disappear. Rather than distinguish herself from Mary, Elizabeth emphasizes their 
proximity, even indivisibility, as sisters. Her tactics worked. Mary did not execute 
Elizabeth, and Elizabeth became queen only a few years later. 
In 1568, Elizabeth found herself in a situation very similar to that of Mary Tudor 
when her cousin and self-proclaimed heir to the English throne Mary Queen of Scots 
crossed the English border. The parallels between Elizabeth’s early letter to Mary Tudor 
and the letters from Mary Queen of Scots to Elizabeth are striking. As Elizabeth had done 
to her own sister, Mary begs Elizabeth to admit her into her presence. In letters dated 
from May to July 1568, Mary pleads to Elizabeth “to send to fetch me as soon as you 
possibly can,” desires “to come in person to lay my complaint before you,” and demands 
to “come to you to make my moan to you; the which being heard, I would declare unto 
you mine innocency, and then require your ayde.”
55
 Mary repeatedly emphasizes her 
likeness to Elizabeth—as “sisters” and as regnant queens: “I beseech you, since you see 
that subjects favour subjects, you, a queen, my sister and cousin, to favour your equal.”
56
 
                                                 
54
 Elizabeth I, The Letters of Queen Elizabeth I, ed. G.B. Harrison (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), 
19-20.  
55
 Mary Stuart, Letters of Mary, Queen of Scots, and Documents Connected With Her Personal History, 
with an introduction by Agnes Strickland, vol. 1 (London: Henry Colburn, 1842), pp. 43, 45, 60-61. Mary’s 
letters were originally written in French. 
56
 Stuart, Letters of Mary, Queen of Scots, vol. 1, p. 57. 
  
119 
 
Addressing most of her letters to “Madam my good sister,” Mary holds a mirror up to 
Elizabeth’s face, trying to force Elizabeth to see what they have in common. 
Yet unlike Mary Tudor, who conceded to her sister’s request to make her 
presence known, Elizabeth fostered a strategy of absence with Mary Queen of Scots. 
Many of their letters display Petrarchan characteristics as Mary desperately pursues 
Elizabeth while Elizabeth performs the role of the inaccessible mistress. Although she 
denies to Elizabeth her involvement with the Petrarchan letters and sonnets of the Casket 
Letters, writing that “I know nothing about them, and have never written such silly 
things, even if I had imagined them,”
57
 Mary frequently uses Petrarchan conceits in her 
letters to Elizabeth to describe her forsakenness. For example, in September 1568, Mary 
writes, “I have said what I had upon my heart to your vice-chamberlain, entreating you 
not to let me be lost for want of a safe port; for like a vessel driven by all the winds, so 
am I, not knowing where to find a haven, unless, taking into your kind consideration my 
long voyage, you bring me into a safe harbour.”
58
 In October 1569, she emphasizes her 
unrequited love, pleading to Elizabeth to “not leave me to waste away here in tears and 
complaints caused by the disease for which I came to seek the remedy.”
59
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As the years pass with no favorable results, Mary’s tone grows even more 
passionate. In October 1570, she portrays herself as committed lover:  
Then, Madam my good sister, do not refuse this my very humble request 
to see you before my departure, so as to remove from me all fear of being 
undeservedly in your disfavour; and thus, relying altogether on your 
goodwill, I shall have an indissoluble bond of friendship between us twain 
sufficient to shut the mouths of our mutual enemies who might pretend to 
the contrary; and, by the same means, I shall discover to you the secrets of 
my heart, of which I have given some insight, but darkly, to Mr. Cecil 
your secretary; . . . I shall devote myself more and more to love, honour, 
and obey you, which I am resolved to do nevertheless
60
 
Using the language of marital vows, Mary blurs the line between political alliance and 
erotic love. She portrays herself both as submitting to Elizabeth’s will (fearful “of being 
undeservedly in your disfavour”) and as controlling information that would be beneficial 
to Elizabeth (“I shall discover to you the secrets of my heart”).  
Elizabeth, on the other hand, plays the part of the cruel Petrarchan mistress who 
never fulfils Mary’s desires yet always leaves open the possibility of doing so. In her 
letters, which are far outnumbered by Mary’s, Elizabeth rejects Mary’s requests to see 
her—yet never absolutely. In a letter dated June 8,
 
1568, Elizabeth responds to several 
successive letters from Mary desperately seeking her audience: 
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Madame: I learn by your letter and by my lort Herrys your desire to justify 
yourself in my presence of the things charged against you. O madame, 
there is no creature living more desirous to hear it than I, or who will more 
readily lend her ears to such answer as shall acquit your honour. But 
whatever my regard for you, I can never be careless of my own reputation. 
. . . If you find it strange not to see me, you must make a metamorphose of 
our persons, and then you will see it would be malayse for me to receive 
you before your justification. But once honourably acquitted of this crime, 
I swear to you before God, that among all worldly pleasures that will hold 
the first rank.
61
 
Instructing Mary to put herself in her shoes—to “make a metamorphose of our 
persons”—Elizabeth stresses her interchangeability with Mary and her closeness as 
twinned sisters. Yet for Elizabeth to maintain power, she must ensure that the meeting of 
her double is indefinitely deferred. Never foreclosing the possibility of a meeting and 
always leaving open the channels of desire, Elizabeth suspends her commitments to her 
cousin in perpetual ambiguity. 
Mary’s letters to Elizabeth make clear that the very threat Mary denies—tainting 
Elizabeth’s authority with her proximity—is the one that Elizabeth fears most. In a 
provocatively phrased letter dated July 5, 1568, Mary articulates—even as she 
disavows—the very concerns Elizabeth expresses about her presence: 
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Good sister, be of another mind. Even the heart and all shall be yours, and 
at your commandment. I thought to have satisfied you wholly, if I might 
have seen you. Alas! do not as the serpent that stoppeth his hearing, for I 
am no enchanter, but your sister and natural cousin. . . . I am not of the 
nature of the basilisk, and less of the cameleon’s, to turn you to my 
likeness: and though I should be so dangerous and curst as men say, you 
are sufficiently armed with constancy and with justice, which I require of 
God, who give you grace to use it well, with long and happy life.
62
 
Mary claims that she is not inconstant, yet her language suggests the powerful currency 
of these tropes against women. The terms that she uses—basilisk, chameleon—pervade 
Petrarchan literature as metaphors for feminine danger. The basilisk, for example, whose 
glance was thought to be deadly, recurs as an image of female erotic power over men. In 
sonnet 47 of John Davies’s Wittes Pilgrimage (1605), the speaker begins, “The fatall 
beames thou dartest from thine Eyes / (Like Basilisks work on me, in effect.”
63
  
And the chameleon, known for its ability to live without food for long periods of 
time and thus “eat the air,”
64
 also develops a reputation for its ability to change the color 
of its skin and becomes a metaphor for the fickleness of women. In The Forrest of Fancy 
(1579), a collection of poems (many about the cruelty of womankind), one of the poems 
refers to women as chameleon-like in their “wily wayes”: 
                                                 
62
 Stuart, Letters of Mary, Queen of Scots, vol. 1, p. 90.  
63
 John Davies, sonnet 47, in Wittes Pilgrimage, (by Poeticall Essaies) Through a World of amorous 
Sonnets, Soule-passions, and other Passages, Diuine, Philosophicall, Morall, Poeticall, and Politicall 
(London: Iohn Brown, [1605]), E1v. 
64
 In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, when Claudius asks, “How fares our cousin Hamlet?” Hamlet replies, 
“Excellent, i’ faith, of the chameleon’s dish: I eat the air, promise-cramm’d” (3.2.93-94). 
  
123 
 
They can condicions chaunge, 
to cause their friendes vnrest, 
As the Chameleon chaungeth hue, 
When as it likes him best, 
If that they be disposde, 
pore louers to allure, 
They can as wily wayes inuent, 
their purpose to procure.
65
 
Mary appeals to Elizabeth’s constancy, a quality that both male and female Petrarchan 
lovers profess despite the trials of love,
66
 as an antidote to any female threat that may 
come her way, but her evocation of the “wily” dangers of women proves a powerful 
articulation of the very associations Elizabeth wishes to avoid. 
Yet despite the evident dangers of Mary’s presence, Elizabeth nevertheless 
emphasizes her associations with her rival, suggesting that she depends her double just as 
much as she is threatened by her. Just as Leslie authenticates Mary by emphasizing those 
who counterfeit her, so does Elizabeth highlight the ways in which Mary replicates her 
own sovereignty—even as she keeps Mary at arm’s length. For instance, James Melville, 
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Mary’s English ambassador, records in 1564 a conversation in which Elizabeth 
aggressively demands that he compare the beauty and talents of the two queens: 
Her hair was more reddish than yellow, curled in appearance naturally. 
Then she entered to discern what coulour of hair was reputed best; and 
whether my queen’s hair or her’s was best; and which of them two was 
fairest. I answered that the fairness of them both was not their worst faults. 
But she was earnest with me to declare which of them I thought fairest. I 
said she was the fairest queen in England and ours the fairest queen in 
Scotland. Yet she was earnest. I answered they were both the fairest ladies 
of their courts and that Her Majesty was whiter, but our queen was very 
lovely. She enquired which of them was of highest stature. I said, our 
queen. Then, saith she, she is too high and that herself was neither too 
high nor too low. Then she asked what kind of exercises she used. I 
answered that [when] I was despatched out of Scotland, the queen was 
lately come from the Highland hunting; that when she had leisure from the 
affairs of her country she read upon good books, the histories of diverse 
countries, and sometimes would play upon the lute and virginals. She 
asked if she played well. I said, reasonably for a queen.
67
 
With its fairy tale quality, Elizabeth’s language suggests that for a woman to be a true 
queen—the fairest one of all—she has to be compared to a false queen. Just as 
Malecasta’s status as the “fairest Dame” relies on her comparison to the ladies whom her 
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knights disavow, Elizabeth’s status as the only female sovereign of England relies on her 
comparison to an inferior counterpart. Elizabeth’s persistent inquiries about Mary’s hair, 
height, and musical abilities imply that as much as Mary is a menace to Elizabeth’s reign, 
she is also a necessary component of it. Elizabeth needs Mary to authenticate her own 
validity as queen. Shakespeare echoes this conversation in Antony and Cleopatra, when 
Cleopatra demands that her messenger compare her features to Octavia’s:  
Go to the fellow, good Alexas; bid him  
Report the feature of Octavia, her years,  
Her inclination; let him not leave out  
The color of her hair. Bring me word quickly.  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Bid you Alexas  
Bring me word how tall she is.
68
  
Like Elizabeth, Cleopatra recognizes the fragility of her authority as queen, which is 
always dependent on the construction of an inferior copy. Cleopatra must distance herself 
from Octavia, asserting her superior traits, yet at the same time insinuate her closeness. 
Even in her prevarications, scoldings, and rejections of Mary’s suits, Elizabeth 
remains careful to emphasize her close sisterhood to Mary. In her letters to Mary, she 
uses the same language of affection and familial bonds that Mary uses, even when 
Elizabeth can barely veil her fury. In Elizabeth’s 1567 letter to Mary responding to 
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Darnley’s shocking death, Elizabeth sternly warns Mary not to marry Bothwell, yet she 
still maintains their likeness as queens:  
I do not write so vehemently out of doubt that I have, but out of the 
affection that I bear you in particular. For I am not ignorant that you have 
no wiser counselors than myself. . . . 
. . . Praying the Creator to give you the grace to recognize this 
traitor and protect yourself from him as from the ministers of Satan, with 
my very heartfelt recommendations to you, very dear sister.
69
  
Even through her bossiness, Elizabeth refuses to abandon the sisterly tropes that 
characterize their correspondence, suggesting their value to her.  
As Mary’s threat to Elizabeth grows, Elizabeth still appropriates the language of 
sisterhood to represent her relationship with her cousin. After the Northern Rebellion of 
1569-70, in which Thomas Howard plotted to marry Mary and to take the English throne, 
Elizabeth passionately proclaims her generosity toward her undeserving “good sister”: 
“Good madame, what wrong did I ever s[eek] to you or yours in the former part of my 
reign, when y[ou] know what was sought against me, even to the sp[oil] of my crown 
from me? . . . And what moved me thereto but my natural inclination towards you, with 
whom I desired to live as a neighbor and a good sister?”
70
 Elizabeth deftly mirrors 
Mary’s pleas in her letters, putting herself in the role of the trusting victim who is at the 
mercy of the actions of her sister. 
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Elizabeth’s most extended—and most public—use of the language of female 
doubling comes in her two speeches about Mary’s conviction of treason late in 1586. 
First delivered to Parliament and later revised for publication, these speeches make the 
case for Elizabeth’s genuine affinity with her rival cousin at a time when Elizabeth’s 
authenticity as a queen is most at stake. The purpose of these speeches was to address 
Parliament’s growing pressure to execute Mary and to delay giving them a response—to 
leave them lingering with her “answer answerless.”
71
 Yet Elizabeth’s desire to 
disseminate these speeches to a wider audience—along with her conspicuous use of the 
language of doubling—suggest that these speeches were also a way for her to 
demonstrate her legitimacy as queen. Her emphasis on her closeness to Mary works not 
only to diminish her culpability in the inevitable execution of another sovereign queen 
but also to highlight her genuineness in the face of the false female other. 
Toward the beginning of her first speech, she emphasizes her likeness to Mary, 
subtly reminding Parliament that as a princess, she had suffered a similar tyranny under 
her own sister, Mary Tudor:  “And now, albeit I find my life hath been full dangerously 
sought and death contrived by such as no desert procured, yet am I therein so clear from 
malice . . . as I protest it is and hath been my grievous thought that one not different in 
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sex, of like estate, and my near kin, should fall into so great a crime.”
72
 Elizabeth uses the 
proximity of her cousin to draw attention to her own innocence. She also uses the striking 
image of milkmaids to suggest an unspoiled bond between the two queens. She argues 
that were it not for the welfare of her subjects—if her “own life were only in danger and 
not the whole estate of [their] religion and well-doings”—her relationship with Mary 
would be as unencumbered “as two milkmaids with pails upon [their] arms.”
73
  Elizabeth 
thus suggests not only that she would selflessly sacrifice herself for the good of her 
people but also that the affairs of the state rather than her own selfish vengeance interfere 
with an idyllic relationship with her cousin.   
The image of the milkmaids has attracted the attention of several scholars. Janel 
Mueller contends that her reference to the two queens as “milkmaids” is a genuine but 
unsuccessful fantasy: “That hypothetical private construction proves a failure and an 
illusion.”
74
 Laurie Shannon argues that Elizabeth’s use of the milkmaid image points to 
Elizabeth’s subordination of her private desires to her public obligations. If she were a 
milkmaid, she could pardon Mary, but since she is not, she must “indicate a complete 
dedication of the private self to her subjects’ good.”
75
 Yet rather than just a private 
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fantasy that Elizabeth must disavow to retain public authority, the milkmaid association 
is very much connected to her success as a female sovereign at this moment. Elizabeth’s 
emphasis on the twinned milkmaids suggests the extent to which female sovereignty 
relies on the language of doubling for its authenticity. Like Una, Britomart, or Mercilla, 
Elizabeth must imply her closeness to Mary—rather than her opposition to her—in order 
to secure her position as true queen.  
Elizabeth’s likening herself and Mary to milkmaids also highlights the ways in 
which the body natural is intertwined with Elizabeth’s construction of female 
sovereignty. In comparing Mary to a milkmaid, she relegates Mary to the body natural, 
yet in doing so she ties herself to the body natural as well. Elizabeth’s reliance on a 
striking image like the one of milkmaids suggests that the concept of the body politic can 
never fully compensate for the body natural, especially when that body is female. 
Elizabeth depends on the body natural to authenticate her sovereignty, using the image of 
the milkmaids to enhance her own authority, yet she also exposes the tenuousness of that 
sovereignty, which rests on the thin line between proving she is the true woman and Mary 
is the false one. Elizabeth suggests that she cannot always make her female body natural 
disappear, and because of that, she must validate it by tying it to another, inferior copy. 
Elizabeth also stages her authenticity through the performance of her grief. As 
with Mary and so many of Spenser’s characters, female grief was often under suspicion 
for being counterfeit. Elizabeth suggests that the only way she can validate her grief as 
true is by setting it against the image of the false woman: 
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But I must tell you one thing more: that in this last act of Parliament you 
have brought me to a narrow strait, that I must give direction for her death, 
which cannot be to me but a most grievous and irksome burdon. And lest 
you might mistake mine absence from this Parliament . . . yet hath it not 
been the doubt of any such danger or occasion that kept me from thence, 
but only the griet grief to hear this cause spoken of; especially that such a 
one of state and kin should need to so open a declaration, and that this 
nation should be spotted with blots of disloyalty. Wherein the less is my 
grief, for that I hope the better part is mine; and those of the worse not 
much to be accounted of; for that in seeking my destruction, they might 
have spoiled their own souls.
76
 
Elizabeth’s “great grief” becomes genuine only in contrast to Mary’s “blots of 
disloyalty,” and conversely, Mary spoils her own soul in seeking the “destruction” of the 
truly grieving Elizabeth. Again, Elizabeth points to her affinity with Mary—“one of state 
and kin”—only to suggest how her female double, exposed as disloyal, props up her own 
authority as queen.  
Elizabeth continues to appropriate the language of doubling in her second speech, 
even more vehemently objecting to the idea of killing one who is so like herself: “What 
will they not now say when it shall be spread that for the safety of her life, a maiden 
queen could be content to spill the blood even of her own kinswoman?”
77
 Yet she also 
shows her awareness of the thin line she treads between being the true queen and being 
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labeled the counterfeit. In one version of her second speech, she insists that she is not the 
one making false shows: “If there be any that think I have prolonged the time of purpose 
to make a counterfeit show of clemency, they do me the most undeserved wrong, as He 
knoweth, which is the searcher of the most secret thoughts of the heart.”
78
 Aware of how 
Mary’s display of grief for Darnley became hotly contested and questioned, Elizabeth 
recognizes that her own grief could easily be branded forged, and she uses a number of 
techniques to stave off that charge. 
One trope she consistently uses in this speech to authenticate her position is the 
complaint, a trope often associated with female speakers: 
I have strived more this day than ever in my life, whether I should 
speak or use silence. If I speak and not complain, I shall dissemble; if I 
hold my peace, your labor taken were full vain. For me to make my moan 
were strange and rare; for I suppose you shall find few that for their own 
particular will cumber you with such a care. Yet such, I protest, hath been 
my greedy desire and hungry will that of your consultation might have 
fallen out some other means to work my safety joined with your assurance 
than that for which you are become such earnest suitors as I protest I must 
needs, though not of you, but unto you, and of the cause. . . .  
And since now it is resolved that my surety cannot be established 
without a princess’s end, I have just cause to complain that I, who have in 
my time pardoned so many rebels, winked at so many treasons, and either 
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not produced them or altogether slipped them over with silence, should 
now be forced to this proceeding against such a person.
79
  
The female complaint was a trope long established in English literature; speakers like 
Jane Shore in The Mirror for Magistrates (1563), Rosamond in Samuel Daniel’s 
Complaint of Rosamond (1592), and Britomart give long complaints about their 
sufferings. While some critics have interpreted the female complaint as a mode of 
passivity for women, other scholarship has pointed to the complaint as a vehicle through 
which female speakers can achieve legitimacy.
80
 Elizabeth seems aware of both 
possibilities here. Acknowledging that “For me to make my moan were strange and rare,” 
she recognizes the risk that a complaint will appear self-indulgent, or perhaps even 
forged. Yet she also suggests—through her convoluted syntax— that the complaint is the 
only way she can respond to a crisis of such magnitude—to a crisis that cannot be 
resolved “without a princess’s end.” Elizabeth appropriates this form as one way of 
validating her grief for her cousin as true. 
What is even more interesting about Elizabeth’s use of the complaint in this 
speech are the ways in which Elizabeth echoes Mary’s own pleas in her letters to 
Elizabeth. Time and again, Mary begged Elizabeth to let her come make her complaint. 
In May 1568, for instance, Mary writes, “I wished above all to come in person to lay my 
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complaint before you, as well on account of our near relationship, equality of rank, and 
professed friendship,” and in November 1569, Mary pleadingly writes to Elizabeth, “now 
that you listen to the malice of my rebels, as the Bishop of Ross informs me, refusing to 
hear the just complaint of her who has placed herself voluntarily in your power, and 
thrown herself into your arms, I have presumed once more to try my fortune, and to 
appeal to the queen my good sister herself.”
81
 In using the language of the complaint, 
Elizabeth co-opts Mary’s own pleas. Like Britomart, who becomes queen of the 
Amazons only after Radigund has been beheaded, Elizabeth can appropriate Mary’s 
position and language only after her threat has been eliminated.  
While Mary was still alive, though, she remained too much of a threat to 
Elizabeth to see her in person, which is why Elizabeth could not risk being present at her 
trial. As Spenser shows, when two female sovereigns are in the same room, one has to 
disappear, and Elizabeth could not gamble on being the one who is eliminated. Scholars 
have rightly pointed to the tactical reasons behind Elizabeth’s evasiveness here.  As Jayne 
Lewis argues, killing another sovereign sets a very bad precedent, striking “at Elizabeth’s 
queenly authority in a complicated way—not just by subjecting the queen’s will to that of 
Parliament but, more subtly, by forcing her to want to divest herself of a royal 
prerogative that she, not unlike Mary, held dear.”
82
 Yet Elizabeth’s reluctance to show 
herself literally reflected by her sister/rival is also rooted in the Petrarchan context that 
informs their relationship. Like a Petrarchan mistress, whose legitimacy was slippery and 
often required the comparison to a false female other, Elizabeth carefully stage-managed 
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her relationship with Mary in order to secure her own tenuous power as a female 
sovereign. Elizabeth needed Mary to authenticate her own queenship, but in finally 
eliminating her female counterfeit, Elizabeth also risked eliminating her own authority—
disappearing herself like Una, Britomart, or Mercilla once their false doubles were 
exposed. Elizabeth instead elected to manage her own absence at Mary’s trial, ensuring 
that she was not the one eliminated in their rivalry and that Mary’s sisterly closeness to 
her—so vital to her reign for the past nineteen years—did not come too close.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Old Wives’ Tales, the Petrarchan Complaint, and The Winter’s Tale 
 
In The Winter’s Tale, Hermione appears in two ghostly manifestations: once in 
Antigonus’s dream, and again in the last scene when she emerges from what the audience 
thought was her death. As a female ghost, Hermione is an unusual figure in early modern 
literature. Most ghosts of the period, critics point out, were male, particularly the revenge 
ghosts that dominated the London stage. Frances Dolan emphasizes the “dearth of female 
ghosts both before and after the Reformation, in continental Europe as well as in 
England” and argues that the female ghosts who do appear in literature are 
disappointingly passive, refraining “from reproaching, menacing, or intervening,” unlike 
their male counterparts.
1
 For Dolan, Hermione’s role as revenge ghost is frustratingly 
weak, and she asserts that Hermione neither defends herself nor expresses anger in her 
appearance in Antigonus’s dream: “The Winter’s Tale robs its female protagonist of rage 
and vengefulness even as it so provocatively links her to the spectral and iconic.”
2
 Like 
Valerie Traub and Abbe Blum, Dolan sees Hermione’s “death” as a way of immobilizing 
her desirability so that she can be fully possessed by her husband.
3
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Yet critics have largely ignored two popular early modern contexts in which 
women figure widely as ghosts and as participants in supernatural encounters. One is the 
Protestant literature that condemns ghosts—along with demons, spirits, goblins, fairies, 
witches, and the like—as “old wives’ tales.”
4
 Women, according to these writers, are 
both the culprits in transmitting the stories and the false images themselves. In The 
Discoverie of Witchcraft (1584), Reginald Scot writes that “in our childhood our mothers 
maids have so terrified us” with stories of the supernatural “that we are afraid of our 
owne shadowes.” He also writes that “spirits most often and speciallie take the shape of 
women.”
5
 Protestant writers also argued that women were more susceptible to believing 
in ghosts. In Of Ghostes and Spirites Walking by Fyght, first translated into English in 
1572, Lewes Lavater argues, “Wemen, which for the most parte are naturally geuen to 
feare than men, . . . do more often suppose they see or heare this or that thing, than men 
do. And so do yong wemen, bicause commonly they are afrayde.”
6
 The young maiden 
became an especially prominent figure in early modern stories about the supernatural, 
which detail the erotic encounters she has with apparitions at the same time that they 
argue that those encounters did not happen at all. In these cases, writing texts that deride 
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Catholic superstitions as old wives’ tales becomes a way to participate in the dangers of 
the erotic female body—open, desiring, vocal, and sensual—all the while insisting that 
this body is not really there. Despite the derogatory nature of the term “old wives’ tales,” 
its use also constituted a space of pleasure—if illicit pleasure—for these writers.
7
 
The other early modern context that features female ghosts is the complaint 
poems of the 1590s, such as Samuel Daniel’s Complaint of Rosamond (1592) and 
Thomas Lodge’s Complaint of Elstred (1593). Influenced by the complaint of Jane Shore 
in The Mirror for Magistrates (1563) and often appended to sonnet sequences, these 
narrative poems feature female speakers who speak from the grave about their sinful 
sexuality. Unlike Petrarchan mistresses in the sonnets—stony figures who inflict cruelty 
on their suitors—the speakers of the complaint emerge as an open, pleasure-seeking 
characters who actively elicit sexual relationships with powerful men. The frame of the 
ghost story enabled writers to push the figure of the Petrarchan mistress beyond her 
conventional icy boundaries and evoke a different kind of absent presence than that 
ascribed to the distant Petrarchan beloved of the sonnets. As a ghost, the speaker of the 
complaint could evoke full bodily and sensual presence—the unfulfilled fantasy of the 
sonnet speaker—while maintaining her characteristic unavailability. The female 
complaint allowed the Petrarchan mistress to be both virtuous and loose, desirable and 
desiring, admirable and wanton.  
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the stories they once told” (52). 
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Shakespeare’s use of the figure of the female ghost—as well as the frame of the 
old wives’ tale—in The Winter’s Tale draws upon these contemporary representations of 
ghostly eroticism and allows Hermione to return as a speaking, desiring Petrarchan 
figure. Much of the criticism of the play has focused on the anxieties that Hermione’s 
maternal body produces, but the play also suggests that her role as Petrarchan mistress—
the beautiful woman Leontes fears he can never entirely possess—equally unleashes the 
panicked distrust of her faithfulness. Leontes cannot accommodate a Petrarchan mistress 
who speaks back, who delights in her own praise, and who reveals her own desires, and 
her elimination in act 3 seems to set up a context in which Leontes, as Petrarchan lover, 
can worship the absent presence of his beloved who is now safely distant. Yet 
Hermione’s return to the play—first as a ghost in Antigonus’s dream and then as a 
ghostly presence seemingly summoned from the dead—opens up a space in which 
Hermione can speak and still be admired. The question of whether Hermione’s body is 
fully present—which the play leaves hauntingly lingering—makes possible a Petrarchan 
female figure who expresses her own desires. Like the Protestant tracts on ghosts, the 
play calls into question whether Hermione’s seemingly supernatural return from the dead 
is real. And like the female speaker of the complaint poems, Hermione seems at once 
dead and living, and this in-between state permits the figure of the woman on a pedestal 
who embraces her own suitor. 
At the end of the play, Hermione transforms into a figure that recalls both old 
wife and young maiden. Not just a frustrated revenge ghost or an immobilized statue, 
Hermione returns as an animated character whose presence eludes Leontes’s full control. 
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This chapter examines the discourses—both Protestant and Petrarchan—that make such a 
figure possible. Like Askew and Elizabeth I, Shakespeare highlights the liminality of the 
figure of the mistress—in this case, enabled by her ghostly presence—to suggest that the 
body of the mistress need not always be in full possession of her desiring suitor. Instead, 
he points to the contexts in which women may articulate their own erotic desires—and 
yet still remain desirable figures in the eyes of those who encounter them. 
 
Desire and Protestant Skepticism  
The Protestants who wrote about ghost stories and other related beliefs in the 
supernatural in early modern England were officially skeptical, even sarcastic, about 
them, writing about how gullible and foolish people were to believe popish tricks. In The 
Terrors of the Fight (1594), Thomas Nashe declares, “Fie, fie, was euer poore fellow so 
farre benighted in an old wiues tale of diuells and vrchins.”
8
 Yet their texts about 
Catholic occultism also display an intense fascination with these stories and especially 
with the young women who experienced—or who were tricked into thinking they 
experienced—confrontations with the supernatural. Horrified at these women’s erotic 
encounters and at the Catholic priests’ lustful abuse of their bodies, these writers 
nevertheless obsessively return to the dangerous female sexuality of these girls, 
suggesting that the frame of the ghost story invites attention to what is illicit—and thus 
exciting—about the desirable female body. 
                                                 
8
 Thomas Nashe, The Terrors of the night Or, A Discourse of Apparitions (London: Iohn Danter, 1594), 
Hv. Adam Fox, Oral and Literate Culture in England, 1500-1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
examines how both writers of the Protestant Reformation and later writers of the emerging seventeenth-
century scientific culture helped to secure “old wives’ tales” as a term that signified “all the erroneous and 
superstitous rubbish which needed to be stripped away from the essence of truth” (176). 
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Reginald’s Scot’s The Discoverie of Witchcraft (1584) demonstrates the excess 
with which Protestant writers detail the very supernatural beings they abhor, and it also 
points to the female body as the locus of interest for these writers. Although most of his 
text is dedicated to deriding the idea of witchcraft as a Catholic superstition, he also 
names the source of irrational fear in most adults: the tales told by their mothers’ maids. 
In a famous passage, Scot names the goblins, witches, demons, and fairies that have so 
disturbed him—yet his rambling and wildly lengthy taxonomy suggests the pleasurable 
hold these stories have on his imagination: 
It is a common saieng; A lion feareth no bugs. But in our childhood our 
mothers maids have so terrified us with an ouglie divell having hornes on 
his head, fier in his mouth, and a taile in his breech, eies like a bason, 
fanges like a dog, clawes like a beare, a skin like a Niger, and a voice 
roring like a lion, whereby we start and are afraid when we heare one crie 
Bough: and they have so fraied us with bull beggers, spirits, witches, 
urchens, elves, hags, fairies, satyrs, pans, faunes, sylens, kit with the 
cansticke, tritons, centaurs, dwarfes, giants, imps, calcars, conjurors, 
nymphes, changlings, Incubus, Robin good-fellowe, the spoorne, the mare, 
the man in the oke, the hell waine, the fierdrake, the puckle, Tom thombe, 
hob gobblin, Tom tumbler, boneles, and such other bugs, that we are 
afraid of our owne shadowes: . . . For right grave writers report, that spirits 
most often and speciallie take the shape of women appearing to monks, 
&c: . . . Well, thanks be to God, this wretched and cowardlie infidelitie, 
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since the preaching of the gospell, is in part forgotten: and doubtles, the 
rest of those illusions will in short time (by Gods grace) be detected and 
vanish awaie.
9
 
With his declaration that these illusions will eventually “be detected and vanish awaie,” 
Scot reveals one of the central paradoxes of Protestant attitudes toward the supernatural. 
In order to erase all that causes him anxiety—the long list of supernatural beings 
including witches, fairies, ghosts, and devils—he must first evoke, even indulge in, them. 
It is not enough to say they do not exist. In order to vanish, they must first be recalled, 
described, conjured. And Scot’s excess in his descriptions betrays his own pleasure in the 
act of recollection. This passage is quoted at length because of the sheer glut of his list of 
the supernatural beings with which “our childhood mothers maids” filled his head; the 
creatures he insists should be disavowed are the very ones he cannot resist naming, 
cataloguing, and vividly illustrating. Ironically, much of the detailed information that 
scholars have today regarding the specific stories told about the supernatural in early 
modern England comes from those, like Scot, who most vehemently opposed them.
10
  
Scot’s statement that “spirits most often and speciallie take the shape of women 
appearing to monks &c” also suggests how strongly Protestant writers associate the threat 
of the supernatural with the temptation of young, desirable women. In this passage, 
                                                 
9
 Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft, bk. 8, chap. 15. pp. 86-87. 
10
 Scholars note the scattered nature of the records of folk stories, which were largely passed down through 
oral transmission, and they point to Scot as a valuable source of information on this topic. Scot is the sole 
written source for several stories. K.M. Briggs, The Anatomy of Puck: An Examination of Fairy Beliefs 
among Shakespeare’s Contemporaries and Successors (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), writes 
that “Scot himself mentions several fairies not known to folk tradition, which were probably authentic” 
(21). Eleanor Prosser, Hamlet and Revenge (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), writes, “Even 
skeptics who frankly doubted the appearance of ghosts of any type probably were familiar with ghost lore. 
Reginald Scot may have intended to destroy ‘the absurd opinions’ of papists and witchmongers, but his 
Discoverie of Witchcraft actually provided a tantalizing summary of them” (117).  
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Scot’s anxiety gradually moves from the “mothers maids” who told him such stories to 
the “shape of women appearing to monks” that figure widely in these stories. The 
“grave” writer to whom Scot refers in the margins here is Lavater, who, in his quest to 
debunk the Catholic concept of ghosts, writes about monks who trick women into 
believing that they are ghosts so that they will sleep with them. Ironically, Scot misreads 
Lavater; it is not the women who appear to the monks, but the monks who appear to the 
women. Scot’s interest in this aspect of Lavater’s treatise—his notable misreading—
shows the proximity between young women’s bodies and the supernatural in these 
Protestant texts—and it also shows how easily anxiety about the figure of the ghost slips 
into anxiety about young erotic women. 
Like Scot’s Discoverie, Lavater’s Of Ghostes sets out to debunk Catholic 
superstition, firmly refuting the idea that people can come back from the dead. According 
to Lavater, who likens ghosts to “olde wyues tales” (br), “the soules neither of the faithful 
nor of infidels do wander any longer on the earth, when they be once seuered from the 
bodies” (114). Yet even as he denies ghosts’ existence in the Catholic sense, Lavater 
devotes most of the text to ghost stories, instructing readers how to tell which spirits are 
real, how to tell which spirits are good, and how to behave when they encounter spirits.
11
 
                                                 
11
 Looking at the persistence and popularity of ghost stories in early modern England—which appear both 
in numerous ballads and in revenge tragedies—scholars have argued that Catholic views on ghosts 
remained intertwined with Protestant thinking throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Peter 
Marshall, Beliefs and the Dead in Reformation England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
concludes that the “Reformation failed to eradicate a widely held belief in the possibility of the dead 
seeking communion with the living” (261). Prosser, Hamlet and Revenge, points to the proximity of 
Catholic and Protestant positions on spirits, arguing that although Protestants did not believe in ghosts, both 
Catholics and Protestants believed in spirits who wandered the earth, and both groups were equally anxious 
about determining whether spirits were good or bad (106). See also Stephen Greenblatt, Hamlet in 
Purgatory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), who argues for the importance of purgatory as 
an imaginative concept in early modern literature. 
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For a Protestant thinker who does not believe in ghosts, he demonstrates in his treatise 
how much he loves to talk about them.  
Lavater tells several stories near the beginning of his treatise about monks and 
priests who pretend to be ghosts in order to gain access to the women they desire. He tells 
the story from Josephus about the ancient Roman knight Mundus, who, inflamed with 
“louers madnesse,” lusted after a “very riche and exceeding beautiful” Paulina, a married 
woman (23). When he could not allure Paulina away from her husband with money, 
Mundus hires a “mayde cunning in many artes” to devise a way for Mundus to enjoy 
Paulina, and this maid tricks Paulina into believing that the god Anubis has come and 
“vouchsaued to loue hir” (24-25). A devoted worshipper at the Temple of Isis, Paulina 
agrees to his demands and sleeps with Mundus, only to find out later that she has been 
deceived and that her chastity has been undone. Lavater tells another story of a German 
priest who was “farre in loue with an honest and faire mayden” who resisted his attempts 
“to haue defloured hir” (42). In response, the priest dresses as the Virgin Mary, appearing 
to the woman and telling her “that there was a certain holy and religious man, which had 
heretofore asked a thing at hir handes in the very same place, which she had hitherto 
denyed him, but now it was hir pleasure, if he required the same again, she should in any 
wise graunt it, if she wold atteyn euerlasting life” (42). Believing the vision, the woman, 
“supposing she should do high seruice to the virgin Mary, fulfilleth the lust of that 
wicked knaue” (42-43). 
On the one hand, Lavater’s recountings of these false visions expose the 
ridiculousness of these priests and of Catholicism. Lavater writes, “It might be declared 
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in many words what loue is able to do. Now bicause Monks and priests liue idlely, 
abounding in all wantonnesse, and yet are restrayned from holy mariage, what maruell is 
it if at this time also they faine and counterfeite many visions, that they might therby the 
easier enioy their loue?” (46). Yet the comic nature and the sheer number of these stories 
(all of which follow the same pattern) suggest that there is more to these tales than a 
simple denouncement of Catholicism. Lavater’s language of “maruell” also invites the 
reader to participate in the pleasures of the illicit sexuality in these stories. Lavater’s 
animated descriptions of Mundus’s “louers madnesse inflamed” and “the rage of his 
loue” incite pleasurable identification as well as pious condemnation from the reader. The 
stories emphasize the tragedy of these women losing their chastity, but they also detail 
beautiful, seductive women who choose to believe and who choose to engage in 
forbidden sexual encounters to fulfill their religious fantasies. Lavater says of Paulina, 
“And so all that night she satisfied the yong mans desire, supposing she had done 
pleasure vnto the God” (25), and when the German woman sees whom she believes to be 
the Virgin Mary, “The mayden by & by blazed it about all the citie” (42). Lavater’s 
censure of the counterfeit papist visions enables him to detail the delights of women’s 
desires while at the same time suggesting that they do not really exist because they are 
produced by false pretenses. 
Barnabe Rich’s pamphlet, The true report of a late practise enterprised by a 
Papist with a yong Maiden in Wales (1582), vividly demonstrates how ghost stories 
enabled writers to enact the pleasures of the female Petrarchan body while at the same 
time distancing themselves from the dangers of those pleasures. The purpose of the 
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pamphlet is to discredit the visions of a young woman, Elizabeth Orton, who recently 
confessed in church that she had been seduced by a papist. Rich, who was “an eye 
witnesse” to Orton’s public confession, became curious about her, and through his 
“intelligence” he obtained “a Pamphelet that was secretly spread, wherin was described 
the maner of her Visions, penned by some Archpapist that was ashamed to put to his 
owne name.”
12
 Rich prints this unnamed priest’s account of Orton’s visions ostensibly to 
show how ridiculous they are, sarcastically instructing the reader to say his pater nosters 
and Ave Marias and arguing that exposing this account to the world will undoubtedly 
reveal its foolishness: “Were it not pittie then that so worthie a worke as this, should be 
still thus smothered vp amongst our Catholikes? the whiche questionles if it were 
published and brought to light, could not bee but accoumpted of, euen amongst children 
and fooles” (B1r). Yet even as Rich frames the priest’s account as a preposterous old 
wives’ tale, his decision to print it in full suggests that something about it excites, 
intrigues, even titillates him. Rich’s incorporation of the priest’s account into his own not 
only discredits Orton’s Catholic visions as absurd but also participates in the erotic 
delights that the her visions evoke. 
The priest tells of Orton’s visions of Christ, the Virgin Mary, Mary Magdalene, 
and the ghosts of her dead family members as well as of her experience of purgatory and 
her conversion to Catholicism, but the focal point in all these accounts is Orton’s 
eroticized body. The priest emphasizes throughout his narrative Orton’s tears, eyes, 
                                                 
12
 Barnabe Rich, The true report of a late practise enterprised by a Papist with a yong Maiden in Wales, 
accompted emongst our Catholiques in those partes for a greater Prophetise, then euer was the Holie 
Maide of Kent, till now on Sundaie beyng the iiii. of Marche this present yere 1582 (London: Robert 
Walley, 1582), A3r, B1r, hereafter cited parenthetically in the text by page number. 
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mouth, skin, and breasts, pointing to the pleasurable pain of Orton’s experiences. For 
instance, in her encounter with the Virgin Mary, Orton seeks forgiveness for her sins and 
enters purgatorial fires to cleanse herself: 
it seemed more terrible then a womans paines in trauaile with Childe, or a 
man when the stitch teareth his bodie in peeces, and woundeth the harte to 
death: In so muche that the beholders wondered greatly, how her yong and 
tender fleshe could indure the same, for she burned within as well as 
without, that the heate broyled vp to her mouthe, and her skinne scorched 
with suche excessiue heate, that hardly could any man abide to touche her 
to be briefe, for very paine her eyes were couered with a mist, and her 
mouthe fomed, that all the companie assistauntes dispaired of her life, and 
were fore greeued to see so heauie a spectacle, and to heare so pittifull a 
voyce pearcyng their eares, oh, oh, oh, O good Lorde I burne, good Lorde 
I burne. (B4v) 
In one sense, the description of Orton is grotesque, with her foaming mouth and scorched 
skin, yet like the martyrs in Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, Orton’s body is rendered 
blazoned, spectacular, and desirable. Although the witnesses are described as “greeued” 
to see Orton in such pain, the priest also depicts a scene that compels an audience not to 
look away. Orton’s sensationalized body parts and her erotic moaning prompt the reader 
to see her as an alluring subject.  
Orton’s description of an encounter with another vision, in fact, portrays her own 
body in explicitly Petrarchan terms:  
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and loe this while appeared vnto me, a goodly faire birde, hauyng the 
bodie of a Sparhauke, the face of a Man, the beake of a Pigion, and the 
feathers of diuers colours, makyng greate speede towardes me, lightyng 
vppon my breast, and with his winges couered the same, and very softly 
first laid his bill on my forhead, then on myne eyes, lippes and breast, that 
being doen, he declared that he was a messenger from God, chargyng me 
to bee readie at an houres warning, and to aske them forgiuenesse whom I 
had offended, and so vanished awaie from my sight. (C1v-C2r) 
The bird creature that lands on Orton’s body is interested not only in her sins but also in 
her erotic features. The downward trajectory of the bird’s caresses—the forehead, the 
eyes, the lips, and finally the breast—suggests that Orton’s religious encounter is also a 
sexual encounter. The priest’s narrative details a blazon of Orton’s body, but instead of 
an icy, distant, and scornful beloved, Orton is depicted as a mistress who welcomes 
consummation of her lover’s desires.  
Far from a passive recipient of advances from these ghost visions, Orton 
vigorously pursues an erotic connection with the figures she sees. One of the most 
charged moments of the priest’s accounts—and thus one of the most threatening 
moments for Rich—occurs when Orton embraces Christ. The priest writes,  
she saied with very great vehemencie, O Lord, he reacheth his hand 
towardes me, let me goe to hym, let me imbrace hym, wherewith 
immediatly by meare force in dispite of them all, she rose vpon her feete, 
and spreadyng bothe armes she ioyned them againe fast to her stomacke, 
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vtteryng these wordes: I haue haue hym now in armes, O good Lord I haue 
thee, Iesus, help me, leaue me not sweete Iesus leaue mee not: neuer 
ceasyng to call vpon his holie name. (C3v) 
The context of the supernatural allows a space for the threatening female body to be 
described as an erotic agent who speaks with “great vehemencie,” spreading her arms and 
commanding Jesus to stay. Not just a desirable Petrarchan love object, Orton is 
represented here as a desiring subject, transgressing the bounds of acceptable female 
behavior. Orton’s behavior represents the wish-fulfillment of Petrarchan narratives; Orton 
is not simply a beautiful, hard-hearted idol, but a pleasure-seeking woman who fervently 
accepts the suit of her pursuing lover—Christ.  
Unsurprisingly, this behavior is what most offends Rich’s sensibilities. Although 
he dismisses Orton as “but a sillie Maiden” who experiences “Patheticall extasies,” her 
erotic behavior provokes real interest, excitement, and anxiety, and Rich returns to the 
female body as a central focus in the pamphlet (E1v). After the priest’s narrative 
concludes, Rich expresses his shock at Orton’s presumption to touch the body of Christ, 
something even Mary Magdalene dared not do: “When Marie Magdalen went to the 
Sepulchre with teares to seeke Christe, to whom although he firste shewed hym self, yet 
she might not so muche as once to touche hym, yet our yonge Prophetesse, who as our 
aucthour affirmeth was ignoraunt, an heretique, . . . and yet she might bee suffered to 
imbrace Christe in her armes” (E2v). Rich is also dismayed at the behavior of the Virgin 
Mary in the priest’s account, and he contests the idea that Mary would instruct Orton to 
endure purgatory’s fires to cleanse her sins because God’s forgiveness should be enough: 
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“she that was wont to bee called our Ladie of Pitie, is now become a gentilwoman of too 
much crueltie. . . . I perceiue the Prouerbe to bee true, the house is too vnquiet where the 
good wife weares the breeches, and yet you see it is so in heauen” (E2r-v). Rich is 
troubled by the thought of Orton and the Virgin as figures who exemplify what is 
threatening about the female body—its openness, its attractiveness, its potential to speak, 
demand, or desire—and promptly deems them disorderly. In Rich’s eyes, the Catholic 
priest has monstrously transformed the Virgin into a Petrarchan mistress—“a 
gentilwoman of too much crueltie”—and has allowed this figure to run amok with her 
power to control others around her—to wear the breeches. 
Yet despite Rich’s argument that the story of Orton’s visions are laughable—
“what Asse but would haue been ashamed to haue penned doune so ridiculous a matter” 
(E1r)—his inclusion of the priest’s narrative, which exceeds the length of Rich’s own 
text, points to the pleasure of such an account. To be sure, Rich safely contains the 
account by labeling it an old wives’ tale, suggesting that those who would believe in such 
a story are gullible fools: “thou seest that the greatest fortification of our holie Fathers 
doctrine, consisteth in Dreames, olde Wiues tales, Vnknowen scriptures, Traditions of 
menne, straunge Miracles, Fables, and Follies” (D4v-E1r). Rich cautions the reader not to 
be swept away by the tricks of the Catholic Church: “Let not forlorne hope misleade you, 
or fained miracles withdraw you, nor olde wiues prophesies so misgouerne you” (E4r). 
Yet his indulgence in this account—the literary authority he grants the priest by allowing 
him to tell his story—as well as the obsessive attention he places on Orton’s body suggest 
the enticing nature of Orton’s erotic encounters with the supernatural—even as Rich 
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officially disavows them. His repeated admonitions to heed the dangers of old wives’ 
tales only certify their appeal in the first place, and his insistence that these tales are mere 
silly fables also serves as an advertisement for the pleasures old wives’ tales can afford. 
Samuel Harsnett’s A Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures (1603) also 
demonstrates the anxiety and titillation produced by the stories of young women 
experiencing supernatural visions. Written at the request of Elizabeth’s government, the 
treatise addresses the Catholic exorcisms that took place at Denham in 1586. Like Scot, 
Lavater, and Rich, Harsnett cynically portrays Catholic beliefs on supernatural beings, 
and he appends to his text the examinations of three women—Sara Williams, Fid 
Williams, and Anne Smith—who had been subjected to the exorcisms seventeen years 
ago and who, like Elizabeth Orton, now confessed that what they had experienced was 
popish trickery. Harsnett’s text is most often studied today in relation to Shakespeare’s 
King Lear, which borrows heavily from Harsnett, and recent scholars have been 
particularly interested in Harsnett’s use of theatrical language in denouncing the Catholic 
practice of exorcism.
13
 Yet Harsnett’s text is equally interesting in its obsessive return to 
the young girls’ erotic bodies, particularly Sara’s experience with the priests who directed 
her exorcisms. Harsnett’s anxiety about what the priests did to Sara’s body and his 
inability to let it go point to the excitement produced by women’s encounters with the 
supernatural even as Harsnett vehemently insists on the horrible impropriety of the 
priests’ lust. 
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 See, for instance, Stephen Greenblatt, “Shakespeare and the Exorcists,” in Shakespearean Fegotiations: 
The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1988), 94-128. 
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The moment to which Harsnett so often returns originates from Sara’s 
examinations, when she describes the priests’ handling of her body during the exorcisms: 
when she was otherwise evil at ease by reason of their bad usage of her, 
they would in the end (when they were weary with dealing with her) say 
that the wicked spirits were gone downe into her legge, and sometimes 
into her foote, and that they should rest there for that time. And again, 
when they tooke her in hand the next time, they would begin to hunt the 
devil from the foote to bring him upwards, of purpose as they said to cause 
him, when they had him in her head, to goe out of her mouth, eares, eyes, 
or nose. And the manner of their hunting of him was to folow him with 
their hands (as they did pretend) all along the parts of her body. At one 
time, when it began to be with this examinate according to the manner of 
women (as since she hath perceaved), whereby she was much troubled, the 
priests did pretend that the devil did rest in the most secret part of her 
body. Where-upon they devised to apply the reliques unto it, and gave her 
such sliber-sawces as made her (as she was perswaded) much worse then 
otherwise she thinketh she should have beene.
14
 
Not only the actions of the priests but also the pornographic nature of Sara’s description 
shock Harsnett, so much so that he claims he cannot even repeat it. Horrified at what has 
happened to her, he states, “Some of these devil-lodges in Sara and Fid, without a 
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 Samuel Harsnett, A Declaration of egregious Popish Impostures, to with-draw the harts of her Maiesties 
Subiects from their allegiance, and from the truth of Christian Religion professed in England, vnder the 
pretence of casting out deuils (London: Iames Roberts, 1603), in Shakespeare, Harsnett, and the Devils of 
Denham, by F.W. Brownlow (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1993), 349-50. Hereafter, I cite 
Brownlow’s edition parenthetically in the text by page number. 
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praeface of deprecation to your modesty, I must not once name for feare of [a] check 
from your chast eares, and a change of colour in mine inke and paper at such uncouth 
termes. I will onely leape over this kennell of turpitude with a note of unsavorie smels, 
and remitt you to that clause of Sara Williams relation, who as a woman hath touched it 
as modestly as she can” (251). His language suggests strong revulsion, and his text 
literally evades the repetition of the sexual event, “leaping” over the “kennell of 
turpitude” in order to dodge the “check” from the readers’ “chast eares.” He characterizes 
what happened to Sara’s body—or perhaps her body itself—as filthy, stinky, and 
loathsome, and he suggests extreme fear of being tainted by its presence in his text. 
Yet despite his disgust for Sara’s erotic encounter with the priests and his 
insistence that the event is too horrible even to mention, Harsnett compulsively returns to 
that moment, increasing the erotic intensity of his own language even as he condemns the 
actions. In one part of the text, Harsnett describes in great detail how one priest lent Sara 
his stockings and then proceeded to take them off publicly during the exorcism in search 
of the devil: 
Dibdale, Saras ghostly Father, had of his fatherly kindnesse lent his 
ghostly child a payre of his old stockins that happilie had seene Venice and 
Rome; she as a spiritual token of his carnall kindnes doth weare them on 
her legs. See thys odoriferous vertue, in what exceeding measure it had 
discended downe and filled the very seames of Dibdales hose. Saras devil 
had been very turbulent and stirring in her body, and was to be delivered 
downe to his baser lodge; he assed quietly downe til he came at her knee, 
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and coming downe hil too fast, slipt ere he was aware into Saras legge, 
where finding himselfe caught within the priests hose beeing on her legge, 
he plunges and tumbles like a Salmon taken in a net, and cries harro ho, 
out alas, pul off, pul off, off in all hast with the priests hose, or els he must 
marre all, for there he could not stay: and all hast was made accordingly to 
ease the poore devil of his paine, and let him lie at his repose; and was not 
this a goodly ginne to catch a Woodcocke withall, and cause him to shoote 
out of his long bil and cry O the vertue of the priesthood, ô the power of 
the Catholique Church, when they saw with their owne eyes the hose 
hastily snatched off, heard with their owne long eares Saras devil cry, oh, 
beheld her legge quiet when it was bare without the hose, and observed 
how reverently the priests touched, handled, and bestowed the hose when 
it was off, and with what elevation of their eyes to heaven they finished 
the wonder. (265) 
Although he claims that he is horrified at Dibdale’s actions, Harsnett’s language suggests 
excitement as well as disdain: “turbulent and stirring in her body,” “he plunges and 
tumbles,” “the hose hastily snatched off,” “beheld her legge.” His rhetoric becomes more 
heated as the passage goes on, climaxing at the revelation of Sara’s bare leg to a group of 
people and the priest’s fondling of the stocking. Like Lavater, who uses the language of 
“maruell” to describe the priests who trick young maidens into sleeping with them, 
Harsnett talks about the “wonder” of Dibdale’s advances. Although he condemns 
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Dibdale, Harsnett also betrays his own intense fascination with Sara’s erotic female body 
on display in this moment. 
Later in the text, Harsnett argues that he is compelled—by Sara herself—to return 
to the moment of sexual violation. He suggests that he struggles with Sara’s text, and he 
quotes from her examinations in order to avoid speaking the unspeakable himself: 
Heere I had concluded this part of the Pageant, but that Sara nips me by 
the eare, and tells me that I have forgotten a special point of relique-
service, and points me to her deposition, which when I had turned my 
booke and reade over, I pointed at her againe, and willed her to pen that 
point her selfe; therefore thus she tels her owne tale. 
At one time (saith she) when it began to be with me after the manner of 
women, the Priests did pretend that the devill did rest in the most secret 
part of my body, whereuppon they devised to apply the reliques unto that 
place. Good God, what doe we heare? Or is it but a dreame? Or have we 
eares to heare such impious unnatural villanie? (297) 
Ironically, in a text that ridicules the idea of being possessed, Harsnett suggests that he is 
possessed by the figure of Sara, who (quite provocatively) “nips” him “by the eare” and 
coerces him to read her deposition again against his will. To evade responsibility for 
speaking about her erotic body, he “willed her pen” to tell “her own tale,” repeating the 
titillating moment from her examinations by setting it apart in italics. Interestingly, while 
the examination is in the third person, Harsnett changes her text to the first person 
(altering “the devil did rest in the most secret part of her body” for instance, to “my 
  
155 
 
body”), as if to announce even more cogently her ownership of this text and his distance 
from it. Yet the effect is to tie him more indelibly to this moment of erotic excitement; his 
exclamations of disbelief (“is it but a dreame?”) only implicate him further in the 
fantasies that the priests’ handling of Sara initially conjures. Harsnett may denounce the 
ideas of devils, exorcisms, and ghosts as papist superstitions, but doing so allows him to 
indulge in the thrill of the “secret part” of Sara’s body that he insists interests only the 
licentious priests. 
Taken together, the texts of Scot, Lavater, Rich, and Harsnett reveal fascinating 
intersections between the erotic female body and early modern Protestant texts on the 
supernatural. Although officially repulsed by the ideas of both sexualized women and the 
supernatural, these writers demonstrate that the denouncement of Catholic ghosts, 
demons, or spirits opens up a space for indulging in the pleasures of the female body 
usually foreclosed to them. Talking about how silly ghosts are allows these writers to 
elaborate on women who desired their suitors instead of denied them, who invited erotic 
attention to their bodies instead of shunned it, and who pursued forbidden sexual 
relationships—even if they thought they were doing so for the benefit of God. Protestant 
ghost stories enact a fantasy about the erotic female body not typically afforded in 
Petrarchan literature: the Petrarchan woman who loves back. Although Scot, Lavater, 
Rich, and Harsnett express extreme anxiety about the women involved in erotic exploits 
with the supernatural, they also show their inability to resist indulging in the idea of the 
Petrarchan mistress who herself seeks pleasure. 
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Ghosts of the Female Complaint 
In the 1590s, when the genre of the female complaint spiked in popularity, 
women figure prominently in ghost lore not just as witnesses to the supernatural but also 
as ghosts themselves. The context of the female complaint is different from that of the 
Protestant ghost story in that the female complaint embraces rather than eschews the 
figure of the ghost, but the effect is the same. In both kinds of narratives, the frame of the 
ghost story allows an engagement with the erotic Petrarchan body not otherwise possible 
because of the pretext that questions the reality of that female body. 
Samuel Daniel’s Complaint of Rosamond inaugurated the vogue of female 
complaint poems published in the 1590s. The complaint is appended to his Petrarchan 
sonnet sequence Delia, which details the sonnet speaker’s conventional pursuit of the 
alluring woman who rejects him. In the sonnets, the speaker emphasizes the two 
characteristics in Delia that are typical of the Petrarchan mistress: fairness and cruelty. In 
sonnet 5, the speaker says, “With fairest hand, the sweet vnkindest maide, / Castes water-
cold disdaine vpon my face,” and in the following sonnet he famously writes, “Faire is 
my loue, and cruell as sh’is faire.”
15
 The speaker also emphasizes her hard heart, as when 
in sonnet 13 he says, “Hard is her hart and woe is me therefore. / O happie he that ioy’d 
his stone and arte, / Vnhappy I to loue a stony harte.” Repeatedly, the speaker points to 
the disjunction between the beautiful body he craves and the rejection he receives. In 
sonnet 23, he laments, “Ile praise her face, and blame her flintie hart.”  
                                                 
15
 Samuel Daniel, sonnets 5 and 6, in Poems and “A Defence of Ryme,” ed. Arthur Colby Sprague 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). All references to Daniel’s poetry are to this edition; The 
Complaint of Rosamond is cited parenthetically by line number in the text. 
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Rosamond, too, is a Petrarchan mistress. Beautiful and desirable, she is a female 
figure whom Wendy Wall calls “a double for Delia” who exposes the dangers of 
Petrarchism to women.
16
 Ostensibly, that is the purpose of Rosamond’s complaint: “To 
teach to others,” Rosamond says, “what I learnt too late” (67). Yet the frame of the 
complaint—in which a dead woman disavows her erotic past to gain sympathy—enables 
Rosamond to behave in ways that Delia cannot. Delighting in her own body and seeking 
forbidden relationships, Rosamond enacts the fantasy of the Petrarchan woman who loves 
back—all because as a ghost, her body is not really there at all. 
From the beginning of the complaint, Rosamond emphasizes her ghostly status, 
claiming that because of her bad reputation on earth, she is denied “transport to the sweet 
Elisean rest” (9). She points to her purgatorial state, emphasizing her “myserable ghost” 
(29) and stating that “My poore afflicted ghost comes here to plaine it” (2). She asserts 
that Delia’s pity—“her sigh among the rest” (44)—would alleviate her torment, and she 
insists on her regret for her “slippry state” (65), warning other women to learn from her 
“frailtie” (68). Yet her narrative about her sinful past suggests her delight in —much 
more than her remorse for—her beauty and desirability:  
For whilst the sunn-shine of my fortune lasted,  
I ioy’d the happiest warmth, the sweetest heat  
That euer yet imperious beautie tasted,  
I had what glory euer flesh could get” (71-74)  
                                                 
16
 Wendy Wall, The Imprint of Gender: Authorship and Publication in the English Renaissance (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 256. Wall argues that the female complaint elevates the authority of 
the male Petrarchan poet from seducer to the restorer of the fallen woman who preserves her legacy for 
posterity. 
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Full of language of the senses—“warmth,” “sweetest heat,” “tasted,” “flesh”—
Rosamond’s description of her youth suggests that she revels in her former glory much 
more than seeks forgiveness for it. What begins as narrative spoken by a forlorn ghost 
develops into an account of Rosamond’s indulgence in her own desiring female body. 
Rosamond, in fact, explains that her reason for moving from the country to the 
city was the pleasure in being seen and admired by others: 
And Country home kept me from being eyde, 
Where best vnknowne I spent my sweetest dayes; 
Till that my frindes mine honour sought to rayse, 
To higher place, which greater credite yeeldes, 
Deeming such beauty was vnfit for feeldes. (87-91) 
Unlike Delia, aloof to the gazes of her suitor, Rosamond is acutely aware of the eyes that 
seek her body. Not only an object of the male lover who blazons her body, Rosamond 
blazons her own body, relishing in the allure of each body part. Noting how a comet in 
the sky “Drawes all mens eyes with wonder to behold it,” Rosamond argues that “So did 
my speech when rubies did vnfold it; / So did the blasing of my blush appeere, / T’amaze 
the world, that holds such sights so deere” (114, 117-19). While such descriptions only 
further paralyze Delia, whose frigidness forecloses any possibility of reciprocation, the 
blazon titillates Rosamond, who participates in the pleasures of her erotic appeal. 
And Rosamond quickly discovers the power inherent in that beauty: “What might 
I then not doe whose powre was such? / What cannot women doe that know theyr 
powre?” (127-28). Although she earlier claims that her complaint serves to warn women 
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not to follow her path, here she suggests that knowledge of her own authority compels 
her to pursue conquests. Her language becomes martial as she describes the thrill of 
captivating the highest prize of all: Henry II. Rosamond delights in that despite her lower 
station, “A Crowne was at my feete, Scepters obaide mee” (156), and she describes her 
beauty as more powerful than the warlike king: 
For after all his victories in Fraunce, 
Tryumphing in the honour of his deedes: 
Vnmatch’d by sword, was vanquisht by a glaunce, 
And hotter warres within his bosom breedes: 
Warres whom whole Legions of desires feedes 
Against all which my chastity opposes,  
The fielde of honour, vertue neuer loses. (162-68) 
With her fierce “glaunce,” Rosamond wields phallic dominance over the king, 
penetrating him with the rays that beam from her eyes: “No armour might bee founde that 
coulde defend, / Transpearcing rayes of Christall-pointed eyes” (169-70). Rosamond’s 
desire for power is encouraged by the old matron, who urges Rosamond to give her 
chastity to Henry: “Doost thou not see how that thy King thy Ioue, / Lightens foorth glory 
on thy darke estate” (232-33). Using carpe diem logic, the matron exhorts Rosamond to 
use her beauty while it lasts—“Thou must not thinke thy flowre can alwayes florish, / 
And that thy beautie will be still admired” (239-40)—and argues that it is more important 
to seem chaste than to be chaste: “And seeme the chast, which is the cheefest arte, / For 
what we seeme each sees, none knows our harte” (286-87). Unlike many carpe diem 
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addressees in early modern literature, Rosamond is persuaded by the argument and 
becomes Henry’s mistress.
17
 
Once she gives into temptation, however, Rosamond—like the biblical Eve—
discovers that the reality of this pleasure does not live up to its promise. She describes her 
eyes being opened once she entered Henry’s “loathed bed” (441): “My nakedness had 
prou’d my sences liers. / Now opned were mine eyes to looke therein, / For first we taste 
the fruite, then see our sin” (446-48). After she engages in a relationship with Henry, he 
builds her a “stately Pallace” to hide her away from the court, and Rosamond experiences 
the tedium of confinement rather than the freedom of erotic pleasure (463). Yet 
Rosamond’s tone, rather than remorseful about her newly discovered “sin,” is instead 
enraged that her beauty must now be shut up from the world. Far from repentant, 
Rosamond is mournful that she is deprived of her ability to play the Petrarchan mistress: 
What greater torment euer could haue beene, 
Then to inforce the fayre to liue retired? 
For what is Beuatie if it be not seene, 
Or what is’t to be seene vnlesse admired? 
And though admyred, vnlesse in loue desired? 
Neuer were cheeks of Roses, locks of Amber, 
Ordayn’d to liue imprisoned in a Chamber. (505-11) 
                                                 
17
 Elizabeth Harris Sagaser, “Sporting the While: Carpe Diem and the Cruel Fair in Samuel Daniel’s Delia 
and The Complaint of Rosamond,” Exemplaria 10, no. 1 (1998): 145-70, argues that Daniel valorizes the 
figure of the beautiful woman who seizes instead of rejects the carpe diem logic “of living fully in the 
moment” (147). I agree with Sagaser that “instead of asserting that women should be modest and silent,” 
Daniel’s poetry “admits that they would do well to recognize, enjoy, and use the power of their beauty” 
(148), but I believe the frame of the ghost story is crucial in enabling this kind of female figure. 
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Instead of disavowing her beautiful wiles, she laments their loss. And instead of taking 
responsibility for her actions, she assigns blame to others. Although she begins the 
complaint by warning women not to make her choice, Rosamond insists that becoming 
Henry’s mistress was not her fault at all. She places blame on the matron who uses 
enticing language “To ouerthrow a poore vnskilful mayde” (308). And she places blame 
on Henry, whom she claims puts her in a double bind: “But what? he is my King and may 
constraine me, / Whether I yeelde or not I liue defamed” (337-38). Rosamond expresses 
not regret for making a sinful choice but regret for her loss of power.  
At the end of the poem, Henry’s queen learns of Rosamond and forces her to kill 
herself with poison. Rosamond justifies her suicide by claiming that she must atone for 
her sinful behavior: “That body which my lusts did violate, / Must sacrifice it selfe 
t’appease the wrong” (600-601). Her language suggests, though, mourning for the 
pleasure that she lost just as much as for her chastity. Her death enables Rosamond to 
obtain what she initially sought: erotic attention from the king. When Henry finds 
Rosamond dead from the poison, he lavishes her dead body with kisses: 
Thus as these passions doe him ouer-whelme,  
He drawes him neere my bodie to behold it: 
And as the Vine maried vnto the Elme 
With strict imbraces, so doth he infold it; 
And as he in hys carefull armes doth hold it, 
Viewing the face that euen death commends, 
On sencelesse lips, millions of kysses spends. (659-65) 
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Safely distant from her body as a ghost and referring to her body as “it,” Rosamond 
speaks of desire fulfilled—overwhelming passions, entangled bodies, millions of kisses. 
On the one hand, Rosamond’s death contains her erotic behavior because, after all, she is 
not really participating. As Rosamond asks for Delia’s pity at the end of the narrative, her 
ghost—along with the erotic threat of her Petrarchan body—“vanisht” from the poet’s 
sight (736). Yet her vanishing body unleashes Rosamond’s sexual arousal as much as it 
limits it. This disappearing act allows Rosamond, as a female speaker, to address openly 
erotic desires in which she otherwise would not be able to indulge. 
Like Delia, Thomas Lodge’s Phillis conventionally portrays the Petrarchan 
mistress as beautiful but hard-hearted. The speaker in Phillis routinely blames his 
misfortunes on the coldness of his beloved. In sonnet 3, he laments, “But ah the stringes 
of hir hard heart are strained, / Beyond the harmonie of my desires.”
18
 Like the speaker in 
Delia, the speaker in Phillis wonders how Phillis could be “so faire and bee so cruel” 
(C4v), complaining that “She scorns my faith, she laughs at my sad layes” (F2v). He 
repeatedly calls attention to Phillis’s “fatall frownes” (B4v), “hir tiranie” (C2v), and her 
“disdaine” (C4v). By contrast, the appended Complaint of Elstred features a female 
speaker who becomes the mistress of two powerful men and who actively seeks both the 
pleasures of these relationships and the status that comes with them. Although this 
complaint, like The Complaint of Rosamond, ostensibly serves as a warning to women 
                                                 
18
 Thomas Lodge, Phillis: Honoured with Pastorall Sonnets, Elegies, and amorous delights. Where-vnto is 
annexed, the tragicall complaynt of Elstred (London, Iohn Busbie, 1593), B3r, hereafter cited 
parenthetically in the text by page number. 
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not to follow the wayward path Elstred took, it also advertises Elstred’s behavior as 
fulfilling—even if it had deadly consequences. 
Of course, Elstred’s bodily pleasures are curtailed by the fact that as a ghost, 
Elstred really has no body at all. The narrative begins as she approaches the poet with the 
ghost of her daughter, Sabrina, from the river Severen as a “wofull vision” (H4r), 
emphasizing her spectral presence: 
What said I, buried? I in siluer waue. 
What said I, shrowded? I in liquid sheete. 
The water both my winding sheete and graue, 
Which stifling me, for pitty seemd to greete. (H4v) 
In her liquid form, Elstred lacks the bodily substance that renders a Petrarchan mistress 
like Phillis—with her characteristic hardness—so threatening. Elstred distances herself 
from the threat her body poses by disavowing her behavior, claiming, as Rosamond does, 
that her complaint will help other women learn from her mistakes and “auoyde my fall”:  
Let wofull Elstred weepe her wretched state, 
Whose storie merrits some regard to haue. 
Who once inthron’d, and now to fortune thrall, 
May teach successions to auoyde my fall. (H4r) 
With Elstred’s self-repudiation and her ghostly form, the narrative works to restrain the 
dangers of Elstred’s Petrarchan body.  
Yet the tone that Elstred adopts is far more indulgent than ashamed. Like 
Rosamond, Elstred delights in being seen, and she speaks proudly of her ability to attract 
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suitors: “With me all natures ritches issued forth. / They that beheld, admird, and did 
presage / By infancie, the honours of myne age” (H4v). Her first suitor is the German 
knight, Humber, who “saw me in my prime: / All like a mayden-rose, as yet vntainted, / 
Where-with each touch desires to be acquainted” (Ir). Elstred makes it clear that she 
decides to become one of Humber’s mistresses not only because she fulfills his desires 
but also because he fulfills hers: 
His power, his person farre beyond report,  
His promise to enstall me in a throne: 
His working words which mercy might extort, 
Had power to fashion loue where first was none: 
So that two Damsels with my selfe agreed, 
To waight from him our fortunes and good speed. (Iv) 
Elstred’s language suggests immense attraction, not regret. She is infatuated with his 
power, his way with words, and his ability to “enstall [her] in a throne.” Elstred indicates 
an understanding of how her beauty can advance her political goals. She and the other 
mistresses leave Germany with Humber to invade Britain with high hopes for their future. 
Unfortunately, Humber’s conquest is unsuccessful, and Humber along with two of 
his mistresses are executed. Elstred herself is about to be killed when she begs the 
English king Locrine to spare her life, using her female body provocatively to persuade 
him: “And whilst I rent my carelesse-scattered locks, / Those tricked trammels where true 
loue was tangled, / At Locrines breast for mercy fancie knocks” (I4r). Locrine becomes 
enamored and takes Elstred as his mistress. Yet what might have begun as a ploy to save 
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her life develops into a passionate love affair. Elstred describes her relationship with 
Locrine with language never used to depict Phillis: 
Each kisse I lent him, breathed Indian balme 
To cure his woundes, to breake affections cheines 
He had Loues Moly growing on my pappes, 
To charme a hell of sorrow and mishappes. (I4v) 
With their emphasis on Elstred’s kiss, breath, and breasts, the bodily descriptions here 
overlap with the blazon, yet the conventional iciness of the Petrarchan mistress melts 
away with Elstred’s delight in her own bodily charms. Even when Elstred is robbed of 
her crown when Locrine is obligated to marry Guendolen, Elstred still takes pleasure in 
their relationship. Forced to live in a cave, Elstred does not, like Rosamond, lament her 
enclosure, but “payd him trybute for those gifts he sent me, / With all the sweets that God 
and nature lent me” (K2v). Eventually, they have a child together in that cave, Sabrina, 
for whom Elstred is thankful: “A pretty babe for me to stay withall, / A louely child for 
hym to play withall” (K2v). 
Interestingly, it is Guendolen rather than Elstred who takes on the conventional 
hard-heartedness of the Petrarchan mistress in the narrative. Determined to get rid of 
Locrine’s mistress, Guendolen raises an army against Locrine, and Locrine is killed in 
battle. When Elstred finds Locrine, she clings to his dead body, trying to revive him with 
her kisses, and her body is depicted as permeable, open, and fluid. Elstred describes her 
“flood-like weeping” and her sucking of Locrine’s wounds (K4v). By contrast, 
Guendolen is described as having the attribute so often ascribed to Petrarchan mistresses 
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like Delia or Phillis: a flinty heart. As she sentences Elstred and her daughter to death by 
drowning, she is numb to the pleas of the women condemned to die: 
This said, she wild the Ministers to bind 
Our tender armes: and now pale feare addrest 
Our wayning roses, quite beyond theyr kind, 
To flie our cheekes, and helpe our hearts opprest. 
Feare sommond teares, teares came, and stroue to stint 
A ceaslesse hate, within a hart of flint. (Lv) 
The narrative displaces the conventional Petrarchan stoniness onto Guendolen, 
contrasting her hard heart with the “tender armes” of Elstred and Sabrina and the 
abundant tears that flow from their eyes. This displacement allows Elstred to play the role 
of the desirable woman while at the same time being capable of expressing passion, 
tenderness, and desire herself. 
At the end, though, as Elstred once again pleas for her life, she attempts to recast 
herself as resistant to the relationships that she had actively pursued. She tells Guendolen 
that “It was not I, it was thy husbands youth / That made him loue, and traind him to the 
lure” (L2r). Despite Elstred’s erotic advances, the pleasure she took in the relationship, 
and her grief for Locrine, the narrative still attempts to portray her as an unwilling lover, 
forced into the relationship because of her weakness as a woman: 
My sexe was weake, my sences farre more weaker, 
Afflictions taught me to accept occasion: 
I am a poore vnwilling wedlock breaker, 
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I was vnable to withstand inuasion: 
For where the Conquerer crau’d, I knew full well 
He could commaund, if so I should rebell. (L2v) 
Like Rosamond, who insists on being compelled to become Henry’s lover, and like the 
young maidens tricked into sleeping with lustful priests or forced into performing 
exorcisms, Elstred suddenly and unconvincingly becomes the “vnwilling wedlock 
breaker,” a victim of shameless, conquering men rather than a participant in her own 
erotic exploits. Elstred’s statement not only contradicts her earlier behavior toward 
Locrine—when she seduced him with her “careless-scattered locks,” (I4r), laid in “lystes 
of pleasure” in their secret cave (K2v), and desperately sucked his wounds to “reuiue his 
ceaslesse sleeping” (K4v)—but also contradicts the intent of the narrative, which is to 
teach young maidens “to auoyde my fall” (H4r). If there was no way to avoid Elstred’s 
relationships with Humber and Locrine, then there would be nothing to teach young 
maidens, who, as “weake” women, would be as susceptible to male advances as Elstred.  
These textual contradictions suggest that the narrative struggles to cope with the 
figure of the open, desiring, and pleasure-seeking Petrarchan woman that the frame of the 
female complaint has allowed. Elstred’s story concludes not with an endlessly desiring 
woman, but with a female character who must disappear, returning to the bodiless form in 
which the reader originally finds her. After Elstred finishes speaking, she and her 
daughter “sought their Tomb / Within the waues, and suncke vnto the bottome” (L4r). 
Yet far from containing Elstred’s passion, Elstred’s ghostliness allows Lodge to push the 
figure of the Petrarchan mistress beyond iciness found in the sonnets. As a ghost, Elstred 
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could slip into the role of desiring lover all while proclaiming passive virtue—and while 
remaining conventionally unavailable as she disappears into the water. 
Of course, Rosamond’s and Elstred’s claims to virtue were suspect even by some 
of their rival female complainers, like Matilda of Michael Drayton’s Matilda (1594). 
Matilda emphasizes her chastity and tells the story of how she resisted King John’s 
advances, eventually killing herself with poison rather than submitting herself to him. 
Matilda chastises Rosamond, Elstred, and Jane Shore for their sexual behavior, 
concluding, “Thus looser wantons, still are praisd of many, / Vice oft findes friendes, but 
vertue seldome any.”
19
 Yet the popularity of the genre—which also includes poems such 
as Anthony Chute’s Beawtie dishonoured written vnder the title of Shores Wife (1593), 
Hadrian Dorrell’s Willobie His Avisa (1594), and Thomas Middleton’s The Ghost of 
Lucrece (1600)—points to the appeal of the female complaint as a forum for representing 
Petrarchan female figures who are themselves enticed by erotic experience and for 
engaging in the pleasures of the female body usually closed off in Petrarchan narratives.
20
 
By giving their speakers the liminal status of ghosts, writers of the female complaint 
represent Petrarchan women—chaste or not—who draw attention to themselves as 
desiring female subjects. 
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 Michael Drayton, Matilda. The faire and chaste Daughter of the Lord Robert Fitzwater (London: Iames 
Roberts, 1594), B2r. 
20
 For an overview of female complaint poems that appeared in the 1590s, see Hallett Smith, Elizabethan 
Poetry: A Study in Conventions, Meaning, and Expression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1952), 102-26. See also John Kerrigan, ed., Motives of Woe: Shakespeare and the “Female Complaint,” 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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Hermione’s Ghostly Return 
At the end of Hermione’s trial, after Hermione has swooned at the news of 
Mamillius’s death, Paulina emphatically declares,  
I say she’s dead; I’ll swear’t. If word nor oath  
Prevail not, go and see. If you can bring  
Tincture or lustre in her lip, her eye,  
Heat outwardly or breath within, I’ll serve you  
As I would do the gods.
21
  
As Paulina blazons Hermione’s body to prove that it is dead, the play suggests that 
Hermione’s Petrarchan desirability ceases to be threatening only when Hermione has no 
capability of desiring back. As several critics argue, Hermione joins other Shakespearean 
heroines like Ophelia and Desdemona, who can be fully embraced by their lovers only 
after their deaths.
22
 Leontes repentantly responds to Paulina, “Once a day I’ll visit / The 
chapel where they lie, and tears shed there / Shall be my recreation” (3.2.238-40). Yet 
what is different about this play is that despite her threatening eroticism, Hermione does 
come back as a desiring female subject—first as a ghost in Antigonus’s dream, and then 
as a statue-turned-woman at the play’s close. The play’s use of the ghost story—an old 
wives’ tale, according to Protestants—is the frame that allows Hermione to return as a 
Petrarchan beloved who takes her husband back. By conspicuously calling into question 
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 William Shakespeare, The Winter’s Tale, in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. 
J. M. Tobin, 2
nd
 ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 3.2.203-207. Subsequent references to the play are 
to this edition and will be cited parenthetically in the text by act, scene, and line number. 
22
 Laurie A. Finke, “Painting Women: Images of Femininity in Jacobean Tragedy,” Theatre Journal 36, no. 
3 (1984): 357-70, argues that “The Petrarchan lady of the Renaissance . . . must be killed into art so that she 
may remain forever present and forever beautiful” (361). For similar arguments about The Winter’s Tale, 
see Traub, Desire and Anxiety; and Blum, “‘Strike all that look upon with mar[b]le.’” 
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the reality of Hermione’s body at the end of the play—and indeed by framing the entire 
play as a winter’s tale, that which is superstitious, childlike, or untrue—Shakespeare, like 
the writers of Protestant ghost stories and female complaints, can accommodate the threat 
of the Petrarchan mistress who has her own desires, too. 
From the beginning of the play, Shakespeare places Hermione’s character within 
a Petrarchan framework.
23
 In his deconstructive reading, Howard Felperin calls the state 
of the play one of “linguistic indeterminacy” in which readers of the play can never know 
whether outward appearances coincide with inward reality or whether suspicions about 
behavior are founded or merely false.
24
 This is also the condition of the Petrarchan 
mistress. Despite (or perhaps because of) the Petrarchan lover’s excessive cataloguing of 
her alluring body parts, the Petrarchan beloved’s authenticity is always in doubt because 
there is no way to verify what her true desires are. When Hermione implores Leontes to 
tell her when she first spoke well to him, he replies, “Why, that was when / Three 
crabbed months had sour’d themselves to death, / Ere I could make thee open thy white 
hand, / [And] clap thyself my love; then didst thou utter, / ‘I am yours for ever’” 
(1.2.101-105). Yet it is precisely Hermione’s openness as a Petrarchan mistress, signified 
by her “white hand,” that leads Leontes to fear that she can never be fully his. 
                                                 
23
 Scholars have made passing references to Hermione’s Petrarchan qualities, but they have not fully 
examined her as a Petrarchan mistress. In their reading of the play in light of Anne Boleyn’s trial, for 
instance, M. Lindsay Kaplan and Katherine Eggert argue that the moment in which Leontes notes 
Hermione’s and Polixenes’s “paddling palms, and pinching fingers” “reiterates Henry’s ex post facto 
conversion of Anne’s Petrarchan flirtations with male courtiers into sexual, rather than social, intercourse” 
(“‘Good queen, my lord, good queen’: Sexual Slander and the Trials of Female Authority in The Winter’s 
Tale,” Renaissance Drama, n.s., 25 [1994]: 98). I agree that this moment intersects with Petrarchan 
discourse, but I do not believe that the sexual and the social aspects of Petrarchism are as separate as 
Kaplan and Eggert suggest. 
24
 Howard Felperin, “‘Tongue-tied our queen?’: The Deconstruction of Presence in The Winter’s Tale,” in 
Shakespeare and the Question of Theory, ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York: Methuen, 
1985), 8. 
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Hermione’s acceptance of Leontes’s suit at once gives Leontes the very thing he desires 
and unleashes his anxieties about the thing he cannot control: a Petrarchan mistress who 
desires back. 
In the first act of the play, Hermione delights in her own erotic body and in her 
power to allure, behaving more like Rosamond or Elstred than like Delia or Phillis. Her 
boldness, for instance, toward Polixenes as she implores him to stay in Sicilia suggests 
her pleasure in her power to attract and persuade: 
    Verily, 
You shall not go; a lady’s “verily” is 
As potent as a lord’s. Will you go yet? 
Force me to keep you as a prisoner, 
Not like a guest: so you shall pay your fees 
When you depart, and save your thanks. How say you? 
My prisoner? or my guest? (1.2.50-55) 
Like Rosamond, who relishes her ability to conquer Henry with her attractive body, 
Hermione embraces the role of Polixenes’s jailer. She asserts the power of her own 
language, implying it is capable of holding another man captive.
25
 She suggests that her 
status as a “lady”—her appealing body and her courtly charm—puts her on equal footing 
                                                 
25
 There has been much scholarship on the homology between female speech and promiscuity, a link that 
Hermione seems not to recognize in this moment. See, for instance, Peter Stallybrass, “Patriarchal 
Territories: The Body Enclosed,” in Rewriting the Renaissance: The Discourses of Sexual Difference in 
Early Modern Europe,” ed. Margaret W. Ferguson, Maureen Quilligan, and Nancy J. Vickers (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 123-42. Lynn Enterline, “‘You speak a language that I understand not’: 
The Rhetoric of Animation in The Winter’s Tale,” Shakespeare Quarterly 48, no. 1 (1997): 17-44, argues 
that Hermione’s powerful speech challenges the Ovidian-Petrarchan tradition in which the male poetic 
voice is grounded on female silence: “The king aspires to order all linguistic exchanges in Sicily, but 
Hermione’s voice teaches him that any such ordering properly belongs to no one” (27). 
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with male combativeness, and her provocative charge, “But let him swear so, and he shall 
not stay, / We’ll thwack him hence with distaffs” (1.2.36-37), turns a traditional domestic 
female instrument into a weapon. In this exchange, Hermione revels not just in the role of 
the pleasing love object, but also in the considerable muscle she wields from the position.  
Hermione also expresses pleasure in the thing that the Petrarchan mistress usually 
disdains: praise. When Leontes tells Hermione that she once spoke just as well as she 
does now to Polixenes, Hermione cannot contain herself, pressing him to flatter her: 
I prithee tell me; cram ’s with praise, and make ’s 
As fat as tame things. One good deed dying tongueless  
Slaughters a thousand waiting upon that. 
Our praises are our wages. You may ride ’s 
With one soft kiss a thousand furlongs ere 
With spur we heat an acre. But to th’ goal: 
My last good deed was to entreat his stay; 
What was my first? It has an elder sister, 
Or I mistake you. O, would her name were Grace! 
But once before I spoke to th’ purpose? when?  
Nay, let me have’t; I long. (1.2.91-101) 
Hermione’s use of the first person plural indicates not an individual need to be affirmed 
but an association with the larger figure of the courtly woman whose identity is formed 
from the attention paid to her by male suitors. Her response to Leontes suggests that she 
understands that the Petrarchan mistress comes into being only through admiration, and 
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her impatience points to her delight in performing that role. The erotic undertones of her 
language—“ cram ’s with praise,” “You may ride ’s,” “I long”—imply that Hermione 
feels that women have equal claim to the pleasures of courtship and that the receiving end 
can also be reciprocating. Hermione uses her body not to reject attention but to accept it, 
as Leontes’s description of her “paddling palms and pinching fingers” suggests (1.2.115). 
Yet Hermione’s embracing of this role only increases Leontes’s anxiety and 
contributes to her vulnerability—as the thing Leontes can never fully possess. Leontes’s 
epithet, “O thou thing!” (2.1.82), reveals how much Leontes has objectified Hermione, 
and his increasingly frantic blazons show the close proximity between the language of 
praise and the language of violent obsession. Attempting to persuade Camillo of his 
wife’s unfaithfulness, Leontes relies on outward female bodily signs to prove what has 
gone on behind closed doors: 
   Is whispering nothing? 
Is leaning cheek to cheek? is meeting noses? 
Kissing with inside lip? stopping the career  
Of laughter with a sigh (a note infallible  
Of breaking honesty?) horsing foot on foot? 
Skulking in corners? wishing clocks more swift? (1.2.284-89) 
Leontes turns the language of praise that Hermione so craved into the language of vicious 
jealousy. His insistence on knowing the meaning of Hermione’s bodily gestures stems 
from the radical instability of those gestures, the anxiety that “whispering,” “Kissing,” 
and “laughter” can never be interpreted with any certainty. Even Hermione’s whiteness, 
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which Leontes had coveted as a sign of her fidelity, becomes endlessly contaminable, a 
marker of the uncertainty that Hermione’s desire brings. Leontes says to Camillo,  
Dost think I am so muddy, so unsettled,  
To appoint myself in this vexation, sully 
The purity and whiteness of my sheets 
(Which to preserve is sleep, which being spotted  
Is goads, thorns, nettles, tails of wasps), 
Give scandal to the blood o’ th’ Prince my son 
(Who I do think is mine and love as mine), 
Without ripe moving to’t? Would I do this? (1.2.325-32) 
Although Leontes refers to his own ability to “sully / The purity and whiteness of my 
sheets,” his remark recalls the whiteness of Hermione’s opening hand. The frenzy of his 
language, which piles one repulsive object onto another, implicitly displaces the qualities 
Leontes disowns—“muddy,” “unsettled,” “spotted”—onto his wife. His speech suggests 
that the features that idealize the Petrarchan mistress are the same ones that make her 
vulnerable because of the ease with which they can be perceived as tainted. Like 
Rosamond, Hermione is incarcerated for the boldness with which she reciprocates the 
Petrarchan advances made to her. 
Hermione’s status as a mother only corroborates the anxiety produced by her role 
as a Petrarchan mistress.
26
 Scholars have traced the intersections between maternal and 
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 For the anxieties produced by Hermione’s role as a mother, see Janet Adelman, Suffocating Mothers: 
Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare’s Plays, “Hamlet” to “The Tempest” (New York: Routledge, 
1992); and Michelle Ephraim, “Hermione’s Suspicious Body: Adultery and Superfetation in The Winter’s 
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Petrarchan figures.
27
 Philip Sidney, for instance, frequently writes in Astrophil and Stella 
of Astrophil being infantilized by Stella’s charms. In sonnet 11, Astrophil tells Love,  
So when thou saw’st, in nature’s cabinet,  
Stella, thou straight look’st babies in her eyes,  
In her cheek’s pit thou did’st thy pit-fold set,  
And in her breast bo-peep or couching lies.
28
  
Sonnet speakers frequently express the fear that their beloveds will take away their power 
by turning them into children, and they characterize their mistresses as having maternal 
influence gone awry.  
Leontes expresses this same fear of infantilization when he looks at Mamillius, 
wondering whether he sees himself in his son or only Hermione: “Looking on the lines / 
Of my boy’s face, me thoughts I did recoil / Twenty-three years, and saw myself 
unbreech’d / In my green velvet coat, my dagger muzzled” (1.2.153-56). Leontes’s 
suspicions about Hermione evoke the fear in Leontes of the days, as Gail Kern Paster 
says, when he was “still in the world of women and wearing the skirts of infancy.”
29
 
Leontes tells Hermione, “I am glad you did not nurse him. / Though he does bear some 
signs of me, yet you / Have too much blood in him” (2.1.56-58), referring to the early 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tale,” in Performing Maternity in Early Modern England, ed. Kathryn M. Moncrief and Kathryn R. 
McPherson (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 45-58. 
27
 See, for instance, Naomi J. Miller, “Playing ‘the mother’s part’: Shakespeare’s Sonnets and Early 
Modern Codes of Maternity,” in Shakespeare’s Sonnets: Critical Essays, ed. James Schiffer (New York: 
Garland, 1999), 347-67. 
28
 Sir Philip Sidney, sonnet 11, in A Critical Edition of the Major Works, ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). For an argument that questions the critical tendency to frame 
Astrophil and Stella as a sequence about masculine mastery, see Catherine Bates, “Astrophil and the Manic 
Wit of the Abject Male,” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 41, no. 1 (2001): 1-24. 
29
 Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern 
England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 265. 
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modern idea that mothers can corrupt children through their breast milk.
30
 Just as the 
Petrarchan mistress provokes anxiety about what may or may not be lurking underneath 
her beautiful body, so does the figure of the mother provoke anxiety about the invisible 
links between her and her child. 
Hermione’s emphasis on her role as a mother in her trial, then, as dignified as it 
is, only contributes to Leontes’s suspicions about her role as a lover. In a speech that she 
knows cannot prove her innocence, Hermione lays claim to the only thing that she feels 
can corroborate her guiltless position: her maternal body. She says, 
   My second joy 
And first-fruits of my body, from his presence 
I am barr’d, like one infectious. My third comfort 
(Starr’d most unluckily) is from my breast 
(The innocent milk in it most innocent mouth) 
Hal’d out to murther; myself on every post  
Proclaim’d a strumpet; with immodest hatred 
The child-bed privilege denied, which ’longs  
To women of all fashion; lastly, hurried  
Here to this place, i’ th’ open air, before 
I have got strength of limit. (3.2.96-106) 
                                                 
30
 For more on the relationship between The Winter’s Tale and early modern concepts of nursing, see 
Paster, The Body Embarrassed; and Donna C. Woodford, “Nursing and Influence in Pandosto and The 
Winter’s Tale,” in Moncrief and McPherson, Performing Maternity, 183-95. 
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Even as Hermione proclaims her right as a woman to her children, her language suggests 
the very things that make her body suspicious. Her shock at being treated “like one 
infectious” only points to the fear that all women’s bodies are corrupting and impossible 
to control, and her insistence of the “innocent milk” that should be flowing from her 
breast only highlights the culture’s suspicions of all breast milk as tainted. Hermione’s 
eloquent grief for her lost children fails to change Leontes’s mind, and even the oracle, 
which proclaims that “Hermione is chaste” (3.2.131), is labeled “mere falsehood” by 
Leontes. Only Hermione’s immobilized body, freed from its threats of circulation and 
contamination, can convince Leontes that Hermione is innocent after all. 
It is amazing, then, that Hermione is allowed to return in the play given the threat 
that her Petrarchan body poses to Leontes. Yet this is precisely what the frame of the 
ghost story allows. Hermione first returns as the ghost in Antigonus’s dream, and the play 
conspicuously questions the reality of this figure. Antigonus opens his monologue about 
the dream much like a Protestant who is confronting the question of whether ghosts exist:  
I have heard (but not believ’d) the spirits o’ th’ dead  
May walk again. If such thing be, thy mother  
Appear’d to me last night; for ne’er was dream  
So like a waking. (3.3.16-19)  
Like Lavater or other ghost theorists of the sixteenth century, Antigonus officially 
expresses his skepticism about ghosts—“I have heard (but not believ’d)”—yet remains 
open to the possibility of supernatural encounters. Lavater’s treatise dismisses people’s 
beliefs in ghosts, yet the bulk of his text is devoted to instructing the reader what to do 
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when encountering a spirit and how to tell a good spirit from a bad one. Lavater says, 
“What souer the cause is, it may be proued, by witnesse of many writers, & by dayly 
experience also, that spirites and straunge sightes doo sometyme appeare, and that in 
verye deede many straunge and maruellous things doo happen” (9). Antigonus’s speech 
keeps the reality of Hermione’s ghost suspended, opening up space for Hermione’s 
desirable female presence to return in ways less threatening than her living body. 
If Hermione’s Petrarchan body caused so much anxiety in the first half of the 
play, in Antigonus’s dream it provokes only awe and admiration. Antigonus says, 
To me comes a creature,  
Sometimes her head on one side, some another—  
I never saw a vessel of like sorrow,  
So fill’d, and so becoming; in pure white robes,  
Like very sanctity, she did approach  
My cabin where I lay (3.3.19-24)  
As in the beginning of the play, Hermione’s presence provokes anxiety, yet here its 
effects are benign. Antigonus expresses pity for the attractive, yet dignified, “vessel” that 
approaches him, describing her as “so becoming.” Here, Hermione’s Petrarchan 
whiteness in the “pure white robes” she dons transcends the bodily pureness that Leontes 
feels is endlessly corruptible and instead approaches allegory, becoming, Antigonus says, 
“Like very sanctity.” As a ghost, Hermione can both exhibit corporeal form—as a filled 
vessel wearing robes—and evade it, as “She melted into air” (3.3.37). 
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Of course, Hermione’s ghost is not completely harmless at this moment as she 
prophesizes that Antigonus will never see Paulina again and disappears “with shrieks” 
(3.3.36). Hermione takes on aspects of a revenge ghost here, and Antigonus is frightened 
by as much as he is attracted to Hermione’s presence, becoming convinced—despite his 
initial skepticism—that Hermione’s ghost is real: “Dreams are toys, / Yet for this once, 
yea, superstitiously, / I will be sqar’d by this” (3.3.39-41). Yet more than a failed 
representation of a ghost from a revenge tragedy, Hermione’s ghost seems much more 
tied to the Protestant debates about ghosts and believability—and the place of the female 
body in those debates.
31
 Like the ghost stories that officially denounce ghosts as papist 
tricks yet fixate on the young women’s bodies that experience visions, Antigonus’s 
dream open up a space for indulging in Hermione’s body, which when alive had been the 
source of suspicion at court. Officially, Antigonus deems that Hermione is guilty, and he 
is uneasy about “superstitiously” believing in that which he ought to know is not true, yet 
his description of the encounter suggests wonder and esteem for the mournful, beautiful, 
and “pure” figure of Hermione. The play’s interrogation of whether or not the vision of 
Hermione is really her enables her Petrarchan body to return as a speaking, moving, and 
desiring subject—qualities that earlier could provoke only mistrust. 
In Hermione’s second reappearance in the last scene of the play, she comes back, 
of course, not as a ghost, but as a woman who had been alive all along. Logically 
                                                 
31
 Hermione’s ghost is an exception to most ghosts on the early modern stage. Prosser, Hamlet and 
Revenge, argues that most stage ghosts are connected to Senecan revenge conventions rather than to 
Christian ideas of the supernatural. By her account, of the fifty-one ghosts that appear onstage in England 
from 1560 to 1610, “only four ghosts in the entire period are placed even vaguely in Christian perspective” 
(257). Prosser does not include Hermione in her count, presumably because she does not actually appear 
onstage as a ghost. 
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speaking, readers and viewers of the play should dismiss the ghost of Antigonus’s dream 
as just that—a dream. Yet rather than merely contradict each other, these two figures of 
Hermione are very much connected. Like the figure of Hermione in Antigonus’s dream, 
the Hermione who returns as an animated statue is set in a context of that which is 
implausible. Just as Antigonus admits “superstitiously” to believe in his dream, so does 
Perdita assert, “And do not say ’tis superstition, that / I kneel, and then implore her 
blessing” (5.3.43-44). And although what takes place in the last act of the play really 
happens, Paulina calls into question the reality of Hermione’s body by suggesting that the 
entire performance may be just an “old tale”: “That she is living, / Were it but told you, 
should be hooted at / Like an old tale; but it appears she lives, / Though yet she speak 
not” (5.3.115-18). Paulina, who orchestrates the unveiling of Hermione’s statue, assures 
Leontes that Hermione really has been hiding away for sixteen years, but she provokes 
speculation otherwise by failing firmly to refute the possibility of the supernatural, saying 
only that she “appears” to live. By framing the entire play—and especially the last act—
as an old wives’ tale, or a ghost story, Shakespeare invites both the questioning of 
Hermione’s living presence and the indulgence in the pleasure of that presence.  
The term “old tale” returns at the end of the play with notable frequency.
32
 The 
gentlemen who narrate the offstage reunion between Leontes and Perdita in act 5, scene 2 
twice refer to the stories they tell as old tales. The second gentleman says, “This news, 
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 Mary Ellen Lamb, “Engendering the Narrative Act: Old Wives’ Tales in The Winter’s Tale, Macbeth, 
and The Tempest,” Criticism 40, no. 4 (1998): 529-53, argues that “these allusions expose the power of 
childhood tales as prototypes for the fictions of the stage” (529). I agree with her assessment that the 
attention to old tales in The Winter’s Tale both recuperates the female world associated with tales by filling 
the audience with wonder and points to “the continuing threat of the power of women’s tales” (537), but 
my emphasis is more on the kind of Petrarchan subject that the frame of the old wives’ tale enables at the 
end of the play. 
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which is call’d true, is so like an old tale, that the verity of it is in strong suspicion” 
(5.2.27-29). And the third gentleman, when questioned about Antigonus, says, “Like an 
old tale still, which will have matter to rehearse, though credit be asleep and not an ear 
open: he was torn to pieces with a bear” (5.2.61-63). Their language retains the 
derogatory tone toward old tales as something effeminate, childlike, and silly, yet they 
also betray the attractiveness—even illicitness—of indulging in something that should 
not be real. Like the Protestant writers who call stories about the supernatural old wives’ 
tales and yet cannot refrain from elaborating on the erotic details of the women who 
experience their encounters, the gentlemen claim that these stories should be relegated to 
the fantastical yet openly express their pleasure in them. Even an event as terrible as 
being “torn to pieces with a bear” is narrated with relish as well as horror—indicating, 
perhaps, the wide overlap of those two emotions. 
The very implausibility of Hermione’s return from the dead, then, opens up a 
space in which her Petrarchan subjectivity can be enjoyed rather than be seen solely as 
threatening. Hermione’s statue has often been seen in the Ovidian context from which 
Shakespeare’s play draws, and many scholars have noted the contrast between her 
statuesque demeanor and her earlier animated self. Peter Erickson writes, “When at last 
Hermione is revived, her original vitality and vivacity are not recovered.”
33
 Hermione’s 
immobilized body, like Pygmalion’s, is now able to be repossessed at the end of the play 
by her male maker. And it is clear in the last act that Leontes, in desiring Hermione to 
return, can think only of her motionless, Petrarchan body parts. He says to Paulina, “O, 
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 Peter B. Erickson, “Patriarchal Structures in The Winter’s Tale,” PMLA 97, no. 5 (1982): 825. 
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that ever I / Had squar’d me to thy counsel! then, even now, / I might have look’d upon 
my queen’s full eyes, / Have taken treasure from her lips—” (5.1.51-54).   
Yet Hermione’s body at the end of the play returns animated and “warm” rather 
than stony and cold. Hermione is “stone no more” as she descends from her pedestal 
(5.3.99), a vibrant, desiring subject like Elizabeth Orton, Sara Williams, Rosamond, or 
Elstred. True, Leontes’s descriptions of the statue parody the Petrarchan blazon when he 
remarks, “The very life seems warm upon her lip” (5.3.66) or exclaims, “What fine chisel 
/ Could ever yet cut breath?” (5.3.78-79). His emphasis on warmth and liveliness, 
however, points to Leontes’s desire for a woman who circulates rather than one who just 
stands still, and the play accommodates in this moment a Petrarchan female figure other 
than one who is immobilized and fragmented. 
The very actions that earlier in the play proved Hermione’s guilt in Leontes’s eyes 
now certify her virtue. When Camillo remarks that “She hangs about [Leontes’s] neck,” 
Hermione is represented as a desiring, sensual figure (5.3.112). Whether or not her 
embrace suggests her forgiveness, it certainly signifies her indulgence in her own erotic 
gesture. Paulina even characterizes Hermione as the aggressor in the relationship, saying 
to Leontes, “When she was young, you woo’d her; now in age, / Is she become the 
suitor?” (5.3.108-109). Just as Rosamond and Elstred conquer their kings with their 
desirable bodies, so does Hermione, as a ghostlike figure that comes back from the dead, 
occupy the role of the pursuing lover. Unlike Leontes’s earlier yearning for Hermione’s 
jewel-like eyes and treasure-like lips, here Hermione is depicted as tender, open, and 
fluid, as when Hermione commands the gods, “look down / And from your sacred vials 
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pour your graces / Upon my daughter’s head!” (5.3.121-23). Although Hermione is silent 
to Leontes, her original loquaciousness returns with her impetuous questioning to Perdita:  
Tell me, mine own,  
Where hast thou been preserv’d? where liv’d? how found  
Thy father’s court? for thou shalt hear that I,  
Knowing by Paulina the oracle 
Gave hope thou wast in being, have preserv’d  
Myself to see the issue.” (5.3.123-28)  
Her language of “preserving” herself recalls the description of a corpse, yet her 
garrulousness suggests animation and vigor. In her liminal status of dead-yet-living, 
Hermione transcends Leontes’s desires to possess her as a treasured statue and becomes 
an effusive, insatiable figure who pursues her desires. 
Critics have also seen the statue in the context of Catholic iconography, and 
scholars have argued that the play participates—at least on some level—in questioning 
Protestant iconoclasm.
34
 With its attention to “magic” (5.3.38), “faith” (5.3.95), “sacred 
vials” (5.3.122), and the miraculous statue, the last scene of the play seems to suggest 
that the old wives’ tales that the Protestants so vehemently derided are actually true and 
that kneeling to Hermione’s statue, as Perdita does, is not to believe in superstition or 
false idols. Yet the fantastic nature of Hermione’s revival indicates that the play’s 
relationship to the miraculous ending is much more indeterminate. Neither fully real nor 
fully unreal, Hermione’s presence exists only in the fantasy space of the old wives’ tale. 
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 See, for instance, Michael O’Connell, The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm and Theater in Early-Modern 
England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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The play does not completely embrace Protestant skepticism or Catholic “superstition,” 
and that place of uncertainty—where Polixenes questions whether Hermione is “stol’n 
from the dead” (5.3.115)—enables the liminality in which Hermione can return as a 
speaking, desiring subject. As a genre that produces both doubt and curiosity, disbelief 
and fascination, the old wives’ tale allows the kind of attention on the erotic, desiring 
female body—the fantasy of the Petrarchan mistress who enjoys her own desirability—
that would otherwise be foreclosed. 
Of course, Hermione’s spectacular return does not eliminate all the anxieties that 
Hermione’s Petrarchan body elicits, and Leontes’s last words stubbornly resist closure: 
    Good Paulina, 
Lead us from hence, where we may leisurely 
Each one demand, and answer to his part 
Perform’d in this wide gap of time, since first 
We were dissever’d. Hastily lead away. (5.3.151-55) 
After submitting himself to Paulina’s instruction for so long, Leontes returns to his place 
of command, and the hastiness of the last line subtly recalls the rashness that compelled 
Leontes to accuse Hermione of adultery in the first place. The swift conclusion raises the 
question of whether Hermione’s body, as it becomes fully living once again, will cause 
the same kind of panicked jealousy that it earlier generated. But if her ghostly return does 
not completely erase the anxieties that her body creates, the last scene of the play 
demonstrates that it can at least suspend them. As a form inherently unreal yet intensely 
appealing, the old wives’ tale becomes the vehicle through which the play can explore 
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alternatives to Hermione’s subjectivity other than what her disappearance at her trial 
initially suggests. As a figure “stol’n from the dead,” Hermione can legitimate her 
presence as a Petrarchan mistress who affirms her own desirability—all because she may 
not be really there at all. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Questioning Constancy in Mary Wroth’s Urania 
 
In The Examinations of Anne Askew, John Bale frequently uses the term 
constancy to describe Askew. In the lattre examinacyon, he remarks, “And in the ende 
she sheweth the stronge stomacke of a most Christen martyr, in that she is neyther 
desyerouse of the deathe, neyther yet standeth in feare of the vyolence or extremyte 
thereof. What a constancye was thys of a woman, frayle, tendre, yonge and most 
delycyouslye brought up?”
1
 Bale even includes the “Constancye of Anne Askewe” as a 
line in his index, suggesting that this was a characteristic he consciously highlighted—
and one for which readers might have been looking.
2
 Bale often emphasizes Askew’s 
material body—her femininity, tenderness, and pained experiences of torture—to 
demonstrate her constancy. By contrast, Askew never uses the word constancy in her 
own account of her examinations. Although she expresses her Protestant devotion as 
zealously as her editor, she much more elusively portrays her identity as a martyr and a 
woman. Like the figures of Elizabeth I and Hermione in The Winter’s Tale, Askew 
appropriates the liminality of the Petrarchan mistress—a figure neither fully absent nor 
fully present—to assert a position of control in the text within which she operates.  Only 
when these female figures withhold their full presence—in Askew’s muted description of 
her torture, for instance, or Elizabeth’s empty chair in the trial of Mary Queen of Scots, 
                                                 
1
 Beilin, Examinations, 106-107. 
2
 Beilin, Examinations, 159. 
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or Hermione’s ghostly return to the play—can they maintain authority without the 
vulnerability of their material bodies. 
It may seem surprising, then, that the last writer I address in this project and the 
first woman to write a Petrarchan sonnet sequence in English, Mary Wroth, imagines a 
heroine who so intensely embraces the idea of constancy. Unlike Askew, who 
conspicuously avoids the term, Wroth’s Pamphilia obsessively articulates a desire for 
constancy, a trait that so many male sonnet speakers claim for themselves in the 1590s. 
Critics of Wroth’s works have argued that Wroth’s use of constancy in both her prose 
romance, The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania, and her appended sonnet sequence, 
Pamphilia to Amphilanthus, marks a reappropriation of the term.
3
 While male lovers 
typically profess their constancy, they usually accuse women of inconstancy, and so by 
associating her female protagonist with constancy, Wroth makes that Petrarchan quality 
available to women. With her emphasis on philandering men and faithful women, Wroth 
seems to turn the tables on Petrarchan conventions, resignifying constancy from an 
impossibility for women to a strong female identity. 
                                                 
3
 Elaine V. Beilin, Redeeming Eve: Women Writers of the English Renaissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1987), argues that Wroth transforms constancy into a “heroic virtue” (208) and “develops 
Pamphilia into the embodiment of constancy” (217) in the Urania and in Pamphilia to Amphilanthus, and 
many critics have followed with similar assessments of Wroth’s treatment of the term. See, for instance, 
Mary Ellen Lamb, Gender and Authorship in the Sidney Circle (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1990), who argues that “Pamphilia provides a model of heroism for women in her unswerving loyalty to 
the lover who has forsaken her” (165) and that constancy is “one of the few heroic forms of self available 
to Renaissance women” (169); Maureen Quilligan, “The Constant Subject: Instability and Female 
Authority in Wroth’s Urania Poems,” in Soliciting Interpretation: Literary Theory and Seventeenth-
Century English Poetry, ed. Elizabeth D. Harvey and Katharine Eisaman Maus (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990), who sees constancy as “an act of willul self-definition” (323); and Elizabeth Hanson, 
“Boredom and Whoredom: Reading Renaissance Women’s Sonnet Sequences,” Yale Journal of Criticism 
10, no. 1 (1997): 165-91, who states that constancy “functions meta-discursively as a claim for a credible 
position from which to speak, for the authority in other words of a desiring, reflecting, writing subject. To 
be constant is to establish a self whose meaning isn’t at the mercy of whatever code is prevailing at the 
moment” (182). 
  
188 
 
Yet Wroth’s extended exploration of the term in the Urania suggests that 
Pamphilia’s association with constancy may not be all that positive. Although critics 
often note the closeness of Pamphilia’s story to Wroth’s own biography, this chapter 
posits that Wroth does not necessarily endorse Pamphilia’s adherence to this ideal. The 
female characters linked to constancy—including not only Pamphilia but also characters 
such as Limena, Bellamira, and Nereana—are often disempowered from their devotion, 
finding their options more limited than the women who renounce this value. Wroth 
suggests that constancy may be just as problematic for women as the inconstancy of 
which they are so often accused in the sonnets. Constant women in the Urania feel 
compelled either to exhibit full bodily presence—such as Limena, who must forever 
prove her constancy through displays of bodily pain—or to absent themselves 
completely—such as Pamphilia, who neglects her role as queen by withdrawing herself 
from court, or Bellamira, who spends the remainder of her days enclosed in a cave. 
Wroth’s female characters who endorse constancy forego the liminality of the role of the 
Petrarchan mistress, becoming entrapped by Petrarchan conventions rather than 
exercising their flexibility. 
Wroth suggests that the mistake that these characters make is to believe that 
constancy is a real and coherent virtue, rather than a construct that entails contradictions 
and inconsistencies. Wroth’s obsessive focus on constancy reveals that it is a term with a 
history—and that it circulates in several contradictory contexts. Petrarchan literature 
imported the term from at least two sixteenth-century discourses: the martyrology of 
writers like Bale and John Foxe, who emphasized martyrs’ constancy through the display 
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of their pain, and the stoicism revived by humanists, who valued the Roman concept of 
constantia as a way to conquer emotions. Constancy is thus a term that is strained 
between something that is marked on the body—a martyr in pain—and something that 
exists apart from the body—a quality of the mind.  
In her sprawling narrative, Wroth explores the term constancy and the tensions 
created by its varied connotations, from martyred resonances to stoic suggestions. Wroth 
takes a long look at what it means for a character to declare herself constant or to label 
someone else constant, and unlike sonnet sequences, which unquestioningly endorse 
constancy, the prose romance adopts the humanist mode of debate to test the value of the 
term. In characters like Limena, Wroth literalizes the martyr metaphor, interrogating what 
the implications are for women who must forever show bodily signs of their constancy. 
And in characters like Urania, who engages in debates about the value of constancy in an 
inconstant world, Wroth shows constancy to be a term in question rather than a fixed 
identity. Debate in the Urania enables female characters not just to be held to an 
impossible ideal of constancy or to be accused of being forever inconstant. Instead, 
female characters are part of the process of debating constancy, and their debates allow 
the text to question the assumed merits of constancy, especially for women. The Urania 
entertains the possibility that constancy is an identity trap, or, as one shepherd boy puts it 
when pressed by Pamphilia, “the foolishest unprofitable whining vertue” (571). Although 
Pamphilia fervently defends constancy, the text as a whole does not, and Wroth reveals 
the contradictions, dangers, and even absurdities of embracing constancy as an identity.  
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Wroth shows that constancy is a term pulled apart not only by its historical uses 
but also by literary convention. It is true that at the end of Wroth’s sonnet sequence, 
Pamphilia suggests that the constancy she embraces has empowered her, enabling her to 
come to terms with the trials of love she has experienced. Declaring her “muse now 
hapy,” she leaves love poetry—“the discource of Venus”—to “young beeginers,” and she 
uses the term constancy to describe herself. Directing her muse, she finishes the sequence 
by stating, “And thus leave off, what’s past showes you can love, / Now lett your 
constancy your honor prove.”
4
 Here, Wroth suggests that Pamphilia has achieved 
constancy: her love for Amphilanthus will no longer torment her, she has taken the high 
road, and she is over him. 
Yet part of the reason constancy becomes so incoherent in the Urania is that the 
idea of constancy is virtually incompatible with romance.
5
 In a discourse that Patricia 
Parker describes as “the dilated, or dilatory, space of a form which simultaneously moves 
torwards and delays definitive resolution or presence,” the expectation that a character 
remain constant is simply too high.
6
 With its endless deferrals, spiraling plotlines, and 
                                                 
4
 The Poems of Lady Mary Wroth, ed. Josephine A. Roberts (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1983), P103. I use Roberts’s numbering of the sequence.  
5
 In using this term, I do not suggest that romance is a coherent genre, but follow Barbara Fuchs in her 
suggestion that romance is “a literary and textual strategy” that “describes a concatenation of both 
narratological elements and literary topoi, including idealization, the marvelous, narrative delay, 
wandering, and obscured identity” (Romance, The New Critical Idiom [New York: Routledge, 2004], 9). In 
her overview of romance, Fuchs incorporates the archetypal theories of Northrop Frye, who argues that 
romance is a mythos rather than a genre (Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays [Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1957]; and The Secular Scripture: A Study of the Structure of Romance [Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1976]), with the poststructuralist thinking of Patricia Parker, who argues that 
romance “simultaneously quests for and postpones a particular end, objective, or object” (Inescapable 
Romance: Studies in the Poetics of a Mode [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979], 4).  
6
 Parker, Inescapable Romance, 14. See also A.C. Hamilton, “Elizabethan Romance: The Example of Prose 
Fiction,” English Literary History 49, no. 2 (1982): 287-99, who argues that “In contrast to comedy and 
trady in which there is a plot with a beginning, middle, and end unfolding inexorably in five acts, in 
romance there is a variety of distinct, always surprising episodes” (297). This is not to say that all romance 
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resistance to closure, romance provides an inhospitable environment for constant 
behavior. Although the Urania, like other prose romances, includes sonnets within the 
text, Wroth is makes an unusual move in publishing an entire sonnet sequence appended 
to her romance. By juxtaposing the sonnets with the prose romance, Wroth shows 
constancy to be not a universal term but a term shaped and altered by literary 
conventions. While in the tightly-knit form of the sonnet, Pamphilia can jubilantly 
proclaim her constancy, in the prose romance, that same term proves a fiction that easily 
comes undone. The varied ways in which the term constancy is invoked in the Urania 
troubles the idea in the last sonnet that Pamphilia’s identification with constancy is 
secure—or even desirable. Wroth suggests that although these discourses draw from the 
same concepts and figures, they also reveal them to be much more malleable, 
contradictory, and situationally specific. Wroth ultimately produces two different 
Pamphilias in two different discourses: one lover in the sonnets, who performatively 
announces her constancy, and another lover in the romance, who exposes the complicated 
resonances of such an utterance.  
 
Constancy in the Sixteenth Century 
Constancy was a term that came late to English Petrarchism. Early Petrarchan 
imitators in England like Wyatt and Surrey almost never used the Latinate word, instead 
                                                                                                                                                 
resists closure. Looking at popular writers such as Robert Greene, Thomas Lodge, and Thomas Nashe, 
Steve Mentz argues that “the defining feature of Elizabethan fiction, the feature that distinguishes it from 
its medieval ancestors and connects it to the modern novel, is simply large-scale narrative coherence” 
(Romance for Sale in Early Modern England [Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006], 11). Wroth’s Urania, 
however, follows a much more chivalric pattern. 
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relying on terms like “trouth” “faithful” or “steadfast” to express the concept of fidelity.
7
 
In the Elizabethan period, constancy became a commonplace term, appearing in almost 
every sonnet sequence of the 1590s.
8
 Often, the male lover declares himself constant 
amid the turmoil of his unrequited love. In William Percy’s Sonnets to the Fairest Coelia 
(1594), for instance, the speaker asserts, “One solace I shall find when I am over, / It will 
be knowne I dy'de a constant louer.”
9
 In Richard Linche’s Diella (1596), the speaker 
proclaims, “Constant haue I been, still in fancie fast, / ordayn’d by heauens to dote vpon 
thy faire.”
10
 And in William Smith’s Chloris (1596), the speaker writes, “So though my 
loue and life by hir are crost; / My hart shall still be constant firme and true.”
11
 When 
describing women, Petrarchan writers often use constancy to suggest either that women 
are too unyielding—hard-hearted like Delia or Phillis—or that they are liars for claiming 
constancy at all. In Edmund Spenser’s Amoretti (1595), the speaker states that even 
though he shows her his pain,  
                                                 
7
 See, for instance, Wyatt’s poems XIX and XLIII in the Collected Poems of Sir Thomas Wyatt, ed. 
Kenneth Muir and Patricia Thomson (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1969). Thomas Greene argues 
that the word “trouth” is one of the terms that distinguishes Wyatt from Petrarch and that the changing 
meanings of the word mark “the moral, social, and linguistic disarray caused by the disappearance of 
medieval ethical-political norms” (The Light in Troy: Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry [New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982], 255). Petrarch uses the word “constant” only once in the Rime 
sparse, in poem 357: “Né minacce temer debbo di morte, / che ’l Re sofferse con più grave pena / per farme 
a seguitar constante et forte” [“Nor do I fear the threats of death, which the King suffered with worse paine 
in order to make me constant and strong in following Him”] (Petrarch’s Lyric Poems: The “Rime sparse” 
and Other Lyrics, trans. and ed. Robert M. Durling [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976], 
554-55).  
8
 The term constancy appears, for instance, in the sonnet sequences of Philip Sidney (Astrophil and Stella 
51), Edmund Spenser (Amoretti 54 and 84), William Shakespeare (sonnets 105, 117, and 152), Barnabe 
Barnes (Parthenophil and Parthenophe 16), Bartholomew Griffin (Sonnets to Fidessa 9, 56, and 61), 
William Smith (Chloris 28, 31, and 35), William Percy (Sonnets to the Fairest Coelia 19), and Richard 
Linche (Diella 35).  
9
 William Percy, sonnet 19, in Sonnets to the Fairest Coelia (London: Adam Islip, 1594), C4r.  
10
 Richard Linche, sonnet 35, in Diella (London: Henry Olney, 1596), D2v. 
11
 William Smith, sonnet 31, in Chloris, or the Complaint of the passionate despised Shepheard (London: 
Edm. Bollifant, 1596), C2v. 
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Yet she beholding me with constant eye,  
Delights not in my mirth nor rues my smart:  
But when I laugh she mocks, and when I cry  
She laughs, and hardens evermore her heart.
12
  
In Shakespeare’s sonnets to the dark lady, constancy is only ever a deception:  
For I have sworn deep oaths of thy deep kindness,  
Oaths of thy love, thy truth, thy constancy,  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
For I have sworn thee fair: more perjur’d I,  
To swear against the truth so foul a lie!
13
  
What all these sonnets share is the use of the term constancy as a performative utterance 
in which their speakers declare themselves constant or their beloveds inconstant.  
Petrarchan writers imported the term constancy as it gained popularity in other 
discourses, notably martyrology and humanism. Sixteenth-century Protestant sermons, 
for instance, commonly use the phrase “constant martyr of Christ,” and the term reached 
an especially wide audience when John Foxe used constancy to describe the martyrs in 
Acts and Monuments. Foxe draws from a long tradition of extolling Christian martyrs for 
their constant devotion to their faith in the face of death, and he follows writers of ancient 
Rome who appropriated the stoic term constantia to describe Christian suffering.
14
 In 
                                                 
12
 Edmund Spenser, sonnet 54, in The Yale Edition of the Shorter Poems of Edmund Spenser, ed. William 
A. Oram et al (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). 
13
 William Shakespeare, sonnet 152, in The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. J. M. 
Tobin, 2
nd
 ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997). 
14
 Catharine Edwards, Death in Ancient Rome (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), discusses 
some of the ways in which Christian martyrs appropriate pagan concepts for their own uses. For instance, 
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“Ad Martyras” (“An Address to the Martyrs”), Tertullian pays tribute to “haec exempla 
constantiae” (“these examples of constancy”) who die not for “gloriae causum” (“the 
motive of glory”) but who face adversity “constanter” (“with constancy”); the writer of 
the “Passio Sanctarum Perpetuae et Felicitatis” (“The Martyrdom of Saints Perpetua and 
Felicitas”) describes how Perpetua “constantia repugnauit” (“strenuously resisted”) the 
robes of the priests of Saturn at her execution; and in his Peristephanon Liber (Crowns of 
Martyrs), Prudentius remarks on the arresting constancy of martyrs in pain: “tali 
repressus cognitor constantia / cessare poenam praecipit” (“Checked by such firmness of 
spirit, the judge orders that the torture rest”).
15
  
For martyrologists, violence done to—and endured by—the body testifies to the 
martyr’s constancy.
16
 Foxe writes of the early Christian martyr Julitta, “The ioyful Martyr 
embraceth the sentence as a thing most swete and delectable She addresseth her selfe to 
the flames, in countenance, iesture, and wordes, declaring the ioye of her hart, coupled 
with singular constancie.”
17
 Foxe’s poem on Askew’s death in his Latin Rerum Ecclesia 
Gestarum Commentarii is entitled “In Annae Askevae Constantissimae foeminae & 
                                                                                                                                                 
in De spectaculis, Tertullian condemns Roman spectacles yet celebrates the spectacles of Christian 
martyrdom: “Tertullian at least finds the seductive allure of the spectacles traditionally provided by the 
Roman state impossible to evade altogether. All he can do is offer a Christian substitute” (208).  
15
 Tertullian, “Ad Martyras,” in Tertulliani Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. Franz Oehler, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 
1853), 13-14; Tertullian, “An Address to the Martyrs,” in Tertullian, trans. Rev. C. Dodgson, vol. 1, 
Library of the Fathers (Oxford: John Henry Parker, 1842), 156-57; “Passio Sanctarum Perpetuae and 
Felicitatis,” in The Acts of the Christian Martyrs, trans. Herbert Musurillo (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1972), 126-27; Prudentius, vol. 2, trans. H.J. Thomson, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), 266-67. 
16
 Janel Mueller argues that in Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, pain helps constitute the selfhood of the 
martyrs, contrary to Elaine Scarry’s influential study that asserts that torture “enforces the unmaking of the 
victim’s world, self, and voice” (“Pain, Persecution, and the Construction of Selfhood in Foxe’s Acts and 
Monuments,” in Religion and Culture in Renaissance England, ed. Claire McEachern and Debora Shuger 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 161). 
17
 John Foxe, Acts and Monuments […]. The Variorum Edition (1570 edition), [online] (hriOnline, 
Sheffield), p. 120, hereafter cited parenthetically in the text by page number. Available from: 
http://www.hrionline.shef.ac.uk/foxe/. [Accessed: 06.23.2010]. 
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martyris bustum, Epitaphium Sapphicum, I.F.,” and it emphasizes Askew’s constancy 
through her tortured erotic body—“ her tendons untied” and her “chaste body.”
18
 Writers 
like Foxe emphasize martyrs’ bodies in pain—their countenance, gestures, and words, as 
he notes, and often the grotesque details of their executions—to verify their inward faith 
to God and to the Protestant cause. 
By the end of the sixteenth century, Petrarchan writers often used the trope of 
martyrdom as a metaphor for the pain of unrequited love; constant martyr and constant 
lover became conflated figures. A famous Nicholas Hilliard miniature shows a young 
lover in front of a background of flames, and an emblem in Otto Van Veen’s Amorum 
Emblemata (1608) depicts Cupid burning on the stake. The opposing poem, “Love in 
enduring death,” praises Cupid for remaining constant despite torment by his beloved: 
“Yet constant hee remaynes, whyle hee hath anie breath, / True loue in death it self, none 
can vnconstant know.”
19
 The pain of a martyr became an emblem, or a sign with which to 
demonstrate the undying devotion of the lover. In Parthenophil and Parthenophe, 
Barnabe Barnes writes,  
Parthenophe mine harts soueraine,  
Why doest thou my delightes delay?  
And with thy crosse vnkindnesse killes,  
Mine hart bound martyr to thy willes?
20
  
                                                 
18
 Beilin, Examinations, 193-94. 
19
 Otto van Veen, Amorum Emblematum (Antwerp, 1608), 184-85. 
20
 Barnabe Barnes, sestine 2, in Parthenophil and Parthenophe: A Critical Edition, ed. Victor A. Doyno 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), 91. 
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Wroth herself frequently uses the martyr metaphor in both her sonnets and her romance. 
In the first sonnet of Pamphilia to Amphilanthus, Pamphilia declares that Cupid has 
“martir’d my poore hart” (P1). Petrarchan writers evoked outward suffering to prove 
inward suffering, and they used the figure of the martyr to signify the impassioned 
helplessness of someone overcome by love. 
Humanist scholars also used the term constancy widely in the sixteenth century 
when they became interested in philosophers like Seneca, Tacitus, and Cicero, who 
emphasize the stoic virtue constantia. In 1586, the Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius wrote 
De Constantia, which was first translated into English as Two Bookes of Constancie in 
1594 and went through several editions in early modern England. A fictional dialogue 
between the character “Lipsius” and his wiser friend Langius on the virtues of constancy, 
Two Bookes of Constancie seeks to teach the reader how to deal with adversity. 
Instructing his naïve friend, who wishes to flee his war-torn country, Langius defines 
constancy as “a right and immoueable strength of the minde, neither lifted vp, nor 
pressed downe with externall or casuall accidentes.”
21
 Constancy was a concept that 
promised power to the individual over the changeability of the world, and it began to 
appear with frequency in English texts in the late sixteenth century.
22
 Lipsius was a 
correspondent with both Philip and Robert Sidney, and many of the same humanists that 
                                                 
21
 Iustus Lipsius, Two Bookes of Constancie, trans. Iohn Stradling (London: Richard Iohnes, 1594), 9, 
hereafter cited parenthetically in the text by page number. 
22
 Note that translations of the Bible in the 1580s use the term “constant” more than any other English 
Bible: The Rheims-Douai Bible (1582-1610) uses the term 46 times, and the Geneva Bible (1587) uses it 
40 times, mostly in the marginal notes. See The Bible in English (990-1970), online database, Chadwyck-
Healey Literature Collections (ProQuest, 1997-2010). 
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showed interest in Roman constancy began to use the term in their Petrarchan writings.
23
 
The sonnet sequences of the 1590s frequently adopt the term to describe both the 
Petrarchan lover, who is constant in his love despite cruelness of the world, and the 
beloved, who is criticized for her inconstancy. In Idea, Michael Drayton writes of the 
unshakable male lover: “Thus the world doth and evermore shall reel; / Yet to my 
Goddess am I constant ever.”
24
 Like Langius’s description of the constant man, Drayton’s 
lover is “immoueable” in the face of external cruelty. 
Yet the figure of the impassioned martyred lover is in many ways incompatible 
with the dispassionate stoic lover. While the constant martyr demonstrates affection with 
the body, the constant stoic is supposed to subdue it with the mind. In Two Bookes of 
Constancie, Langius instructs Lipsius to “change your owne mind wrongfully subiected 
to affections” (7). According to Langius, desire, joy, fear and sorrow are the “foure 
principall affections which doe greatly disquiet the life of man,” and “constancie of the 
minde resteth, as it were, in an euen ballance, these affections” (15). Yet these 
“affections” are what define a Petrarchan lover; to be a constant lover is to express desire 
for the beloved, joy at her beauty, fear of her loss, and sorrow because of her rejection. In 
The Arte of English Poesie, George Puttenham writes that love “requireth a forme of 
Poesie variable, inconstant, affected, curious and most witty of any others, whereof the 
ioyes were to be vttered in one sorte, the sorrowes in an other, and by the many formes of 
                                                 
23
 On Lipsius’s relationship with the Sidneys and other English humanists, see Adriana McCrea, Constant 
Minds: Political Virtue and the Lipsian Paradigm in England, 1584-1650 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1997). 
24
 Michael Drayton, Idea, sonnet 51, in Poems: By Michael Drayton, Esqvire (London: W. Stansby for 
John Smethwicke, 1619), 270.  
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Poesie, the many moodes and pangs of louers, throughly to be discouered.”
25
 While 
sonnet writers evoke “constancy” as a fixed quality for its characters (“to my Goddess am 
I constant ever”), the term actually represents a contradiction in meanings, an uneasy 
tension between the effusive display of emotion and the suppression of it.  
The convention of debate was one way that humanists explored these tensions 
without ever resolving them. Although Langius asserts that constancy is an unchanging 
concept, Lipsius’s persistent questions expose fissures in the term. Their long dialogue 
suggests that constancy is an idea in process that requires intellectual labor, and it also 
entertains the possibility that constancy may mean more than just one thing. As Yvonne 
Bruce points out, constancy “is a vexed term, not only because it resists stable definition, 
as any abstraction does, but also because its meaning is fluid in both classical and early 
modern understanding of Stoicism.” From Guillaume Du Vair’s exhortation to maintain 
happiness through “a constant disposition of will” to Michel de Montaigne’s definition of 
constancy as a “languishing and wavering dance,” constancy as a term fractures into 
contradictory meanings.
26
 The format of the debate in particular highlights the unfinished 
nature of the concept, and Lipsius’s conversation with Langius raises the possibility—
however strongly refuted—that constancy may have negative consequences, from the 
acceptance of evil to the display of pride. The characters’ disputes lay bare both the 
instabilities of the term and the questions of its merits. 
                                                 
25
 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie, ed. Gladys Doidge Willcock and Alice Walker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), bk. 1, chap. 22, p. 45. 
26
 Yvonne Bruce, “‘That which Marreth All’: Constancy and Gender in The Virtuous Octavia,” Medieval 
and Renaissance Drama in England 22 (2009): 42-43. Bruce provides a helpful overview of the many 
contradictory definitions of constancy during this time, including those of Cicero, Joseph Hall, Du Vair, 
Montaigne, Gabriel Powell, and Lipsius. 
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One of the largest tensions in Lipsius’s Two Bookes of Constancie is whether 
constancy is passive—something you have—or active—something you do. Langius 
begins by telling Lipsius that constancy is internal, “a right and immoueable strength of 
the minde” (9), yet he emphasizes that to be constant, Lipsius must effect change rather 
than take orders. He explains the difference, for instance, between pity and mercy. Pity, 
according to Langius, is something “which must be despised of him that is wise and 
constant” because it means simply to bewail the misfortunes of others rather than to aid 
people in their misery (29). He instead advocates for mercy, which means to help rather 
than just to “waxe watry” at others’ pain (29): “I permit MERCY, but not pittying. I call 
MERCY, An inclination of the minde to succour the necessitie or miserie of another. . . . 
He that is trulie mercifull in deed . . . will performe more in workes than in wordes: and 
will stretch out vnto the poore and needy his hand, rather than his tongue” (29-30). 
Constancy means to do rather than to sit idly, to change the world rather than to accept 
evil. Langius even promises that constancy will empower him to become like a 
sovereign: “Thou shalt be a king indeed free indeed, only subiect vnto God, enfranchized 
from the seruile yoke of Fortune and affections” (13-14). Far from a state of just 
accepting the world as it comes, constancy demands and enables complete control. 
Yet Langius complicates these assertions by suggesting that Lipsius needs to 
endure rather than resist miseries because they are always sent by God: “Think you that 
God giueth vs onely pleasing and profitable things? No: he sendeth likewise noisome and 
hurtful: . . . From heauen (Lipsius) from heauen are all these miseries sent” (33-34). 
Contrary to his claim that a constant man must change the world—must “performe more 
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in workes than in wordes”—here Langius argues that Lipsius should accept all bad things 
as part of God’s plan. No longer sovereign because of his constancy, Lipsius is subjected 
to any miseries God imposes on him. Lipsius naturally asks, then, if all things are a result 
of God’s destiny, why should he try to solve any of his country’s problems? “Why doo 
wee not leaue all to that greate masterlesse Lord, and sit still our selues with our handes 
in our bosomes?” (55). Langius answers by insisting that destiny of course does not work 
alone: “Who tolde thee that Destiny worketh alone without coadiuuant and meane 
causes? It is Destiny thou shouldest haue children: yet first thou must sowe the seede in 
thy wiues garden” (56). To be constant, Lipsius must carefully discern between helping 
his country while there is still hope and yielding to God’s destiny when there is not:  
Howe knowest thou that? What canst thou tell whether this be onelie a 
light fit of a feuer, or a deeper disease vnto death? Therefore put to thy 
helping hand, and (as the prouerbe is,) hope still whiles breath is in the 
sicke bodie. But if thou see by certain and infallible tokens that the fatall 
alteration of the State is come, with mee this saying shall preuaile, Fot to 
fight against God. (56-57) 
Like a physician, Lipsius is supposed to make the crucial distinction between a patient 
able to recover and a patient beyond hope.  
Yet what exactly are these “certain and infallible tokens” that supposedly alert 
Lipsius when to resist and when to give in? Langius never says. Rather than securing a 
firm line between action and passivity, Langius posits an ambiguous and variable 
boundary that may be difficult to interpret. Constancy, as it turns out, changes depending 
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on the circumstances. Far more than an “immoueable strength of the minde,” constancy 
becomes, as the dialogue develops, a shifting role that Lipsius must negotiate in order to 
perform effectively. Many early modern writers, in fact, became anxious about verifying 
“true” constancy as opposed to false, and constancy was described not as an inner quality 
at all but as a trait that must be demonstrated, like martyrdom, with outward signs. James 
I, for instance, was skeptical of Lipsius, who changed religions several times, thus 
displaying inconstant behavior. In the 1599 edition of Basilikon Doron, James rails 
against “that proud inconstant LIPSIVS,” and in later editions he contrasts true constancy 
with the hypocrisy of stoic writers: “Keepe true constancie, not onely in your kindenesse 
towardes honest men; but being also inuicti animi against all aduersities: not with that 
Stoicke insensible stupiditie, wherewith many in our daies, preassing to winne honour, in 
imitating that ancient sect, by their inconstant behauiour in their owne liues, belies their 
profession.”
27
 “True” constancy, according to James, is measured by what you do rather 
than just by how you think. 
Langius walks a similar fault line when instructing Lipsius on how much 
intellectual labor goes into to cultivating constancy. On the one hand, diligent study is 
necessary to craft the mindset that will battle inconstant Fortune. Langius scolds Lipsius 
for admiring his garden, accusing him of being attracted only to its outward beauty. He 
insists that gardens should be places of intellectual work rather than idleness:  
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Here let al the learned meditate and write: here let the Philosophers argue 
& dispute of contentation, constancie, life, and death. . . . Here I either plie 
my selfe with diligent and earnest reading, or els sowe in my heart some 
seed of good cogitations, and thereby lay vp some wholsome lessons in my 
minde, as it were weapons in an armorie, which are alwayes ready with me 
at hand against the force and mutabilitie of Fortune. (65-66)  
Readying constancy is like preparing for battle, requiring industry rather than laziness, 
inquisitiveness rather than acceptance. Langius insists that Lipsius cannot attain 
constancy simply by wishing it but must earn it: “Doest thou betake thy selfe to wishing, 
rather than doing? . . . Thou must bestow thy labour with al, and (as the saying is, ioyne 
handes with heart. Seeke, read, learne” (70). 
Yet when Lipsius participates in this very intellectualism, pressing Langius on the 
logic of constancy, Langius grows more and more impatient. When Lipsius urges 
Langius to explain why God’s punishment is unequal, Langius is offended that Lipsius 
even asked: “Wandring minde! What meanest thou by this curious carefulnesse? . . . Of 
this onlely I am assured, that Gods will is a cause aboue all causes; . . . God hath 
pardoned: God hath punished: what wilt thou haue more? . . . And art thou more bold 
with God? Fie vpon such peruerse curiositie” (88). Although constancy requires 
intellectual “labour,” curiosity is “peruerse.” Langius becomes harsher to Lipsius as he 
continues, angrily emphasizing that it is not for Lipsius to try to understand God’s 
wisdom. When Lipsius asks why some evil men go unpunished, Langius responds, “Nay, 
thou bewrayest hereby thy blockishnes. For who art thou that dost not only appoint God 
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how, but also prescribe him when to punish?” (90-91). Lipsius cannot strike the right 
balance, in Langius’s judgment, between understanding constancy and questioning God’s 
plan. Although constancy requires intellectual work, Langius scolds Lipsius for any 
question that tries to comprehend God’s logic. 
One of the most surprising revelations of the text comes when Langius, the 
mouthpiece for constancy, tells Lipsius that he is actually not a constant person at all. 
John Stradling, the translator of the treatise, advertises to the reader that the text is a kind 
of self-help manual that enables readers to adopt the practices of constancy: “if thou take 
vnto thee the armour and wepons here offered, hauing an indifferent courage of thine 
owne, thou shalt assuredly remaine a conquerour of those selfe affections” (“The Epistle 
to the Reader”). Lipsius assumes that because of Langius’s confidence, Langius is a 
model of constancy that he can imitate: “And with his last profound and constant talk, I 
confesse he made me amazed. Yet recalling my self, Oh happie man (said I) both in 
tranquilitie and troubles! O more than manly courage in a man! which wold to God I 
were able in some measure to imitate, and to creepe after your footsteps, although I came 
farre behind” (67). Yet Langius scolds Lipsius for his assumption, calling into question 
whether the constancy he preaches can ever be achieved:  
Here Langius reprehending me, what talke you of imitating? you may 
easily exceed me: and not onely follow, but far passe mee. For I my selfe 
(Lipsius) haue trode but verie little in this path of Constancie and vertue. 
Neither am I to bee compared as yet to valiant and good men, but 
perchance am a little better than the most effeminate and worst sort. But 
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thou, whose towardlines is lusty and quick, set thy selfe forwards, & vnder 
my conduct enter into this high-way which leadeth directly to Stablenes 
and Constancie. (67) 
Although Langius clings to the idea that constancy can be realized in someone as 
promising as Lipsius, his language suggests that this realization is actually quite 
uncertain. In sharp contrast to his earlier characterization of constancy as an “immoueable 
strength of the minde” (9), here constancy is a journey in motion, a “high-way” that can 
only promise stability. Far from an attribute that describes a person, constancy is, in 
Langius’s depiction, always in the process of becoming. If the authority figure on 
constancy cannot ever get there, the text casts doubt on the possibility of anyone else 
getting there either. 
As one who calls himself “effeminate” and yet the one who can guide Lipsius to 
manly constancy “vnder [his] conduct,” Langius also unsettles his own categorization of 
constancy as an active masculine virtue. More than expressing false modesty, Langius 
puts pressure on his attempts to gender constancy as male. On the one hand, Langius sets 
up a rigid binary in the dialogue, arguing that in order to achieve constancy, Lipsius must 
accept his afflictions like a man and eschew effeminate “dandling”: 
Thinkest thou that [God] will handle his schollers tenderly? that he will 
dandle them with delights vpon his knee? No, he will not doe so. Mothers 
for the most do corrupt their children, and make them wantons with tender 
bringing vp: but their fathers hold them in aw with more seuerity. God is 
our father, therfore he loueth vs truly yet with seuerity. If thou wilt be a 
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Marriner, thou must be taught in tempests. If a souldier, in perils. If thou 
bee a man indeed, why refusest thou afflictions? seeing ther is none other 
way to constancy. (78) 
Constancy, according to Langius, is a form of toughness, an extension of humanist 
pedagogy that views physical punishment as a means to mastery. A constant subject is a 
male subject, who must repel female attempts to “corrupt” his constancy. Yet at other 
moments in the text, the line between masculine and feminine is much less clear. Langius 
instructs Lipsius that learning is incomplete without wisdom, and he portrays the constant 
subject here as an empty feminine vessel that must be impregnated with manly wisdom: 
“For as some trees will beare no fruite, except they grow neere vnto others that be of the 
male kind: No more wil these tender Virgins (I mean good letters) vnlesse they be 
conioyned with the manly courage of wisedome” (69). Just as Langius’s depiction of 
constancy vacillates between action and passivity, so does it waver between the 
masculine endurance of pain and the feminine acceptance of a virile presence. 
Langius’s gender metaphors become even more confused when he describes 
wisdom. Although wisdom is “manly,” it is also personified as a woman shortly 
thereafter: “Apply thy selfe to wisedom, which may amend thy euill maners, set at rest 
and beautifie thy distempered and vncleane mind: She only is able to imprint vertue, & to 
work the impression of CONSTANCIE in thee, and to set open vnto thee the Temple of 
A GOOD MIND” (69). Curiously, the impregnating force is female, able “to imprint,” 
“to work the impression,” and “to set open.” Lipsius’s treatise sends mixed messages 
about whether constancy is something within the body—an inner virtue that needs to be 
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demonstrated—or something outside the body that must be imprinted on it. Lipsius gives 
contradictory suggestions about where constancy originates and how it can be verified.  
In the end, the structure of the debate refuses to settle the contradictions that the 
text reveals. Although the text ostensibly serves as a guide for the reader to help cultivate 
constancy, it is unclear whether the reader should believe the older, supposedly wiser 
Langius who nevertheless cannot achieve constancy himself, or the younger, more naïve 
Lipsius who seems so easily swayed yet asks some of the most pointed, logical questions 
about the implications of embracing constancy. It is not even clear if constancy has any 
ability to perform its most revered stoic function, which is to control emotion. While 
Langius argues that “vaine delightes doe kindle and enflame in vs the fewell of 
affections” (6), Lipsius remarks shortly thereafter that in hearing Langius’s “earnest” 
words on constancy, he was “enflamed with a sparke of this good fire” (14). Constancy, 
while supposedly quenching the flames of passion, is also the source of passion, perhaps 
explaining its frequent appropriation in both martyrological and Petrarchan discourses. 
Lipsius’s treatise leaves the questions it raises unresolved: how constancy is produced, 
what the effects of constancy are, or whether constancy is a force of good or of evil.  
In what follows, I analyze some of the moments in the Urania that interrogate the 
term constancy. I argue that in many of the same ways that Lipsius’s treatise calls 
attention to the irresolvable tensions in the term, so does Wroth’s text point to the pull 
between the term as a passive quality that characters have and a more malleable concept 
that must be negotiated. In some instances, Wroth seems to tow the stoic line, as when 
Leandrus advises Parselius, who complains to him after an imprisonment. Leandrus tells 
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Parselius, “be confident, the Heavens ordaine all things for the best, then doe not repine, 
you have made your selfe already famous sufficient to gaine sorrow for your end and 
revenge; be then brave and resolute, and make bold Death (by your constant suffering) 
quake to assaile you.”
28
 Like Langius, Leandrus advocates for constancy in the face of 
adversity, but even here, constancy straddles the line between passive acceptance of 
“suffering” and active defiance of death. Wroth’s text rigorously tests and exposes the 
complications of the term constancy, especially for its women characters. 
 
Constant Martyrs in the Urania 
The very first tale in the romance is of a constant woman, Limena, yet ironically, 
even in a character who so perfectly represents constancy, constancy is remarkably 
difficult to locate. Wroth seems less interested in the idea that Limena is “constant” than 
in how she came to be so. The parodic nature of the episode suggests that Limena is not 
intrinsically constant at all; instead, constancy is something that must be written on her 
body, almost always through suffering. Limena’s martyrdom is necessary to demonstrate 
her constancy, and although Wroth narrates a happy ending for this character, she also 
emphasizes that her happiness must be purchased with pain. 
On the surface, Limena seems inherently to embody constancy. In love with 
Perissus, whom Urania finds lamenting in a cave, but married against her will to 
Philargus, Limena remains true to Perissus even under threats of death from her husband, 
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who suspects she is not being faithful. Yet Perissus’s description of Limena to Urania 
indicates that constancy is not an inner quality of Limena, but an outward performance 
that must be tested. He bewails, “O deere Limena, loving Limena, worthy Limena, and 
more rare, constant Limena: perfections delicately faign’d to be in women were verified 
in thee” (4). His comment about the “faign’d” constancy in other women suggests an 
anxiety about the authenticity of constancy, which, despite being an inner virtue, must be 
“verified” by outward signs. Like James I, who anxiously works to establish “true” 
constancy against the imposters who only claim it, Perissus anxiously maintains the 
boundary between false constancy and true constancy—yet fails to articulate exactly how 
to tell the difference. Just as Elizabeth I and Mary Queen of Scots struggle to prove their 
authenticity in a culture that blurs the distinction between true and false women, so does 
Wroth highlight the difficulty for any female character fully to prove her constancy. 
Oddly, despite Perissus’s many professions of Limena’s “modest constancy, and 
constant determination” (13), Perissus argues that Limena loses her constancy once she is 
dead. Believing that Philargus has killed her, he vows to live his life in despair and tells 
Urania, “No, shee is dead, and with her is all vertue, and beauteous constancy gone” (15). 
This statement, of course, does not make much sense, for why would Limena become 
inconstant once she is dead? Perissus’s logic here suggests that constancy exists only 
when it is demonstrably verifiable, and the phrase “beauteous constancy” conflates, even 
confuses, outward beauty with an inner quality. Far from a stable virtue, constancy can 
appear and disappear. Here, constancy is not just remaining steady despite the world’s 
troubles; it is also projecting a pretty face. 
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The torturing of Limena later in the romance shows how much Limena’s body in 
pain produces the constancy that she is supposedly just conveying. Parselius comes 
across Limena, bound to a pillar by her hair, naked from the waist up, being whipped by 
her husband. Here she is the emblem from van Veen’s book, martyred in her constant 
love for Perissus. Parsellius’s pornographic admiration for her at this moment points to 
the close correlation between Limena’s Petrarchan beauty and her constant martyrdom: 
The Morean Prince [Parselius] staid to behold, and beholding did admire 
the exquisitenes of that sad beautie, but more then that did the cruelty of 
the armed man seeme wonderful, for leading her to a pillar which stood on 
the sand (a fit place that the sea might stil wash the memorie of such 
inhumanity) he tied her to it by the haire, which was of great length, and 
the Sun-like brightnesse. Then pulled hee off a mantle which she wore, 
leaving her from the girdle upwards al naked, her soft, daintie white hands 
hee fastened behind her, with a cord about both wrists, in a manner of a 
crosse, as testimony of her cruellest Martyrdome. (84) 
Martyrdom, and hence constancy, are not self evident, as this passage shows, but require 
“testimony.” In Limena’s case, the most convincing evidence comes from her suffering 
beauty—her hair of “Sun-like brightnesse” tied to a pillar, her naked breasts, her “soft, 
daintie white hands” bound with a cord. Like Foxe’s description of Cicelie Ormes in Acts 
and Monuments, which points to Ormes’s Petrarchan beauty as proof of her true 
martyrdom, Wroth shows the close correlation between feminized bodily pain and inner 
virtue. When Parselius fights Philargus to free Limena, he accidentally nicks Limena’s 
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breast in a moment that recalls Britomart’s wounding: “it a little rased her on the left side, 
which shee perceiving, looking on it, and seeing how the bloud did trickle in some 
(though few) drops, ‘Many more then these,’ said shee, ‘have I inwardly shed for thee my 
deare Perissus’” (84). Outward bodily signs serve as proof for inward emotions. 
Yet these things of course do not prove anything, and Wroth highlights the 
bizarreness of Philargus’s sudden change of heart about his wife. After Parselius defeats 
Philargus, he abruptly reverses his judgment of Limena: “Now are mine eyes open to the 
injuries done to vertuous Limena, her chastity appeares before my dying sight, whereto 
before, my eyes were dimme, and eares deafe, seeing and hearing nothing, but base 
falshoods, being govern’d by so strong and undeserved Jealousie” (85). Chastity is of 
course distinguished from constancy in this text; Limena can be constant to one man—
Perissus—while being chaste to another—Philargus. Yet both concepts are invisible on 
the body and thus must be marked in some way to signify their presence. Philargus’s 
emphasis on the senses, especially sight, suggests that Limena has offered visual proof of 
her chastity, and yet her outward appearance is the same as it was a few minutes ago, 
before Parselius came to rescue her. Wroth posits a confusing relationship between inner 
and outer here; Limena’s martyred body first proves her guilt to Philargus, and then 
suddenly her innocence. If Limena’s chastity becomes something that can be proven or 
disproven with the same outward sign, then Wroth suggests that women cannot ever 
prove their faithfulness definitively. 
Limena has a happy ending, but Wroth calls attention to the problematic ways that 
constancy is made into an identity for women. Limena gets to marry her true love, 
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becoming Queen of Sicily, and when she makes brief appearances throughout the 
narrative, she is usually associated with constancy, as when Pamphilia accepts her pledge 
of service from “you most happy Queene, the rare vertue of matchlesse and loyall 
constancy” (149). Yet even after she is promised to Perissus with her dying husband’s 
blessing, Limena continues to showcase her wounds, suggesting that her role as constant 
lover is never completely secure. She tells the rest of her story of her torture, showing her 
scars as evidence for her love of Perissus: “‘When I had put off all my apparell but one 
little Petticote, he opened my breast, and gave me many wounds, the markes you may 
here discerne’ (letting the Mantle fall againe a little lower, to shew the cruell 
remembrance of his crueltie) which although they were whole, yet made they newe hurts 
in the loving heart of Perissus” (87). The role of martyr becomes one that Limena cannot 
stop herself from playing. Curiously, her wounds are not even there any more (“they were 
whole”), yet the gesture alone of showing where they were testifies to her love of 
Perissus, making “new hurts” in his “loving heart.” Wroth points to both the compulsory 
and compulsive element of performance in constituting Limena’s constancy, which must 
be rehearsed over and over through the demonstration of Limena’s pain.  
Throughout the Urania, Wroth highlights the suffering that women must 
demonstrate publicly again and again—so much so that they become caught in a 
masochistic cycle of witnessing their constant devotion.
29
 Although Pamphilia is 
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described as being alone, she is often “alone” in an extremely public way.
30
 When 
Amphilanthus comes to rescue Pamphilia from the Theater of Enchantment, for instance, 
he comes surrounded by his former girlfriends Musalina, Lucenia, and the Queen of 
Bulgaria. While the other princesses in the theater are reunited with their lovers, 
Amphilanthus’s rejection of Pamphilia becomes painfully apparent:  
now they perfectly saw and knew, misery to them that were subjects to it, 
and such did Pamphilia feele, who returning to the seate, she had before 
sate in, not only as she did alone, but viewed by all to be so. They 
infinitely wished for the finall end, and she for hers; directly before her sat 
Musalina, and the halfe fulfiller of the Adventure, a sad spectacle, but she 
must and did indure it (442) 
Pamphilia’s constancy at this moment is not private suffering but a public performance, 
carried out, no less, in a theater. Her aloneness becomes a “sad spectacle” that is “viewed 
by all,” and Wroth suggests that the constancy Pamphilia displays for Amphilanthus is 
part of her public image. While Pamphilia’s feelings may be genuine, her relationship 
with Amphilanthus is never just between the two of them, instead extending into her 
persona as steadfast queen.  
Pamphilia’s displays of suffering become entwined with her identity as a woman, 
and Wroth suggests that she even revels in the image she projects as a martyr. When she 
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comes across the wedding of Alarina, for instance, who had previously taken a vow of 
chastity, Pamphilia wonders if she is the only one who can maintain constancy: 
“‘Alasse,’ said she, ‘can there not live two constant women all at one time? yet Pamphilia 
be thou still just, and though but thy selfe, and so alone to suffer glory in such 
martyrdome’” (482). Like Limena, who obsessively points to her scars to prove her 
devotion to Perissus, Pamphilia repeatedly performs her own suffering to “glory” in her 
constancy for Amphilanthus. Not just a passive acceptance of suffering, Pamphilia 
actively seeks to project her image, wearing black clothes and conspicuously shunning 
the company of others. Yet Wroth emphasizes that this endless display of suffering can 
also entrap Pamphilia in her own misery. Wroth points to the decay of Pamphilia’s 
beauty, for instance, as she lets herself go: Pamphilia “now wore only black, and in 
wearing that as carelesse, as before extreame curious, her hayre that was before, but with 
greatest care dressed, shee onely kept cleane, and neglectively wore it, no jewels came 
about her; so as she was a mourner in stead of the most sumptuous habits shee was wont 
to honour the Court withall” (461). Far from the spectacular monarch she once was, 
Pamphilia becomes locked in a state of self-pity and neglect. 
Wroth suggests that the association between constancy and martyrdom does not 
ever fully prove a lover’s suffering, but it compels the lover to rehearse that suffering 
over and over again in a public way. In a long interior monologue, Pamphilia wonders 
whether she was born to suffer: “else why was this rare excellent qualitie of constancy 
alotted thee?” (464). Far from a solitary condition, Pamphilia’s constancy requires 
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repeated public display. In an apostrophe to Amphilanthus, she makes clear that everyone 
around her is aware of her constancy:  
you might yet most cruell man have shewed more gratefulnesse, and I 
have been contented, no colour you have to excuse that with all, for you 
knew my love, you seemed to cherish it, all eyes saw it too, for my face 
shewed it, I strove for nothing more then meanes to declare it, mine eyes 
did looke for meanes, to shew how they and I were won by you, my lipps 
have parted from themselves to let my tongue make true confession of that 
you then seemd with expressfull joy, and content to entertaine. (464) 
With her sonnets that she carves on trees for others to discover, her complaints she makes 
for others to overhear, and her disheveled self-presentation, Pamphilia ensures that “all 
eyes saw it too.” Wroth suggests that rather than become freed with her devotion to 
constancy, Pamphilia becomes trapped into compulsively demonstrating her sorrow.  
Yet all these demonstrations ultimately prove nothing. Pamphilia questions why 
Amphilanthus cannot see her pain despite her endless displays of suffering: “the Heavens 
will yet for me witnes my unchanged heart, and unstained affection: the aire hath been, 
and is so fild with my complaints and protestations, as I wonder it doth not like 
Ordinance rattle in your eares” (464). Wroth implies that that no matter how many 
“complaints and protestations” Pamphilia makes, her constancy can never be fully 
verified, and like Limena, she is caught in a cycle of forever pointing to her wounds. 
Pamphilia says in her monologue that her passions “have left this poore body a loyall 
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sacrifice to love” (465), and for Wroth, that seems to be the point: Pamphilia’s constancy 
spurs an endless display of pain, leaving her identity calcified as a sacrificial martyr. 
For women in the Urania, constancy more often prompts perpetual mourning than 
singular spectacles of pain. Amphilanthus and Ollorandus come across Bellamira, whose 
story shadows Pamphilia’s, in “mourning attire, her faire eyes shewing more griefe, then 
her apparrell sadnesse” (377). Bellamira tells them about her love for a man whom she 
could not have. Under her father’s coercion, she married another man and had a child 
with him, and afterward she discovered that her original lover had been false to her 
despite her constancy to him throughout her marriage. Before her marriage, she 
“performed a vowed sacrifice, which was a lock of haire that I had worne constantly 
many yeares; this haire was his, . . . The vow was, that if ever I should be so unfortunate, 
as to marry any but himselfe, that morning before my marriage to burne it to my losse 
and love” (387-88). Even after she was widowed and discovered her lover’s faithlessness, 
she still professed her constancy to him: “truly can I not hate this man, but love him stil 
so wel, as if he could looke backe on me with love, all former ills should be forgotten, but 
that cannot be, such an unfortunate strangnes hath beene betwixt us, as wee never meete” 
(390). Like Pamphilia, Bellamira devotes her life to a man who will never be faithful. 
Yet Wroth suggests that Bellamira’s constancy entraps her to a miserable 
existence. When Bellamira’s husband and son died, and after she discovered that her 
lover had been false all along, Bellamira decides to confine herself to a cave: 
Into this Cave I then confined my selfe, and hence I have not stirred, 
further then you finde me, nor will, heere purposing to end, and with my 
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deerest son be laid, who only was to me constant in affection; and to him, 
daily doe I perform those rights belonging to the dead, after the manner of 
our country; In these parts can you finde no more then now you see, my 
miserable spectacle (389) 
Bellamira casts herself as a martyr, emphasizing her “miserable spectacle,” but curiously, 
she is a spectacle in the dark where no one can see her. For Wroth, constant martyrdom 
does not simply testify to the lover’s suffering, but must be painfully reiterated over and 
over again—even if no one is watching. Bellamira must “daily perform” the mourning 
rights to her dead son, the only person in her life who has reciprocated her constancy, yet 
she can never fully prove her constancy to her missing audience. 
For Bellamira, constancy is not an empowering virtue, but an enslaving one. She 
tells Amphilanthus, “Dull I have been called, for constancy is now termed so, and his 
assurance of my faith made him leave mee, a thing he thinks soone wonne, or rather held 
at pleasure, confident assurance of firmnesse, growing to contempt; and this course doe 
unfortunate poore constant lovers run” (381). Bellamira’s revelation of her constancy to 
her lover made her vulnerable to him, who took it as a sign of weakness rather than 
strength. Her echo of A Midsummer Fight’s Dream is a bitterly ironic one, for while the 
lovers’ misfortunes get resolved at the end of Shakespeare’s play, Bellamira is left 
abandoned for her constancy.  
In Protestant works, martyrdom was a tool for inspiring others and effecting 
change; the spectacle of a martyr’s pain was invoked to encourage others to follow the 
cause. In Acts and Monuments, Foxe writes, “And though we repute not their ashes, 
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chaynes, and swerdes in the stede of reliques: yet let vs yelde thus much vnto theyr 
commemoration, to glorify the Lord in his Saintes, and imitate their death (as much as we 
may) with like constancy, or theyr lyues at the least with like innocency” (12). Wroth 
shows that in romance, however, constancy prompts the endless repetition of suffering 
rather than a glorious blaze. During one of Pamphilia’s tormented fits of passion, Wroth 
writes, “being alone she thus began, or rather continued her complaints which could have 
no new beginning never having end” (467). Instead of shaping a spectacular female 
identity, Pamphilia’s constant martyrdom leads her to a life of ceaseless suffering.  
 
Constancy as Debate in the Urania 
While the stories of constant martyrs in the Urania show the process by which 
women can become entrapped by their very impassioned professions of constancy, the 
debates on constancy between the characters also question the virtue—and the 
coherence—of the term. The sonnets of the period suggest that constancy is an either/or 
condition: a lover is either constant or is not. Yet the debates in the Urania show that the 
connotations that the term constancy has accumulated make it difficult for characters to 
agree what constancy is or whether it is a virtue or a vice. The conversations in the 
romance send mixed signals about whether constancy produces or controls passion, 
whether it is a masculine stoic virtue or a feminine erotic weakness, and whether it 
constitutes authority or takes it away. The figure of the constant martyr shows how easily 
constancy can lock women into identities of unhappiness, yet the debates on constancy 
reveal that a character’s association with constancy is never fully secure. Far from the 
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uncontested virtue of the sonnets, constancy in the romance is an ideal of more 
questionable value, one that the characters mistrust as much as they embrace. 
In many ways, Wroth shows constancy to be a stoic ideal that controls excessive 
passion, which can be detrimental, even dangerous, to the characters of the romance. She 
describes Pamphilia, who is the character most associated with constancy, as “the most 
silent and disreetly retir’d of any Princesse” (61). Like Langius, who argues that 
constancy is a masculine virtue, several characters call Pamphilia “Masculine” or 
“manlike” in her behavior (468, 570). When Rosindy instructs the incarcerated Parselius, 
“make bold Death (by your constant suffering) quake to assaile you” (405), Wroth seems 
to suggest that constancy can conquer emotion. When Amphilanthus jousts with the King 
of Celicia, he feels strengthened by Pamphilia’s display of constancy: “The Emperour 
marking her, had inwardly new power and might given him by her constancy, and strong 
affection” (566). Just as Langius promises Lipsius that constancy will make him like a 
king, Wroth shows here the almost magical powers of constancy to infuse Amphilanthus 
with his needed strength of mind. 
Yet many characters question the association between constancy and stoic control 
when constancy becomes entangled with Petrarchan discourse. For instance, when 
Rosindy and Selarinus go for a walk, Selarinus discloses his love for Rosindy’s sister, 
Philistella, who is trapped at the Theater of Enchantment: “O Philistella, treasure of the 
truest sweetnesse; why art thou lost, and I in thee? Why was ever cruell fortune turned on 
thee, and why alone wert thou made excellent to bee fallen into this misery?” (411). Yet 
Rosindy cautions him on his excessive emotion: “‘This passion,’ said Rosindy, ‘so well 
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fits your love, as I must commend it, and be no way angry with your choller, your 
constant affection to my sister, moves in mee as much love as I desire to have from my 
best friend; yet I would have you temperate in your sufferings’” (411). Rather than 
subduing affection, constancy actually has the danger of producing too much affection. 
Wroth reveals constancy as a term that splits at the seams; she shows how the stoic and 
the Petrarchan connotations of constancy both coexist and work against each other at the 
same time. Not the either/or identity of the sonnets, constancy in the romance is a 
contradictory ideal, at once evoking the control of passion and its excess. 
Urania’s debate with Pamphilia about her love for Amphilanthus constitutes one 
of the most sustained challenges to constancy in the text. Like Rosindy, Urania 
characterizes constancy as producing slavish devotion to passion rather than “discreet” 
control of it, and she charges Pamphilia with weakness: 
Where is that judgment, and discreet govern’d spirit for which this and all 
other places that have beene happy with the knowledge of your name, hath 
made you famous? will you now fall under the low groanes of the meanest 
esteemed passion? Where is that resolution, which full of brave 
knowledge, despised the greatest Princes when they wore loves livery; 
must this sinke, while his tossing follies swimme? shall your excellent 
vertues bee drowned in the Sea of weaknesse? call your powers together, 
you that have been admired for a Masculine spirit, will you descened 
below the poorest Femenine in love? (468) 
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Although in Lipsius’s treatise, Langius promises that constancy will ensure sovereignty, 
here Urania argues that a constant lover is a bad ruler. In matters of love, constancy 
encourages an ungoverned spirit and enslavement to “the low groanes of the meanest 
esteemed passion.” Urania questions, “how can you command others, that cannot master 
your selfe; or make laws, that cannot counsel, or soveraignise over a poore thought?” 
(468). She tells Pamphilia to stop crying and to man up, opposing constancy with the 
power Pamphilia needs to wield in order to govern effectively.  
Yet Urania does not simply encourage Pamphilia to be masculine in an essential 
way. Instead, she suggests that in her stubborn adherence to constancy, Pamphilia forfeits 
the flexibility to perform different gender roles. Urania encourages Pamphilia not only to 
be masculine but also to embrace the feminine role of Petrarchan mistress, prodding her 
to summon her “resolution” to despise great princes again. Urania’s argument recalls an 
earlier moment in the romance in which Pamphilia scornfully rejects Steriamus. When 
Steriamus confronts Pamphilia, he holds a mirror up to her face to show her the cause of 
his pain, but Pamphilia will yield to none of his desires: “She (with seeing her face, saw 
my cause of torment) said as little as I: onely taking the Glasse turn’d the other side, 
which was dull like my gaines, and with as much scorne and contempt, as could appeare 
in so much beauty (like as if the Sun would in spite shew himselfe in a storme), she turnd 
from me” (69). Urania suggests that the best way for Pamphilia to gain power is not to 
subvert Petrarchan conventions, claiming male constancy for herself, but to take control 
of the conventions of the mistress already available to her. Urania reminds Pamphilia of 
the appeal of the role of the Petrarchan mistress, suggesting that it has the potential to 
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empower as well as entrap women. Urania sees the promise of Pamphilia’s elusiveness; 
she suggests that she remain present enough to maintain the desire of suitors yet always 
retain the power to turn her suitors away. 
Pamphilia refutes Urania’s charges, ardently defending both love and constancy 
as virtues. She points out that she is not alone in her devotion to constancy, “that the 
wisest, bravest, and most excellent men have been lovers, and are subject to this passion” 
(469). She maintains constancy as a virtue worth protecting, portraying her body as a 
sanctuary to this ideal: “Pamphilia must be of a new composition before she can let such 
thoughts fall into her constant breast, which is a Sanctuary of zealous affection, and so 
well hath love instructed me, as I can never leave my master nor his precepts, but still 
maintaine a vertuous constancy” (470). Pamphilia’s intense devotion to this concept 
suggests that she draws pleasure—however perverse—from her constancy to 
Amphilanthus and that she constructs a virtuous identity from her very privation.  
Yet Urania opposes Pamphilia’s zeal by arguing that this attitude only further 
entraps those who bind themselves to it: 
“Tis pittie,” said Urania, “that ever that fruitlesse thing Constancy was 
taught you as a vertue, since for vertues sake you will love it, as having true 
possession of your soule, but understand, this vertue hath limits to hold it 
in, being a vertue, but thus that it is a vice in them that breake it, but those 
with whom it is broken, are by the breach free to leave or choose again 
where more staidnes may be found; besides tis a dangerous thing to hold 
that opinion, which in time will prove flat heresie.” (470) 
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Urania posits “virtue” and “vice” as relative rather than absolute terms. Virtues, she 
claims, exist only because of the limits that make them so, and vices are only what virtues 
arbitrarily exclude. She urges Pamphilia to stop defining herself so narrowly, and she 
sees the destructiveness of those who confine themselves to lives of misery in the name 
of constancy. Urania is confident that the value of constancy will come under public 
scrutiny and eventually “prove flat heresie.”  
Wroth leaves it unclear who wins the debate. On the one hand, both Urania and 
Pamphilia present compelling testimony. Urania’s logic seems to sear through the 
emotional turbidity of Pamphilia’s feelings for Amphilanthus, yet Pamphilia’s devotion 
to her “Sanctuary of zealous affection” seems admirably to defy Urania’s cynicism. On 
the other hand, both women problematize their arguments. Although many of Urania’s 
points are cogent critiques of Pamphilia’s solipsistic behavior, others appear specious. 
She scolds Pamphilia, for instance, for letting her beauty fade because of her constancy: 
“beautie is besides a vertue counted among men of that excellent worth, as it wil draw 
their hearts as Adamants doe Iron: yet in this the comparison is not so proper, their hearts 
too tender to resist an easier invitement, but I say beauty will sooner compasse ones 
desires in love, then any other vertue, since that is the attractive power” (468). Although 
Urania rightly points to the self-destruction that results from Pamphilia’s constancy—her 
conspicuous absence—she also suggests that beauty—her fully present body—is the only 
way to remain attractive to other men. For Urania, the big loss for Pamphilia is her place 
in the love market, and she advises her to guard her “attractive power.”  
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Yet Pamphilia’s defense of constancy also poses problems for the reader. 
Pamphilia once again identifies herself as a martyr, suggesting that she has locked herself 
into a masochistic state of misery: “I am so wholy his as it is past mistaking, the wound 
being given mee deepely by his unkindnes which martyrs mee” (470). Pamphilia’s logic 
seems circular as she tries to explain why she remains constant to Amphilanthus:  
To leave him for being false, would shew my love was not for his sake, but 
mine owne, that because he loved me, I therefore loved him, but when hee 
leaves I can doe so to. O no deere Cousen I loved him for himselfe, and 
would have loved him had hee not loved mee, and will love though he 
dispise me; this is true love (470) 
Pamphilia claims that her love is for “his sake,” yet it is unchanging despite 
Amphilanthus’s reaction. Therefore, her love cannot be for him if he does not respond to 
it; it can be only for her own pleasure or pain. Her claim that her love for Amphilanthus 
is for him alone seems delusional, and her constancy appears a misguided fantasy rather 
than just a steadfast love. 
The end of the debate leaves unresolved, then, exactly what constancy means and 
how virtuous it is. Wroth’s inclusion of a humanist debate unveils the complexity of a 
term that might otherwise be taken at face value in Petrarchan discourse, and it also 
reveals the place of women in this discourse to be contested rather than fixed. 
Pamphilia’s uncertain roles—as constant lover or Petrarchan mistress, as in control of her 
emotions or controlled by them, as devoted to constancy or devoted to pride—suggest 
that her relationship to constancy is always negotiated and tested. 
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Wroth includes another debate when Pamphilia and Amphilanthus go hunting and 
meet a shepherd boy who does not know their true identities. They prod him to find out 
what people think of Pamphilia as a queen and receive a remarkably candid response: 
she is upright and just, in her government mild, and loving to her subjects, 
she loves all good exercises as well abroad, as at home; shee hath indeed 
they say, a brave and manlike spirit, and wonderous wise shee is; yet for all 
these good parts, shee could not keepe out of Cupids clawes, but was 
mightily in love, and is still as it is mutterd about with a gallant man, a 
brave fighting man, for whose sake she refused all others, and lately the 
King of Celicia her next neighbor; but for all her wisdome, there I believe 
she was ill advised to refuse him, for he came with such an Army against 
her, to have her by force, as had like to have marrd all (570-71) 
The shepherd takes constancy out of its narcissism and reminds Pamphilia that her love 
life has material consequences for her people. While in Pamphilia to Amphilanthus, 
Pamphilia’s constancy affects only her and perhaps (as her last sonnet suggests) future 
sonnet writers, in the Urania, her constancy has political implications. The shepherd is 
particularly critical of her recent decision to turn down the King of Celicia, who 
aggressively pursued her hand in marriage. The shepherd worries that her rejection of 
him will lead to a war and an occupation; while Pamphilia may suffer emotionally for her 
unfulfilled love for Amphilanthus, the shepherd suggests that her people will suffer 
physically from the bloodshed of war. 
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Like Urania’s challenge to Pamphilia’s constancy, the shepherd’s blunt remarks 
shatter the idea that constancy is universally revered. Although the shepherd initially 
insists that “no pride dwells in” Pamphilia, he also suggests that her constancy produces 
quite selfish behavior: “‘for mine owne part I would the Queen were of our mind’ 
(whereat they [Pamphilia and Amphilanthus] both laughed); ‘for I protest,’ said he, ‘I 
thinke varietie the sweetest pleasure under Heaven, and constancy the foolishest 
unprofitable whining vertue’” (571). Wroth highlights the distance that constancy fosters 
between Pamphilia and her people; Pamphilia’s and Amphilanthus’s condescending 
laughter implies that the shepherd’s remarks are not being taken seriously. Yet Wroth’s 
inclusion of the shepherd’s scathing criticism reinforces the possibility that constancy 
may have damaging consequences. As in the debate between Urania and Pamphilia, 
Wroth does not definitively resolve the issue here, but she does emphasize that constancy 
is contested, not unanimously admired. 
 
Constancy and Romance Conventions 
Far from a universal Petrarchan virtue, constancy is a concept that just does not 
work in the romance setting. Two of the episodes in the Urania that most highlight 
romance conventions—the rescue at the Throne of Love at the close of book 1 and the 
vision at the Hell of Deceit near the end of book 3—both invoke constancy as an ideal 
and suggest that it is incompatible with romance. Constancy emerges in the Urania as a 
construct strained by the romance conventions of the marvelous, narrative deferral, and 
resistance to closure.  
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The climactic episode of the first book is Pamphilia’s rescue of the ladies trapped 
in the Throne of Love, and in this incident, Wroth posits constancy both as a saving grace 
and as an ideal that falls apart. At the Throne of Love, located on an island with people of 
“barbarousnes” (46), there are three towers: the Tower of Love, represented by Cupid; 
the Tower of Desire, represented by Venus; and the Tower of Constancy, represented by 
the female figure Constancy herself, who is “holding in her hand the Keyes of the 
Pallace” (48). When a group of characters are shipwrecked on this island, they drink from 
the river, which awakens passions within them, and several of them, including Urania and 
Selarina, get locked in the towers. Like Lipsius, Wroth draws from humanist ideas by 
opposing constancy to the “affections”: love and desire. According to an “aged Man,” 
only “the valiantest Knight”—or Amphilanthus—and “the loyallest Lady”—or 
Pamphilia—can “open that gate, when all these Charmes shal have conclusion” (48-49). 
Wroth thus suggests that constancy can triumph over affection and that the relationship 
between these two characters can set right the petty passions of the other characters. 
And on some level, that is what happens when Pamphilia and Amphilanthus come 
to the Throne of Love and release the prisoners. Yet the separation between constancy 
and other affections seems less secure when the two characters who most painfully desire 
each other come together: 
Both then at once extremely loving, and love in extremity in them, made 
the Gate flie open to them, who passed to the last Tower, where Constancy 
stood holding the keyes, which Pamphilia tooke; at which instant 
Constancy vanished, as metamorphosing her self into her breast. (169) 
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Rather than a stable figure, Constancy is fleeting, able to be “metamorphosed” into 
Pamphilia’s breast. While critics often interpret this moment as one in which Pamphilia 
becomes constancy herself,
31
 the ephemeral nature of constancy is unsettling. 
Interestingly, authority over Pamphilia and Amphilanthus at this moment comes from 
love, not constancy. When Constancy vanishes, they make their way into a garden of 
love, where they hear a voice instructing Pamphilia to release all the ladies and 
Amphilanthus to release all the knights:  
Loyallest, and therefore most incomparable Pamphilia, release the Ladies, 
who must to your worth, with all other of your sexe, yeeld right 
preheminence: and thou Amphilanthus, the valliantest and worthiest of thy 
sexe, give freedome to the Knights, who with all other, must confesse thee 
matchlesse; and thus is Love by love and worth released. (169-70) 
Love, however, is what supposedly got the prisoners into this mess in the first place, and 
Wroth blurs love, desire, and constancy, which had previously been made distinct. 
Pamphilia and Amphilanthus’s “extremity” in their love suggests that they are figures of 
passion rather than moderation and restraint. Their constancy seems more a performance 
of grandeur rather than a concept much different from the desire the prisoners had 
displayed. In the same breath, Wroth conceives of Pamphilia and Amphilanthus both as 
exceptional and as bound to the same base desires as everyone else. 
In this episode, Wroth imagines constancy both as a magical solution to 
everyone’s love problems and as an ephemeral fantasy. As much as the allegorical figure 
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 Beilin, Redeeming Eve, writes, “The very virtue itself now has its seat in Pamphilia’s heart, inextricably 
tying her future course to its precepts” (219-20). 
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Constancy seems to provide stasis and closure, Wroth quickly pulls the narrative back 
into the romance mode of delay and digression. Book 1 ends not with the triumph of 
constancy, but with another sea voyage after Polarchos implores Amphilanthus and his 
party to help him win his desired Princess of Rhodes:  
then the banquet ended, they tooke leave of the kind King of Ciprus, and 
his company, all the rest taking ship with Pamphilia, sailing directly to 
Rodes, where they received unspeakable welcome, being feasted there 
eight dayes together, and for show of their true welcome, the Duke of that 
Iland bestowed his consent for the marriage of his daughter, with her long 
beloved friend Polarchos, whose joy and content was such, as the other 
amorous Knights wish to know. Then tooke they their leaves of the Duke, 
and all the Rodean Knights and Ladies, taking their way to Delos, 
Polarchos promising within short time to attend them in Morea. (174) 
In the Urania, constancy cannot stand still for long. Like Pamphilia’s declaration, “let me 
be ordaind, or licensed to be the true patterne of true constancy” (244), much of the 
romance is in the subjunctive mood: a promise, a journey, a wish. Fulfillment usually 
leads to separation, and Wroth suggests that rather than just a passive mode of 
acceptance, constancy is, as Langius states, a “high-way,” or an ideal always in process.  
In a later episode, Pamphilia’s encounter with the Hell of Deceit, Wroth shows 
even more skepticism toward the ability of constancy to exist in romance. This episode 
begins when Pamphilia and Amphilanthus get separated on a hunting trip. Although 
Pamphilia initially thinks she has been abandoned again, dreaming that Amphilanthus 
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leaves her for Lucenia, when she goes out searching for him, she traces a trail of fresh 
blood and finds Amphilanthus’s armor cut to pieces, next to a slain boar and a slain 
gentleman. She believes that Amphilanthus has been killed, but when Polarchos enters, 
they put Amphilanthus’s armor on a series of stones, and the scene is magically 
transformed into the Hell of Deceit. Pamphilia pulls on an iron ring that appears and 
watches amazed at what she sees: 
at last she saw Musalina sitting in a Chaire of Gold, a Crowne on her head, 
and Lucenia holding a sword, which Musalina tooke in her hand, and 
before them Amphilanthus was standing, with his heart ript open, and 
Pamphilia written in it, Musalina ready with the point of the sworde to 
conclude all, by razing that name out, and so his heart as the wound to 
perish. (583) 
At this climactic moment of the romance, Wroth invokes the image she has used all along 
to represent the suffering of love: the constant martyr. Like Pamphilia at the beginning of 
the sonnet sequence, whose heart is martyred, Amphilanthus stands ready to lose his 
heart if Pamphilia’s rivals raze out her name.  
Yet Amphilanthus is of course not constant at all, and Wroth makes it clear that 
this space of the Hell of Deceit—the epitome of the romantic marvelous—has no room 
for constancy. When Pamphilia tries to enter to save Amphilanthus, she is thrown out: 
Faine she would, nay there was no remedy, but she would goe in to helpe 
him, flames, fier, Hell it selfe not being frightfull enough to keepe her from 
passing through to him; so with as firme, and as hot flames as those she 
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saw, and more bravely and truly burning, she ran into the fire, but presently 
she was throwne out again in a swound, and the doore shut; when she came 
to her selfe, cursing her destinie, meaning to attempt againe, shee saw the 
stone whole, and where the way into it was, there were these words written. 
Faithfull lovers keepe from hence 
None but false ones here can enter: 
This conclusion that from whence 
Falsehood flowes: and such may venter. (583-84) 
As Pamphilia is barred entrance, Wroth suggests that constancy is literally thrown out of 
the romance universe. Pamphilia desperately wants to be the constant heroine that can 
save Amphilanthus from his erotic threats, yet the narrative will not allow her to play that 
role. The romance instead relegates her to a passive observer, excluded from the very 
passionate mode that seemingly brought her into being.  
Both Pamphilia and Amphilanthus and the Urania end with declarations of 
constancy. Yet the magical, unreal quality of the romance casts doubts on the efficacy of 
constancy, suggesting that it may be just a temporary fiction rather than an enduring 
ideal. In the last pages of the first part of the Urania, Pamphilia is reunited with 
Amphilanthus in a moment that seems to prepare the reader for triumphant closure. The 
scene begins when Pamphilia goes to a stream, dropping her tears into it as she mourns 
the loss of Amphilanthus: 
so farre shee went till shee came to a dainty Spring, issuing out of a stony 
banke upon pibbles, and making on them a murmuring, sweetely dolefull 
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tune, cleere the water was running on gravell; and such was fit for her 
cleere eyes to looke upon, weepe shee did, teares falling into the streame, 
not much increasing the bignes of it, though abundantly they fell, but 
certainely inriching it with rare sweetnes, and dropping into it such vertue 
as appeared after in some that dranke of it, for at that very instant there 
arrived a Knight armed on horsebacke (659-60) 
Wroth’s description of their reunion creates an enchanted scene in which Pamphilia’s 
teardrops make the water into a magical potion that initiates Amphilanthus’s 
appearance—seemingly out of thin air. Pamphilia and Amphilanthus passionately 
embrace each other, “forgiving, nay forgeting all injuries” (660). The stream becomes 
like the river of Lethe, inducing the lovers to forget themselves. 
Wroth suggests that their reunion is almost too perfect to be true. As they 
embrace, Wroth uses the term constancy for the last time in the first part of the romance: 
never was such affection exprest, never so truly felt, to the company, they 
together returned, he leading her, or rather imbracing her with his 
conquering armes, and protesting the water he dranke being mixed with her 
teares, had so infused constancy and perfect truth of love in it, as in him it 
had wrought the like effect. (660) 
Reminiscent of the lovers who drink from the river on the island, “whereof they had but 
drunk, when in them several Passions did instantly abound” (49), Amphilanthus’s 
constancy stems from the magically infused water. Wroth suggests that in order for 
Pamphilia to get Amphilanthus to exhibit constancy, she must drug him, putting him 
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under the spell of her charmed tears. Far from a fortified inner strength, constancy is an 
enchanted fiction in romance, a fleeting “effect” rather than an unchanging ideal. 
And Wroth suggests that this effect may not last long. In her famous mid-sentence 
ending to the romance, Pamphilia and Amphilanthus set off for yet another journey, 
preparing for their next inevitable separation: 
this still continuing all living in pleasure, speech is of the Germans journey, 
Amphilanthus must goe, but intreates Pamphilia to goe as far as Italy with 
him, to visit the matchles Queene his mother, she consents, for what can 
she denye him? all things are prepared for the journey, all now merry, 
contented, nothing amisse; greife forsaken, sadnes cast off, Pamphilia is the 
Queene of all content; Amphilanthus joying worthily in her; And (661) 
The constancy this couple displays—and that Wroth so insistently proclaims—is at odds 
with the forward motion of the journey on which they are about to embark as well as the 
concluding coordinating conjunction “And.”
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 Wroth’s incomplete sentence thrusts the 
narrative into another (still incomplete) second part of the romance, in which Pamphilia 
and Amphilanthus do not marry despite their promise to do so. Both marry other 
characters, straining their professed constancy to its breaking point. 
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finishing what you started” (185); Graham Parry, “Lady Mary Wroth’s Urania,” Proceedings of the Leeds 
Philosophical and Literary Society 21, no. 4 (1975): 51-60, who argues that the ending of the Urania is an 
imitation of the incomplete ending of Sidney’s Arcadia; and Josephine Roberts, “Textual Introduction,” in 
The First Part of the Countess of Montgomery’s Urania, cv-cxx. 
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In the end, constancy in the Urania is illusory. Wroth’s narrative exposes both the 
contradictions in the term that fray its coherence and the fictions that stitch it together. 
From a bodily sign that must be perpetually displayed to an inner stoic virtue that can 
never be proven to a magical ideal that can never exist, constancy eludes the reader even 
as it is obsessively declared. When the reader turns the pages to the sonnets, he or she 
brings to them a loaded term, one that does not sit well with Pamphilia’s claim at the end 
of her sequence—like so many Petrarchan lovers that came before her—that she will 
prove her constancy. Wroth shows the complicated history of that performative utterance, 
dispelling the seemingly fixed identity that sonnet speakers so often claim.
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CONCLUSION 
 
Mary Wroth was one of the last writers in the early modern period to write a 
Petrarchan sonnet sequence, and she is often regarded as a throwback to a tradition whose 
heyday has already passed. Yet this dissertation has argued that Petrarchism in England 
was never a discourse confined to the sonnet writing of the sixteenth century. Instead, it 
proved a much more flexible set of conventions that were transformed and shaped by the 
discourses with which it came into contact. Writers used Petrarchan conventions 
throughout the early modern period to navigate power struggles, to declare or contest 
authenticity, to settle crises of authority, and, of course, to wrestle with desire and gender 
identity. Wroth’s engagement with Petrarchism both in verse and in prose fiction is only 
the beginning of Petrarchan writing in the seventeenth century. From George Herbert’s 
and John Milton’s religious sonnets to the narratives of Margaret Cavendish and Aphra 
Behn, later writers continue to invoke Petrarchan conventions to grapple with their own 
religious, social, and colonial concerns. More work remains to be done on the 
implications of Petrarchan conventions in later texts like these. 
It is my hope that this dissertation opens up a conversation about the complex 
uses of Petrarchism in early modern England, particularly the wide range of possibilities 
for the role of the mistress. As the texts of Askew, Elizabeth I, Shakespeare, and Wroth 
demonstrate, the conventions of the mistress had the potential to constrict women, but 
they also had the capacity to give women a sense of authority, authenticity, erotic power, 
and pleasure—even if these were only fleeting. More than an assemblage of body parts, 
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the figure of the Petrarchan mistress proved a performative role that was appropriated in a 
multitude of contexts, genres, and discourses. This dissertation has explored some of the 
representational possibilities that Petrarchan conventions enabled for women in the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries—from Reformist to queen—and seeks to 
encourage further study on this generative discourse in the early modern period and 
beyond. 
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